Tilton Et Al v. Cofield Et Al
Decision Date | 01 October 1876 |
Citation | 23 L.Ed. 858,93 U.S. 163 |
Parties | TILTON ET AL. v. COFIELD ET AL |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Colorado.
Argued by Mr. George T. Curtis and Mr. George H. Williams for the appellants, and submitted on printed arguments by Mr. Amos Steck for the appellees.
On the 28th of August, 1865, the appellants sued out of the District Court of Arapaho County, Col., a writ of attachment against the property of Judson H. Dudley and Thomas P. Ames, for the sum of $2,591.44. The indebtedness was stated in the affidavit to be upon an account for goods sold and delivered. On the same day, the writ was served by attaching the real estate in controversy. A declaration was duly filed. The damages were laid at $3,000. On the 27th of January, 1865, judgment was rendered for $2,591.44, and costs. This judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court of the Territory on the 10th of February, 1868. On the 9th of March, 1867, Dudley, by Charles G. Cheever, his attorney, conveyed a large amount of property, including all that attached under the writ of appellants, to David Moffit, except two lots, which Dudley himself conveyed to the Hallecks. The other appellees derive their title from Moffit. The power of attorney to Cheever was so far defective, that only an equity was vested in Moffit, and nothing more passed to those holding under him. On the 12th of September, 1868, the Tiltons, by leave of the court, filed in the attachment suit an amended affidavit and declaration, whereby were included, as a demand in favor of the plaintiffs, a promissory note executed to them by Dudley and Ames, dated Sept. 19, 1864, for $2,592.90, and bearing interest at the rate of two per cent per month, until paid. This note was given to balance the account set forth in the prior proceedings, and represented the same debt. On the 1st of November, 1869, judgment was rendered against Dudley by confession for $5,652.80, and an order was made for the sale of the property attached. Pursuant to this order, the sheriff sold the attached property at public vendue to the appellants for the sum of $6,345.25, and on the 13th of December, 1871, executed a deed to them.
The appellees filed a bill and supplemental bill, seeking to vacate the sale and annul the conveyance by the sheriff. The court decreed that the order of sale and the proceedings thereon touching the premises were nullities; that the sheriff's deed to the appellants was void; that the property should be for ever discharged from the lien of the judgment; and that the Tiltons should be perpetually enjoined from intermeddling with or selling it.
The record discloses no ground for any imputation of fraud against the appellants. The good faith of the account, the validity of the note, and the propriety of the amount for which the judgment was recovered, as between the parties to attachment proceedings, are not controverted. The original demand was an honest one, arising in the regular course of commercial dealings. The appellants are bona fide creditors, and have simply pursued the appropriate means for the collection of what was owing to them. Fraud is not an element in the controversy. The case requires no further consideration in this aspect.
Nor is it denied that the court by which the judgment in the attachment was rendered had full jurisdiction.
In Voorhes v. The Bank of the United States, 10 Pet. 449, the defendant in an action of ejectment was the defendant in error. He claimed title from certain proceedings in attachment in Ohio. The following objections were taken to them: 1. No affidavit, as required by the statute, was found filed with the clerk; and the law provided, that, if this were not done, the writ should be quashed on motion. 2. Three months' notice of the attachment was to be given in a newspaper, and fifteen days' notice was to be given by the auditors. It did not appear that either had been done. 3. The defendant was to be called three times, and his defaults recorded. No such record appeared to have been made. 4. The auditors were not to sell until after twelve months. It did not appear when the sale was made. 5. The return showed a sale to Foster and Woodward; the deed was made to Stanley, and no connection between them appeared in the record.
The court there being competent to take jurisdiction, and having acquired jurisdiction by the seizure of the property, this court held that all its acts and orders made during the progress of the case were beyond the reach of collateral inquiry, and could be assailed only in a direct proceeding had for that purpose before a competent tribunal.
In Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 341, the controversy grew out of a license given by the County Court to sell the property of a deceased person. This court applied the same principles. It was said,——
The lines which separate what is void from what is erroneous is clearly drawn in the former case.
The eighth section of the local statute under which the appellants' suit was instituted, declares,——
'No writ of attachment shall be quashed nor the property taken thereon restored, any garnishee discharged, nor any bond by him given cancelled, nor any rule entered against the sheriff discharged on account of any insufficiency of the original affidavit, writ of attachment, or attachment bond, if the plaintiff, or some credible person for him, shall cause a legal and sufficient affidavit or attachment bond to be filed or the writ to be amended in such time or manner as the court in their discretion shall direct; and in that case the cause shall proceed as if such proceedings had been originally sufficient.'
The amendments here in question were all within the equity, if not the letter, of this section. The act provides for the amendment of the writ. No such amendment was made. The grasp of the process was confined to the property originally attached. No attempt was made to reach any other. The description of the cause of action was changed, but in the view of equity, and in point of fact, it was substantially the same with that originally described. Allowing amendments is incidental to the exercise of all judicial power, and is indispensable to the ends of justice. Usually, to...
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