Tiller v. Com.
| Decision Date | 10 March 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 3915,3915 |
| Citation | 193 Va. 418,69 S.E.2d 441 |
| Parties | CURTIS ELMER TILLER v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. Record |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
B. F. Sutherland and S.H. & Geo. C. Sutherland, for the plaintiff in error.
J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General, D. Gardiner Tyler, Jr., Assistant Attorney General and H. Coleman McGehee, Jr., for the Commonwealth.
The plaintiff in error, Curtis Elmer Tiller, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, was convicted by the trial justice of Dickenson county of operating an overloaded motor vehicle in violation of section 46-334 of the Code of Virginia, 1950. 1 The defendant appealed to the Circuit Court of Dickenson county where the case was tried de novo before the judge without a jury. He was again convicted and to that judgment he has obtained a writ of error.
It is stipulated and agreed between the parties that the defendant was operating the White truck in question on a State highway in Dickenson county and that the truck with its load had a gross weight of 26,600 pounds. The combined weight on both front wheels was 5,900 pounds and the combined weight on both rear dual wheels was 20,700 pounds.
The defendant claims that the trial court erred in its judgment because the evidence fails to show that the gross weight of the truck exceeded 35,000 pounds and since, as he contends, the truck was a six wheel vehicle there was no violation of the statute. Furthermore, he claims that the evidence does not show that there was more than 16,000 pounds of weight transmitted through any axle. He also contends that section 46-334 of the Code is unconstitutional and void because it violates the Constitution of the United States, Amend. XIV, § 1.
The defendant's objections arise from the fact that his definitions of certain words appearing in Code section 46-334 differ from the definitions of those same words by the Commonwealth. When the legislature framed this statute, it had in mind a particular definition for each word used and it is our function to interpret the meaning of the words in controversy as intended by the legislature. Unless there is ambiguity in a statute, there is no need for interpretation, for the province of construction lies wholly within the domain of ambiguity. Cason v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 297, 24 S.E. (2d) 435; Hammer v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 355, 193 S.E. 496.
The first question for decision is, how many axles did the truck have within the meaning of Code section 46-334? The defendant contends that since the rear wheels on each side are attached to separate shafts, there are two axles under the rear of the truck. If this is the correct meaning of 'axle', the defendant has not violated the statutory provision limiting the maximum gross weight on the road surface through any axle to 16,000 pounds.
In construing a statute the cardinal rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature constitutes the law, and the primary object in the interpretation of a statute is to ascertain that intention. Anglin v. Joyner, 181 Va. 660, 26 S.E. (2d) 58.
When a penal statute is involved, the legislative intent is, in most cases, to be found by giving to the words the meaning in which they are used in ordinary speech. Gates & Son Co. v. Richmond, 103 Va. 702, 49 S.E. 965.
The construction and maintenance of highways in this State involves the expenditure of vast sums of money and it is obvious that the purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute herein involved was to prevent injury to roads and bridges and to promote the safety of persons traveling over the highways by prohibiting the use on the public highways of vehicles of excessive weight. One of the primary means to achieve this result has been the enactment of legislation to regulate and control the size and weight of vehicles using the highways, and Code section 46-334 is a part of this legislative scheme.
Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1951) defines 'axle' as follows: * * * ' (Italics supplied).
The defendant's White truck was equipped with a single reduction, full floating rear axle.
It is plain from Webster's definition that 'axle' in its ordinary sense and acceptation means the assembly of housing and axle shafts which support and propel the wheels. The definition repeatedly refers to wheels (plural) and to the weight-carrying member and propelling members (plural), or concentric axle shafts. What the defendant defines as 'axle' is what the dictionary refers to as 'shaft' and that is only a part of the entire assembly embraced within the word 'axle' as defined above.
Any other definition would do violence to the obvious intention of the legislature to limit the weight of vehicles using the publc highways. If the defendant's definition were applied, the ordinary four wheel motor vehicle with a conventional rear-end assembly could lawfully carry a gross weight on the rear of 32,000 pounds (16,000 pounds per 'axle'), whereas the statute itself limits the gross weight of four wheel vehicles to 24,000 pounds.
Any doubt on this point is immediately dispelled by that part of the statute which says that 'No two axles shall lie in the same vertical plane, nor shall the spacing be less than forty inches from center to center. ' The meaning of this sentence is clear and unambiguous. Any number of axles in the same vertical plane or any number of axles spaced less than forty inches apart is to be considered as a single axle in computing the gross weight transmitted to the road surface through such axles. Even if the defendant's definition of 'axle' were adopted, the effect of the statute would be the same because the two axles, as defined by him, being in the same vertical plane would still be considered as one axle within the expressed language of the statute. We must conclude that the defendant's position on this...
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Fairfax v. CBS Broad. Inc.
...(2003). Consequently, Virginia courts apply the plain language of a statute unless the terms are ambiguous, Tiller v. Commonwealth , 193 Va. 418, 420, 69 S.E. 2d 441, 442 (1952), or applying the plain language would lead to an absurd result, Cummings v. Fulghum , 261 Va. 73, 77, 540 S.E. 2d......
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Auer v. Com.
...that "it is our function to interpret the meaning of the words in controversy as intended by the legislature." Tiller v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 418, 420, 69 S.E.2d 441, 442 (1952). However, "unless there is ambiguity in a statute, there is no need for interpretation, for the province of cons......
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...must govern, and such intent may be found by giving to the words used their ordinary and usual meaning. Tiller v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 418, 420, 69 S. E. 2d 441, 443; Northrop & Wickham v. Richmond, 105 Va. 335, 339, 53 S. E. 962, 963; Gates & Son Co. v. Richmond, 103 Va. 702, 706, 707, 49......
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McGlone v. Superior Trucking Co., Inc.
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