Tilson v. Tri-Cnty. Metro. Transp. Dist.
| Decision Date | 16 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:19-cv-108-SI |
| Parties | DOUG TILSON and DIANNA WILLIAMS, Plaintiffs, v. TRI-COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT OF OREGON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Andrew Altschul and Dana L. Sullivan, BUCHANAN ANGELI ALTSCHUL & SULLIVAN, LLP, 921 SW Washington Street, Suite 516, Portland, OR 97204; Steven G. Tidrick and Joel B. Young, THE TIDRICK LAW FIRM, 1300 Clay Street, Suite 600, Oakland, CA 94612. Of Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Victor J. Kisch and John B. Dudrey, STOEL RIVES, LLP, 760 SW Ninth Avenue, Suite 3000, Portland, OR 97205. Of Attorneys for Defendant.
Doug Tilson and Dianna Williams (collectively, "Plaintiffs") assert claims for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") against Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon ("Tri-Met" or "Defendant"). Plaintiffs allege that Tri-Met failed to include payments made to Plaintiffs under a "rail allowance" in calculating Plaintiffs' "regular rate" for purposes of determining Plaintiffs' overtime compensation. Plaintiff Tilson also asserts a derivative claim under Oregon Revised Statutes ("ORS") § 652.140 relating to payment of wages upon termination of employment, alleging that Tri-Met did not pay him all earned and unpaid wages upon his retirement because Tri-Met excluded the rail allowance payments from his FLSA overtime calculations before his retirement. The rail allowance relates to payments made by Tri-Met to compensate rail operators during certain shifts that begin and end at different physical locations, for the inconvenience caused by having differing shift start and stop locations. Tri-Met moves for summary judgment on all claims, arguing that rail allowance payments are exempt from the calculation of regular rates under the FLSA. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion is GRANTED and Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED.1
A party is entitled to summary judgment if the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). Although "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for summary judgment," the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position [is] insufficient . . . ." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252,255 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the court "evaluate[s] each motion separately, giving the non-moving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences." A.C.L.U. of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 790-91 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass'n, 605 F.3d 665, 674 (9th Cir. 2010) (). In evaluating the motions, "the court must consider each party's evidence, regardless under which motion the evidence is offered." Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2011). "Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). Thereafter, the non-moving party bears the burden of designating "specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial." Id. "This burden is not a light one." Id. The Supreme Court directed that in such a situation, the non-moving party must do more than raise a "metaphysical doubt" about the material facts at issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586.
The parties agree to all relevant facts. They dispute only the legal consequences of those facts. Accordingly, the parties filed their Stipulated Facts (ECF 17), from which this factual background is derived.
Tri-Met operates a light rail system called the Metropolitan Area Express ("MAX") that serves the greater Portland metropolitan area. Stip. Facts ¶ 1. Tri-Met employed Plaintiff Tilson as a MAX operator (or driver) from May 2001 until his retirement in October 2018. Id. ¶ 2. Tri-Met employed Plaintiff Williams as a MAX operator from November 2014 through the present. Id. ¶ 2.
Tri-Met assigns MAX operators to shifts called "runs" or "run listings." Id. ¶ 5. All MAX runs begin at a "start-shift" point, and end at an "end-shift" point, which are always either a MAX station or a rail yard. Id. ¶ 6. MAX operators must be at the start-shift point at the beginning of their shift and complete the assigned run at the end-shift point. Tri-Met, however, does not impose any requirements about how a MAX operator commutes to or from the start-shift and end-shift points. Id. In calculating pay for a MAX operator, Tri-Met does not consider commute time as hours worked. Id. Tri-Met pays a MAX operator, on a non-exempt (i.e., hourly) basis under Section 207 of the FLSA. Id. ¶ 3. Tri-Met pays a MAX operator from the time a run is scheduled to begin until the time the run is scheduled to end, plus 15 minutes of pre-trip preparation time and eight minutes of post-trip "clear" time for runs that begin or end at a rail yard. Id. ¶ 5. If a MAX operator works more than 40 hours in a single work week, that operator is entitled to an overtime payment calculated at one and one-half times (i.e., one hundred fifty percent of) that operator's regular rate of pay. Id. ¶ 3.
Some MAX runs begin and end at different locations. Id. ¶ 7. Starting and ending a run at different locations may inconvenience a MAX operator because the operator may be required either to travel back to the start shift location to retrieve a commute vehicle or find alternative transportation home from the end-shift location. Id. MAX operators, including Plaintiffs, are represented for purposes of collective bargaining by the Amalgamated Transit Union, Division 757 ("ATU"). Id. ¶ 4. ATU and Tri-Met negotiated a rail allowance payment to compensate MAX operators for the inconvenience of having to begin and end a run at different locations. Id. ¶ 8.
The Wage and Working Agreement ("WWA") is the current collective bargaining agreement between ATU and Tri-Met. Article II, Section 9, Paragraph 10 of the WWA describes the purpose of the "rail operation allowance" and further provides that this allowance is not to be considered as pay for time worked for any purpose. It reads:
The purpose of the rail operation allowance represents compensation for the inconvenience associated with the rail relief. These payments shall not be considered pay for time worked for any purpose. This applies to the unique circumstances pertaining to the District's rail system.
Id. The current WWA became effective on December 1, 2016 and continues through November 30, 2019. Id. ¶ 4. This provision was the same in previous versions of the WWA, dating back to at least December 1, 2003. ¶¶ 9-11. Tri-Met excluded these rail allowance payments from Plaintiffs' regular rate when calculating Plaintiffs' overtime compensation. Thus began the dispute that resulted in this lawsuit.
The FLSA exempts from the definition of "regular rate" payments made for hours understood not to be compensation for hours worked. The relevant text provides:
29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(2) (emphasis added) ("§ 207" or "FLSA § 207 Exemption").
The U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL") has issued regulations interpreting the phrase "other similar payments." The relevant text provides:
Since a variety of miscellaneous payments are paid by an employer to an employee under peculiar circumstances, it was not considered feasible to attempt to list them. They must, however, be "similar" in character to the payments specifically described in section 7(e)(2). It is clear that the clause was not intended to permit the exclusion from the regular rate of payments such as most bonuses or the furnishing of facilities like board and lodging which, though not directly attributable to any particular hours of work are, nevertheless, clearly understood to be compensation for services.
29 C.F.R. § 778.224(a) ("Similar Payments Regulation").
The FLSA, as part of the Portal-to-Portal Act, defines certain non-compensable "activities," except when agreed-upon to be compensable by contract or custom. The relevant text provides:
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