Tilford v. Wayne County General Hospital, Docket No. 58645

• Decision Date: 30 August 1978
• Docket Number: Docket No. 58645,No. 10,10
• Citation: 269 N.W.2d 153,403 Mich. 293
• Parties: Jane TILFORD and Foster Tilford, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WAYNE COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 153

269 N.W.2d 153

403 Mich. 293

Jane TILFORD and Foster Tilford, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WAYNE COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 58645.

Calendar No. 10.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 4, 1978.

Decided Aug. 30, 1978.

Lopatin, Miller, Bindes, Freedman & Bluestone by Michael Gagleard, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Aloysius J. Suchy, Corp. Counsel, County of Wayne, David J. Curran, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Detroit, for defendant-appellee Wayne County General Hospital.

FITZGERALD, Justice.

According to the complaint in this case, on February 17, 1971, Jane Tilford slipped and fell on a patch of ice as she was entering Wayne County General Hospital and, as a result, sustained serious and permanent injuries. The fall allegedly occurred on an entrance walk leading from the parking lot to the hospital.

On May 9, 1975, despite having earlier denied a motion for summary judgment, the trial judge granted defendant's motion for a summary judgment of dismissal on the basis of governmental immunity. On June 17, 1976, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. This Court granted plaintiffs' application for leave to appeal on April 29, 1977. 399 Mich. 894 (1977).

Plaintiffs raise five issues on appeal:

1) Whether the entrance walk of a public building comes within the "public buildings" exception of the governmental immunity statute, M.C.L. § 691.1406; M.S.A. § 3.996(106).

2) Whether the operation of a municipally owned hospital providing medical services for a fee is a proprietary function.

3) Whether the governmental immunity statute violates due process guarantees contained in the United States and Michigan Constitutions.

4) Whether the governmental immunity statute violates equal protection guarantees contained in the United States and Michigan Constitutions.

5) Whether the governmental immunity statute is social legislation which has outlived any legitimate state purpose it may have had.

We reverse on the basis of the first issue and remand for trial.

"PUBLIC BUILDINGS" EXCEPTION

The general grant of immunity to governmental agencies is provided by M.C.L. § 691.1407; M.S.A. § 3.996(107), which reads as follows "Except as in this act otherwise provided, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. Except as otherwise provided herein, this act shall not be construed as modifying or restricting the immunity of the state from tort liability as it existed heretofore, which immunity is affirmed."

To this general grant of immunity, the Legislature provided the "public buildings" exception. M.C.L. § 691.1406; M.S.A. § 3.996(106) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

"Governmental agencies have the obligation to Repair and Maintain public buildings under their Control when open for use by members of the public. Governmental agencies are liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from a Dangerous or defective condition of a public building * * *. (Emphasis added.)

Defendant argues that since Mrs. Tilford was injured on the entrance to its public building, her claim for recovery under the "public buildings" exception of the governmental immunity statute is barred. Defendant would have us hold that the "public buildings" exception is limited to the "specific physical structure" of the building itself.

In Pichette v. Manistique Public Schools, Mich., 269 N.W.2d 143 (1978), released today, we examined the scope of the "public buildings" exception. In that case, plaintiff was injured on a defective slide on the playground of defendant's school. We rejected the narrow construction of the "public buildings" exception advanced by defendants in Pichette, as we do in the instant case:

"(W)e find that such a narrow construction of the 'public buildings' exception conflicts with what we perceive to be the purpose of M.C.L. 691.1406; M.S.A. 3.996(106). We believe that in providing for the three exceptions to the general grant of immunity contained in M.C.L. 691.1407; M.S.A. 3.996(107), the Legislature intended to protect the general public from injury by imposing upon governmental agencies the duty to maintain safe public places, whether such places are public highways or public buildings.

"Accordingly, we find it of little importance that the slide upon which plaintiff in the instant case was injured was not Itself a public building or was on the premises of a public building rather than inside the building. To be sure, Jeffrey Pichette would not have encountered the dangerous condition which led to his injuries but for the existence of defendant's school. To bar plaintiff recovery because he was injured by a defective condition on the premises of a public building, which were under the control of the governmental entity, rather than Inside the building, would have no basis either in logic or justice." Mich., 269 N.W.2d 143 (1978).

In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged that Mrs. Tilford sustained serious and permanent injuries from a slip and fall on a patch of ice on the walk leading to the entrance of defendant's hospital. The premises relating to the public's ingress to and egress from a public building, which are under the exclusive control of the governmental agency, are inextricably connected with the public building itself. Therefore, we find that plaintiffs in the case at bar stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.

We do not find it necessary to address the remaining issues plaintiffs raise on appeal since we find that an entrance walk of a public building under the control of the governmental agency comes within the "public buildings" exception of the governmental immunity statute, M.C.L. § 691.1406; M.S.A. § 3.996(106).

The Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed. We remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

No costs, a public question being involved.

KAVANAGH, C. J., and LEVIN, J., concur.

WILLIAMS, Justice (concurring).

I concur with Justice Fitzgerald; see my concurrence in Pichette v. Manistique Public Schools, Mich., 269 N.W.2d 143 (1978).

MOODY, Justice, concurring.

I agree with Justice Fitzgerald's analysis that "the entrance walk of a public building under the control of the governmental agency comes within the 'public buildings' exception of the governmental immunity statute". M.C.L. § 691.1406; M.S.A. § 3.996(106). Insofar as Pichette v. Manistique Public Schools, Mich., 269 N.W.2d 143 (1978), stands for this proposition, I concur. See Pichette, supra, Blair Moody, Jr., J. (concurring).

RYAN, Justice, concurring.

The complaint in this case alleges that defendant was negligent in the maintenance of a walkway on its hospital premises.

A. Governmental Function

The resolution of the issues presented requires an initial determination of whether the operation of a public hospital is a governmental function for purposes of the governmental immunity statute, M.C.L. § 691.1407; M.S.A. § 3.996(107). That statute provides:

"Except as in this act otherwise provided, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. Except as otherwise provided herein, this act shall not be construed as modifying or restricting the immunity of the state from tort liability as it existed heretofore, which immunity is affirmed."

In Thomas v. Dept. of State Highways, 398 Mich. 1, 10, 247 N.W.2d 530 (1976), the majority noted that the historical context in which the foregoing statute was enacted suggests that the Legislature intended to codify the state's existing common law or judge-made immunity and to restore the immunity of municipalities as it existed prior to the 1961 decision of Williams v. Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).

At common law, the expression "governmental function" was the term of art which both described the nature and defined the limits of state and municipal immunity from tort liability. By employing that same term of art in creating statutory immunity, the Legislature appears to have directed the courts to look to the common law for guidance in determining whether, in a given case, a governmental agency is exercising or discharging a "governmental function" for purposes of the immunity statute.

Reference to the pre-statutory immunity cases discloses that in Martinson v. Alpena, 328 Mich. 595, 44 N.W.2d 148 (1950), this Court held that the operation of a public hospital to promote the general public health is indeed a governmental function. Moreover, it seems evident that the operation of a public hospital is within the frequently cited "common good of all" definition...