Tilly v. Flippin
Citation | 237 F.2d 364 |
Decision Date | 12 September 1956 |
Docket Number | No. 5301,5302.,5301 |
Parties | Virginia L. TILLY, Administratrix of the Estate of A. L. Tilly, Deceased, Appellant, v. Joe FLIPPIN and Ferguson Steere Motor Company, a corporation, Appellees. Mary Ellen CARPENTER, Administratrix of the Estate of Arthur D. Carpenter, Jr., Deceased; Mary Ellen Carpenter, Administratrix of the Estate of James Arthur Carpenter, Deceased, Appellants, v. Joe FLIPPIN and Ferguson Steere Motor Company, a corporation, Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Caswell S. Neal, Carlsbad, N. M. (Stagner & Sage and Neal, Neumann & Neal, Carlsbad, N. M., were with him on the brief), for appellants.
Roy F. Miller, Jr., Albuquerque, N. M. (Merritt W. Oldaker, Albuquerque, N. M., was with him on the brief), for appellees.
Before HUXMAN, MURRAH, and PICKETT, Circuit Judges.
On August 21, 1954, the defendant Joe Flippin, in the course of his employment with the defendant Ferguson Steere Motor Company, a corporation, was operating a motor vehicle which collided with an automobile, resulting in the death of A. L. Tilly, Arthur D. Carpenter, Jr., and James Arthur Carpenter. Virginia L. Tilly, widow of A. L. Tilly, and Mary Ellen Carpenter, widow of Arthur D. Carpenter, Jr. and mother of James Arthur Carpenter, as administratrices, brought separate actions against Ferguson Steere Motor Company and Joe Flippin to recover damages under the general wrongful death statutes of New Mexico, § 22-20-1 and § 22-20-3, N.M.Stat.1943. After an investigation the plaintiffs determined that Flippin was operating the motor vehicle as a public conveyance for Ferguson Steere Motor Company, a common carrier, and conceded that as to it a cause of action was limited to the remedy provided for in the common carrier death statute, § 22-20-4, N.M.Stat.1953. The plaintiffs dismissed the actions as to Ferguson Steere Motor Company and the court sustained Flippin's motions to dismiss, leaving for disposition defendants' counterclaims. The widows then instituted actions to recover $10,000 for each death under the provisions of the common carrier death statute. All the cases, including counterclaims of the defendants, were consolidated for trial and a jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in all cases. Judgment for $10,000 was entered for plaintiffs in each of the three cases brought under § 22-20-4. No appeal was taken from these judgments.
In dismissing the actions against the defendant Flippin, the trial court was of the opinion that no cause of action exists in New Mexico against an employee-driver of a common carrier in a case of this nature. The sole question presented is whether the remedy provided for in § 22-20-4 is exclusive or if in addition a cause of action exists against a negligent employee-driver under the general death statute.
The applicable New Mexico statutes were enacted in 1882 as part of a general Act on damages. They read as follows:
The plaintiffs contend that § 22-20-1 creates a cause of action in all cases where death is caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another where the injured person would have had a cause of action had he survived, and that the driver of a common carrier public conveyance is not excluded from this section. It is said that the forfeiture provision of § 22-20-4 creates a cause of action for the benefit of different persons and for different plaintiffs; that the remedy is for different acts, omissions, or misconduct and for the recovery of different damages, both in amount and nature. The argument is plausible but we think the implications of the decisions by the New Mexico courts, and by this court, lead to the conclusion that the remedy provided for in § 22-20-4 is an exception to the general death statute and is exclusive when death is caused under facts bringing the case within that section. Apparently the New Mexico bench and bar have construed the section as the trial court did. The section has been on the New Mexico statute books for approximately seventy-five years, and so far as we know, no one has sought to recover from a negligent employee in addition to recovery from the common carrier. This is also true in Missouri and Colorado, from which the New Mexico statutes were taken, although the courts of each of those states, contrary to the New Mexico rule, have held that the remedy is not limited to the common carrier statute but the plaintiff may elect to proceed under either statute, but may not proceed under both sections. Jackson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 357 Mo. 998, 211 S.W.2d 931; Friedrichs v. Denver Tramway Corporation, 93 Colo. 539, 27 P.2d 497.
The statute was first considered by the territorial Supreme Court of New Mexico in Romero v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 11 N.M. 679, 72 P. 37, where the administrator brought suit to recover damages from a railroad company for the wrongful death of a person accidentally killed in the railroad yards. In holding that recovery was limited to the forfeiture section (now § 22-20-4), it was stated that at common law no action would lie for an injury caused by the death of a human being. It was said that "If a right of action now exists, therefore, it must be by virtue of legislative enactment." Referring to Missouri cases which had considered the statute of that state, the court stated that damages for a tort to a person resulting in death were not recoverable at common law; that where a statute gave a right of action and provided a remedy it could be maintained, subject only to the limitations and conditions imposed by the statute; that where a statute gives a cause of action which did not exist at common law and designated the persons who may sue, they alone may bring the action.1 The court concluded as follows:
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Langham v. Beech Aircraft Corp.
...death or to the 'owner' of the public conveyance. Beech was neither such 'employer' nor 'owner.' Although the issue in Tilly v. Flippin, 237 F.2d 364 (10th Cir. 1956), as in In re Reilly's Estate, supra, was broader than the one we are now considering, in that in those cases the issue also ......
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Schloss v. Matteucci, 5921.
...Mexico Supreme Court have construed this statute to exclude any liability of the negligent employee for the wrongful death. Tilly v. Flippin, 10 Cir., 237 F.2d 364, and In re Reilly's Estate, 63 N.M. 352, 319 P.2d 1069. Following this construction, the trial court awarded the statutory amou......
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Kilkenny v. Kenney
...of the Sixth Judicial District, 55 N.M. 135, 227 P.2d 937; Hogsett v. Hanna, 41 N.M. 22, 63 P.2d 540. To the same effect see Tilly v. Flippin, 10 Cir., 237 F.2d 364. Also see 16 Am.Jur. (Death) Sec. 197; Annotation 173 A.L.R. 750; and 34 Am.Jur. (Torts) Sec. 160. Thus, it is clear, as admit......
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Reilly's Estate, In re, 6199
...hold is a 'public conveyance'? We believe the question has been answered by the Federal Circuit Court of this District in Tilly v. Flippin, 10 Cir., 237 F.2d 364, 366, in which the Court '* * * the implications of the decision by the New Mexico courts, and by this court, lead to the conclus......