Tilton v. Southwest School Corp., 871A152

• Decision Date: 17 April 1972
• Docket Number: No. 871A152,871A152
• Citation: 151 Ind.App. 608,281 N.E.2d 117
• Parties: G. Frederick TILTON, Appellant, v. SOUTHWEST SCHOOL CORPORATION et al., Appellees.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 117

281 N.E.2d 117

151 Ind.App. 608

G. Frederick TILTON, Appellant, v. SOUTHWEST SCHOOL CORPORATION et al., Appellees.

No. 871A152.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, First District.

April 17, 1972.

Rehearing Denied May 19, 1972.

Richard J. Darko, Bingham, Summers, Welsh & Spilman, Indianapolis, for appellant.

George E. Taylor, E. D. Powell, Taylor & Taylor, Sullivan, for appellees.

LYBROOK, Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Tilton, a non-tenured teacher, brought this action for injunctive relief after appellees notified him that he would not be offered a teaching contract for the 1970--1971 school year. The decision of the trial court was for the defendants (appellees) and Tilton appeals.

The evidence shows that appellant was employed as a social science teacher by the Southwest School Corporation of Sullivan County for the school year 1965--1966. He was given a new contract as a teacher in each of the subsequent years, to and including the year 1969--1970.

Prior to coming to Southwest, Tilton had received both his Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts Degrees and had taken about 20 additional hours of graduate work. He had taught previously at Danville (Illinois) High School and at Casey and Robinson, Illinois for an approximate total of four years before coming to Southwest. He was 60 years of age at the time of trial.

During the five years that Tilton taught at the Southwest Corporation, he spent the first three years teaching social sciences in the Junior High School and the last two years in the Social Science Department of Sullivan High School.

Defendant, Philip L. Borders, who was and had been Superintendent of the defendant school corporation since 1968, notified appellant by registered mail, under date of April 13, 1970, that the Board of School Trustees of the defendant corporation would not offer him a teaching contract for the 1970--1971 school year. The letter also notified Tilton that the contractual obligations between him and the Board of School Trustees would terminate at the end of the 1969--1970 school year.

Other defendants in this cause, in addition to the Southwest School Corporation itself, are Lee French, who was at that time, and had been since 1968, principal of Sullivan High School, and the remaining named defendants, all of whom were members of the Board of School Trustees of the Southwest Corporation in April of 1970.

Upon receipt of the above letter, Tilton, by his own letter dated April 16, 1970, requested a copy of the reasons relied upon by the board in failing to extend him another contract of employment. Then, on April 17, 1970, Tilton requested an open hearing before the members of the Board of Trustees relative to the reasons relied upon by the board. Thereafter on April 20, 1970 all of the defendants, excepting French, sent plaintiff a letter denying his request for reasons and for a hearing. After plaintiff retained an attorney, who requested reasons and a hearing for plaintiff on April 25, 1970, defendant Borders, by letter of April 27, 1970 notified plaintiff that the Board of School Trustees stood upon their refusal to grant plaintiff a hearing and later, on May 13, 1970, in a letter signed by all of the defendants other than defendant French, the reasons for non-renewal of plaintiff's teaching contract were set forth as follows:

'The action of the Board of School Trustees was based upon the decision that the instructional contribution made by you to the educational program was not of a quality sufficiently high to merit your continuation as a teacher in the Southwest School Corporation of Sullivan County. Further, it was determined that the educational program in the social studies area could be improved by your replacement.'

On May 28, 1970 Tilton filed his complaint in the Sullivan Circuit Court, alleging among other things, his prior service as a teacher in the defendant corporation and that he had been refused a contract as a teacher for the 1970--1971 school year. Tilton further charged that the defendants had refused to grant him a hearing before refusing to extend his contract of employment as a teacher and that the action of the defendants in not renewing the contract was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or unlawful in that:

'(a) The plaintiff was not afforded the opportunity of a hearing as to the reason or reasons for the non renewel (sic) or termination of his teaching contract in violation of the provisions of Chapter 97 of the 1927 Acts of the Indiana General Assembly, as amended, being Section 28--4308 Burns Indiana Statutes Annotated, 1948 Replacement, as incorporation (sic) by reference by Chapter 27 of the 1939 Acts of the Indiana General Assembly, as amended.

