Tillinghast v. Leppert

• Decision Date: 19 February 1919
• Citation: 93 Conn. 247,105 A. 615
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: TILLINGHAST v. LEPPERT.

105 A. 615

93 Conn. 247

TILLINGHAST v. LEPPERT.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

February 19, 1919

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; William S. Case, Judge.

Action by Harold W. Tillinghast against Charles H. Leppert.Judgment for plaintiff in treble the amount of the verdict, and defendant appeals.Error, judgment set aside, and cause remanded, with directions.

Where plaintiff's automobile was injured in a collision with defendant's automobile, and plaintiff in a single count set up independent causes of action under the common law under Motor Vehicle Act, Pub.Acts 1917, c. 333, § § 14, 22, and under Law of the Road, Pub.Acts 1917, c. 305 § 7, it was error to permit recovery on some one or more of such causes, and to award treble damages under chapter 305; it not appearing that verdict was based on such statute which alone authorized treble damages.

Harry W. Reynolds, of Hartford, for appellant.

Leonard O. Ryan, of Middletown, for appellee.

WHEELER, J.

The appeal presents the single question whether the court erred in its ruling trebling the actual damages of $150.

In a single count the complaint sets forth several independent causes of action, each seeking a single recovery for the same injury.The allegation of paragraph 3, that " the defendant carelessly and negligently collided with the automobile of the plaintiff," is that of the common-law cause of action of negligence.The allegation of paragraph 4, that " said defendant was operating his automobile in a careless and reckless manner, at a rate of speed greater than was necessary and proper, having regard to the width, traffic, and use of the highway, said collision taking place at a curve or sharp turn in the highway, posted with signs," is that of the cause of action based upon sections 14and22 of chapter 333 of the Public Acts of 1917, called the Motor Vehicle Act.The allegation of paragraph 5, that " the defendant carelessly and negligently failed on approaching said plaintiff to slacken his pace, and give a timely signal, and seasonably turn to the right to give the plaintiff half of the traveled path and a fair and equal opportunity to pass," is that of the cause of action based upon section 2, chapter 305, of the Public Acts of 1917, called the Law of the Road, supplemented by the words " and give a timely signal," taken from section 22 (b) of chapter 333 of the Public Acts of 1917.

The allegations of the complaint thus describe at least three independent causes of action, one upon the common-law rule of negligence, one upon the provisions of the Motor Vehicle statute, and one upon the statute denominated the Law of the Road.There is no rule of law and no statutory authority which authorizes a court to double or treble the damages awarded by court or jury for the causes of action set forth in this complaint, except as to the cause of action based upon chapter 305 of the Public Acts of 1917, and section 7 of this act does confer such authority.

The verdict was a general one; hence the presumption is that the jury found all issues for the plaintiff.Foster v. Smith, 52 Conn. 449, 451.The damages were limited by the charge of the court to compensation for the injury to the automobile, and should have been the same, whether one or all of the causes of action were found, because there was a single indivisible injury.

It would seem to follow logically that the actual damages found could not have been more, whether the verdict was on one or all of the causes of action alleged.Though this were plainly true in this case, it might not be so in another case, where several causes of action were joined in one complaint.

We have adopted certain rules governing actions seeking to recover double or treble damages under statutes.We require that the complaint shall clearly state such facts as will bring the case within the statute.Broschart v. Tuttle, 59 Conn. 1, 8, 21 A. 925, 11 L.R.A. 33.And we require that the claim for relief should be specifically based upon the...