Timmons v. Central Bank of the South
| Decision Date | 24 June 1988 |
| Citation | 528 So.2d 845 |
| Parties | Ginger Medders TIMMONS v. CENTRAL BANK OF THE SOUTH, et al. 86-1074. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Leon Garmon, Gadsden, for appellant.
Michael L. Edwards and Martha F. Petrey of Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, for appellees Central Bank of the South and Gary Archer.
J. Gullatte Hunter III of Simmons, Ford and Brunson, Gadsden, for other appellees.
Ginger Medders Timmons brought this action, alleging fraud, misrepresentation, and fraud by conspiracy against Central Bank of the South, its employee Gary Archer, and Timmons's former husband, Charles Nelson Medders. The complaint alleged that the defendants fraudulently represented to Timmons that she was obligated to pay an indebtedness secured by her automobile, when in fact there was no indebtedness actually secured by the automobile. The trial court granted summary judgment for all defendants.
The Etowah County Circuit Court entered a judgment dated October 26, 1982, dissolving the marriage of Timmons and Medders; that judgment awarded to Timmons all right, title, and interest to a 1980 Datsun 200SX automobile owned by the parties during their marriage. Timmons was declared responsible for "any outstanding indebtedness on the 1980 Datsun automobile." The record reveals that to purchase the automobile Medders had borrowed the money from Central Bank of Gadsden, Alabama. The face of the note contains the statement that the loan was for the purpose of purchasing a car. However, the car was not pledged as security for the loan. Medders's parents permitted him to pledge a savings account they owned at the bank as collateral for the loan.
Pursuant to the divorce decree and allegedly in response to misrepresentations by Gary Archer of Central Bank and by Medders to the effect that failure to make payments would result in repossession of the automobile, Timmons made 16 monthly installments to Central Bank on the promissory note signed by her former husband. Timmons stopped making payments when she learned that the car had not been pledged as collateral for the car loan. Medders began making the payments on the note in order to avoid foreclosure on his parents' savings account.
In March 1985, Timmons filed a petition seeking modification of the divorce decree to allow her to receive additional child support and to ascertain the child support arrearage. Medders counterpetitioned, asking the court to interpret and clarify the provision in the original judgment making the wife responsible for the outstanding indebtedness on the automobile she received as a result of the divorce judgment.
The trial court ruled that Timmons was responsible for the payments on the Central Bank loan and that she was to reimburse Medders for any payments he had made on it after she stopped making payments. Timmons appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.
Timmons then brought this separate action, alleging that statements by Gary Archer, an employee of Central Bank, threatening to repossess her car should she fall behind in her payments, amounted to fraud and misrepresentation. Medders is also alleged to have made fraudulent misrepresentations in conspiracy with Archer concerning Timmons's liability for the car loan payments. Timmons alleges that her reliance on the representations of Medders and Archer resulted in her making a total of $2,392.29 in payments for which, she says, she was not in fact liable. Timmons maintains that she is not liable on the Central Bank note because the car was not the actual collateral pledged to secure the note and only Medders's signature appears on the note.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants.
Timmons argues that the instant tort action should not be barred by the circuit court's resolution of the divorce modification action. She maintains that this action and the divorce modification action did not arise out of one single act, and therefore that this action should not be barred by res judicata.
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are rules for determining the conclusiveness of prior judgments. Conley v. Beaver, 437 So.2d 1267 (Ala.1983); Wheeler v. First Alabama Bank of Birmingham, 364 So.2d 1190 (Ala.1978). In Wheeler this Court set out the...
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...was litigated in the prior action, and (3) resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior judgment. Timmons v. Central Bank of the South, 528 So.2d 845, 847 (Ala.1988). A. Identical Issues In his appeal before the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, Eubanks alleged that the Board denied ......
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