Timberlake v. Summers, CIV-76-0235-E.
Decision Date | 27 April 1976 |
Docket Number | No. CIV-76-0235-E.,CIV-76-0235-E. |
Citation | 413 F. Supp. 708 |
Parties | Ronald N. TIMBERLAKE, Plaintiff, v. James C. SUMMERS, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma |
Eddie Y. Newcombe, Lawton, Okl., for plaintiff.
A. B. Neil, Jr., Neil, Wehby & Dozier, Nashville, Tenn., and William B. Rogers, Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendant.
Plaintiff, a citizen of the State of Oklahoma, alleges he was libeled and defamed by defendant, a citizen of the State of Tennessee, in a letter written by defendant to plaintiff's commanding officer at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
Defendant moves for dismissal for improper service and want of jurisdiction over his person, on the ground that no provision of the long arm statute, 12 O.S. § 187, is available to this plaintiff. The court agrees that § 187 is inapplicable. It is undisputed that defendant has had no contact with Oklahoma other than the writing and mailing of a single letter addressed to a resident of this state.
However, the court must further determine whether jurisdiction is authorized under the long arm statute, 12 O.S. § 1701.03, subsection (a)(3), providing for exercise of personal jurisdiction over one who has caused tortious injury in this state by an act or omission in this state.1
Plaintiff argues that jurisdiction is authorized thereunder, but goes no further than to state that tortious injury has resulted here. The question to be resolved, however, is whether the writing and mailing of an allegedly defamatory letter in the State of Tennessee constitutes "an act or omission in this state."
There is no Oklahoma authority on point.2 However, the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia has had occasion in a similar case to interpret a provision of the Virginia long arm statute identical to the one in issue. St. Clair v. Righter, 250 F.Supp. 148 (1966). The court concluded that while the tortious injury occurred upon the publication of the alleged libel within Virginia, the injury was caused by the act of writing and mailing the letters outside Virginia, and accordingly the acts alleged in the complaint were not sufficient to bring the defendants under the terms of the long arm statute. That court reasoned:
In this case too, the court could find jurisdiction established only by ignoring the distinction which the Oklahoma statute makes between tortious injury resulting from an act within the state and tortious injury resulting from an act outside the state, and the clear restriction of the latter provision to one who engages in a persistent course of conduct or derives substantial revenue from goods used or services rendered in this state.
The St. Clair court proceeded nonetheless to deny defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that the exercise of jurisdiction would be consonant with due process.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has frequently said that the state's long arm statutes are intended to reach to the outer limits of due process. However, this principle has never been enunciated in a decision rendered in disregard of statutory reach. See, e. g., Carmack v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 536 P.2d 897 (Okl.1975) (1701.03a, subsections 1, 2, 4 and 7); Fidelity Bank, N. A. v. Standard Industries, Inc., 515 P.2d 219 (Okl.1973) (subsections 1, 2 and 7); Vemco Plating, Inc. v. Denver Fire Clay Co., 496 P.2d 117 (Okl.1972) (subsections 2 and 7); Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okl.1970) (subsection 7).
In cases in which that court has concluded jurisdiction could not be exercised, the court has based its decision upon statutory grounds. See, e. g., Roberts v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 536 P.2d 353 (Okl.1975); Precision Polymers, Inc. v. Nelson, 512 P.2d 811 (Okl.1973). In those cases the court held that inasmuch as the acts out of which the claims arose were not the same acts as those alleged to confer jurisdiction, jurisdiction could not be exercised, and the court so held without consideration of whether exercise of jurisdiction in the absence of a nexus between the claim and the contacts would nevertheless be constitutionally permissible. See George v. Strick Corp., 496 F.2d 10 (10th Cir. 1974). ". . . § 1701.03 authorizes in personam jurisdiction to the outer limits of due process when and only when the asserted cause of action arises from the defendant's activities within the state." At 13. (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, this court declines to follow the St. Clair example.3 The proper analysis should be: 1) is the exercise of jurisdiction authorized by the statute...
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