Tillett v. Carlin, Civ. No. H-84-1238(MJB).

• Decision Date: 16 May 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. No. H-84-1238(MJB).
• Citation: Tillett v. Carlin, 637 F.Supp. 251 (D. Conn. 1986)
• Parties: Mary TILLETT v. Paul CARLIN, in his official capacity as Postmaster General of the United States.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

637 F. Supp. 251

Mary TILLETT v. Paul CARLIN, in his official capacity as Postmaster General of the United States.

Civ. No. H-84-1238(MJB).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

May 16, 1986.

Jonathan L. Gould, Ruth L. Pulda, Kestell, Pogue & Gould, Hartford, Conn., for plaintiff.

Leslie Ohta, Asst. U.S. Atty., New Haven, Conn., Howard J. Kaufman, Office of Labor Law, U.S. Postal Service, Washington, D.C., for defendant.

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BLUMENFELD, Senior District Judge.

The plaintiff, Mary Tillett, brings this action for declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief against the Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service for acts of employment discrimination and retaliation allegedly committed against her while she was a Postal Service employee.

Background

On November 26, 1984, the plaintiff, a black female, filed a complaint in this court alleging that the defendant violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, by discriminating against her on the basis of race. The complaint, which was based on charges the plaintiff had filed with the EEOC, alleged that the defendant discriminated against her when he issued her a letter of reprimand in May 1983 and that this letter was part of a continuing pattern of retaliation against her for filing charges with the EEOC in prior instances.

The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative, for summary judgment, on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies in a timely manner.

The plaintiff then amended her complaint on January 30, 1985, alleging additional acts of retaliation in the defendant's failure to promote her on three occasions in 1984. On March 6, 1985, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, or in the alternative, for summary judgment.

On March 20, 1985, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion regarding the original complaint, and requested an extension of time to respond to the motion to dismiss her amended complaint. The request was based in part on the plaintiff's assertion that the defendant's two motions to dismiss were grounded on the same legal theory and that the court's decision on the defendant's first motion would in all likelihood be dispositive of the remaining motion. The plaintiff's request was granted.

Thereafter, on August 5, 1985, this court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the original complaint. Tillett v. Carlin, 637 F.Supp. 245 (D. Conn.1985) (Ruling on Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Aug. 5, 1985) ("Tillett I"). That ruling was based on the plaintiff's failure to comply with the 15-day time limit for filing a formal complaint of employment discrimination with the employing agency. That failure to exhaust administrative remedies was held to preclude the plaintiff from bringing suit on the claims of discrimination and retaliation contained in her original complaint.

Following that ruling, which reserved decision on the three instances of failure to promote raised in the amended complaint, the plaintiff submitted a memorandum in opposition to defendant's pending motion to dismiss or for summary judgment as to the amended complaint. Defendant replied on October 1, 1985.

Discussion

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., federal agencies and their employees, including the Postal Service, are subject to the rules and regulations set forth in section 717 of the Act. Pursuant to section 717 of the Act, the EEOC has adopted regulations detailing the requirements for filing a timely complaint of employment discrimination with the employing agency. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.211 et seq.

Plaintiff advances two major arguments in opposition to this second motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. In her first argument, already addressed and rejected by this court in Tillett I, she challenges the validity of two of the EEOC administrative regulations imposing time limitations on the complaint process. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.214(a)(1)(i) and (ii). In her second argument, she urges the court to interpret the language of one of these regulations in a way that would result in her having met its deadline.

1. Validity of the Administrative Regulations

The EEOC regulations that the plaintiff challenges require an aggrieved federal employee seeking relief for alleged employment discrimination to bring the matter or personnel action to the attention of an Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") counselor within 30 days of the matter or action, 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(1)(i), and in addition, to file a formal, written complaint with the employing agency within 15 days of the final EEO interview, 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(1)(ii).

Plaintiff concedes that she did not meet the 15-day requirement but argues that her admitted failure to exhaust the requisite administrative remedies should be overlooked because the administrative regulations imposing these time limitations are invalid. She rests this claim of invalidity on the premise that the administrative time limits are inconsistent with the scheme and purpose of Title VII.

This argument was considered at some length and rejected in Tillett I. Plaintiff has not presented any new analysis or precedents but simply asks the court to reconsider its prior ruling.

As stated in that ruling, these administrative regulations promulgated by the EEOC pursuant to statutory authority are entitled to great judicial deference absent a showing that they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the delegating statute. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R. D.C., Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Plaintiff has made no such showing.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that section 717 of Title VII provides for a careful blend of administrative and judicial enforcement powers, including "rigorous administrative exhaustion requirements and time limitations." Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 833, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1968, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976). Since the Brown decision, courts have consistently held that the failure to meet time limits during the administrative stages of filing a formal complaint is grounds for dismissing the action. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States Postal Service, 752 F.2d 410 (9th Cir.1985); Bickham v. Miller, 584 F.2d 736 (5th Cir.1978); Keene v. Costle, 589 F.Supp. 687 (E.D.Pa. 1984); Bright v. Butler, 37 Fair Emp.Prac. Cas. 782 (D.D.C.1985).

The plaintiff has identified no case in which a court has held invalid the regulation here in question.¹ Given all of these circumstances, the ruling in Tillett I on the validity of these regulations is adhered to in deciding this motion. The 15-day time limit for filing a formal complaint is a valid administrative requirement of the EEOC.

2. Interpretation of Section 1613.214(a)(1)(i)

Plaintiff's second argument concerns the proper interpretation of the 30day limit contained in 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(1)(i), which provides in relevant part:

First, he must have brought the matter or personnel action to the attention of his EEO Counselor within thirty days of the matter or action.

Plaintiff's claims in this action are based on three instances where the defendant failed to promote her. She concedes that she did not bring these matters to the attention of her EEO counselor within 30 days of learning that she would not receive the promotions but contends...