'(b) The reason or reasons for terminating or not renewing the teaching contract of the plaintiff is in violation of the provisions of Chapter 97 of the 1927 Acts of the Indiana General Assembly, as amended, being Section 28--4308, Burns Indiana Statutes Annotated, 1948 Replacement, as incorporated by reference by Chapter 27 of the 1939 Acts of the Indiana General Assembly, as amended.

'(c) The written reason or reasons provided to the plaintiff by written instrument dated May 13, 1970 were not the reason or reasons for the non-renewal or termination of the plaintiff's teaching contract as stated in the written notification to plaintiff dated April 13, 1970.

'(d) The plaintiff categorically denies each of the reason or reasons stated in the instrument of May 13, 1970, to him for the non-renewal or termination of plaintiff's teaching contract for the 1970--1971 school year.

'(e) The non-renewal or termination of the plaintiff's teaching contract for the 1970--1971 school year is in violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that the plaintiff was denied a hearing on the reason or reasons for the termination or non-renewal of the plaintiff's teaching contract for the 1970--1971 school year.'

Plaintiff further alleged irreparable harm as a result of the action of the defendants and prayed that they be enjoined from not renewing his contract for the 1970--1971 school year and be mandated to renew his teaching contract for the 1970--71 school year upon the same basis, salary, terms and conditions as his contract for the previous school year.

Defendants filed answer to plaintiff's complaint and the cause was submitted to the court for trial without the intervention of a jury on November 9, 1970 and concluded on November 10, 1970. On January 13, 1971 the court entered the following judgment:

'Come now again all parties herein by attorneys of record and the Court having heretofore taken ruling under advisement now finds for the defendants. (IT) IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that plaintiff take nothing by his complaint, all at plaintiff's costs herein laid out, expended and taxed at $_ _.'

Appellant timely filed his Motion to Correct Errors which sets forth the following five specifications:

'1. That the decision of the Court is contrary to the evidence in that the plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the action of the defendants was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious as stated more fully in plaintiff's brief in support of this motion.

'2. The decision of the Court is contrary to law in that the defendants did not comply with, nor did the Court require compliance with, the procedural protection of Burns' Indiana Statutes Annotated, Section 28--4511 to 28--4516 (formerly codified as Burns' 28--4307 to 28--4312) as incorporated in Burns' Indiana Statutes Annotated, Section 28--4517 (formerly codified as Burns' Section 28--4312), as more fully set out in plaintiff's brief in support of this motion.

'3. The decision of the Court is contrary to law in that the defendants did not comply with the dictates of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, nor did the Court require such compliance, in that the defendants did not provide a hearing to the plaintiff upon the defendants' decision to deny the plaintiff a contract of employment for the 1970--71 school year.

'4. The decision of the Court is contrary to law in that the defendants did not comply with the dictates of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, nor did the Court require such compliance, in that the reasons given the plaintiff for the nonrenewal of his contract were vague and ambiguous, and were not sufficiently detailed to permit the plaintiff to correct a decision made on the basis of mistaken or false facts.

'5. The decision of the Court is contrary to state law, Burns' 28--4517, in that the reasons given the plaintiff for the nonrenewal of his contract were vague and ambiguous, and were not sufficiently detailed to permit the plaintiff to correct a decision made on the basis of mistaken or false facts.'

Hearing was duly had on the Motion to Correct Errors and the same was overruled on May 11, 1971.

We shall now proceed to consider the points raised by the appellant in the same order they were presented.

In appellant's brief (p. 12) he characterizes his first point by the following title:

'1. The action of the defendants in denying plaintiff further employment was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.'

which would lead one to believe that the above was the error complained of. However, a comparison of the above statement with the actual Specification 1 in the Motion to Correct Errors reveals a difference between the two. In the Motion to Correct Errors appellant contends 'That the decision of the court is contrary to the evidence in that plaintiff proved by a preponderance . . . that the action of the defendants was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, * * *' (Emphasis supplied.)

Specification 1 seems to invite this court to weigh the evidence in the case and determine where the preponderance lies. This...