Timmons v. People's Trust Co.
| Decision Date | 20 February 1934 |
| Docket Number | C. C. 492. |
| Citation | 173 S.E. 79,114 W.Va. 618 |
| Parties | TIMMONS v. PEOPLE'S TRUST CO. (two cases). |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted February 6, 1934.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Whatever facts are necessary to be proved to sustain a pleading must be alleged in the plea. When several pleas are filed, each must present a complete defense. Each plea is separate and distinct in itself except when one is connected with another by apt words of reference.
2. The facts relied on in a plea must be directly and distinctly stated. The allegations should not leave the facts to be deduced by argument and inference.
3. Under modern business conditions the public is so dependent on banks that reasonable regulation of banks under the police power is universally recognized.
4. Code 1931, 31-8-29, providing for the reorganization of an insolvent bank, should be liberally construed.
5. Under Code 1931, 31-8-32, the commissioner of banking has exclusive authority to administer the assets of an insolvent bank.
6. Prior to the insolvency of a bank the claim of an ordinary depositor is personal, but after insolvency his claim becomes communal and is subject to class treatment.
7. Where a common fund is involved, courts will not usually permit a small minority of those interested to defeat the wishes of an overwhelming majority of their associates.
Certified from Circuit Court, Berkeley County.
Two actions by Fannie L. Timmons and by Fannie L. Timmons executrix, against the People's Trust Company. Plaintiff's demurrers to the defendant's pleas were sustained, and the rulings certified for review.
Affirmed.
Emmert & Rice, of Martinsburg, for plaintiff.
J. O Henson, of Martinsburg, for defendant.
These are two certified cases involving certain details in connection with the reorganization of an insolvent bank. In one of the cases plaintiff seeks in her own right to recover $4,725, with interest, which she placed in a savings account with the defendant bank on May 28, 1930. In the other, she seeks to recover as executrix $6,526.45 which was on deposit in a checking account in the bank to the credit of her decedent on September 10, 1930. The two actions were brought in November, 1932. The plaintiff's pleadings allege the deposits, her demands of payment, and the refusals of the bank, but make no reference to the insolvency of the bank which occurred in October, 1931.
The defendant pleaded the general issue and filed certain special pleas in each case, to which pleas plaintiff's several demurrers were sustained and the sufficiency of the pleas certified here.
Plea No. 2 in each case says only that plaintiff should not maintain her suit because at the time of the reorganization of the defendant in October, 1931, plaintiff was informed that at least 66 2/3 per cent. of the stock-holders would pay a voluntary assessment on their capital stock aggregating more than $200,000 in consideration that the depositors allow their deposits to remain "with the bank over a period of years," and that plaintiff did not "disavow the proposed reorganization agreement," but permitted it to be consummated, and is now estopped, etc. It is settled that "all facts essential to be proved to sustain a plea must be alleged in the pleading." 49 C.J. subject, "Pleading," § 220. In other words, "When several pleas are filed each must contain a complete defense; each is separate and distinct in itself, except when one is connected with the other by words of reference." 16 Ency. of Pl. and Pr 561, 562. See generally on such a reference 49 C.J. supra, § 251; State v. Vaughan, 93 W.Va. 419, 117 S.E. 127. Pleas No. 2 do not mention the insolvency of the defendant, make no reference to other pleas which do mention it, do not explain the reorganization therein referred to, do not show that the stockholders were misled or prejudiced by plaintiff's conduct, and are otherwise too incomplete and general in terms to show an estoppel. Demurrers thereto were properly sustained. State v. Seabright, 15 W.Va. 590.
Plea No. 4 in each case would deny plaintiff a cause of action because defendant says that it was placed in "voluntary liquidation" by the state banking department on October 16, 1931; that on November 14, 1931, it undertook to reorganize its business and the banking department required that at least 66 2/3 per cent. of the stockholders should pay an assessment of 100 per cent. upon their capital stock; "that at least 66 2/3 per cent. of the depositors other than public depositors should consent to a freezing of their deposits over a period of years;" that the deposits of depositors not agreeing to the plan should be liquidated by the defendant "as the liquidating agent" and distribution made to them "when the assets should be collected"; that the conditions made by the commissioner of banking were reasonable and in the interest of the depositors; that more than 85 per cent. of both stockholders and depositors complied with the conditions and the bank was reopened accordingly; that plaintiff did not agree to the plan and defendant will liquidate her account "as rapidly as it can"; and that "pending the collection of assets sufficient to pay said account" the plaintiff cannot maintain this suit.
The chief contention of the plaintiff against pleas No. 4 is that the plan of reorganization impairs the defendant's obligations to her under her several contracts of deposit. Under modern business conditions the public is so dependent on banks that reasonable regulation of banks under the police power is universally recognized. Picklesimer v. Morris, 101 W.Va. 127, 132, 132 S.E. 372; Michie on Banks and Banking, vol. 1, § 3; Thompson on Corporations (3d Ed.) § 491; 22 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 933; 7 C.J. 480; 3 R.C.L. 379; Schramm v. Bank, 143 Or. 546, 20 P.2d 1093, 23 P.2d 327; Milner v. Gibson, 249 Ky. 594, 61 S.W.2d 273. Code 1931, 31-8-6, places banking institutions under the supervision of the commissioner of banking, and 31-8-29 (Acts 1929, c. 23, § 31) provides that an insolvent bank may reorganize "with the consent in writing of the commissioner." Some states require the plan of reorganization to be approved by a certain percentage of the depositors, varying from 75 per cent to 90 per cent. Our statute does not prescribe the manner of reorganization, but, being remedial, "must be so construed as to advance the remedy intended." Becker v. Amos, 105 Fla. 231, 141 So. 136, 80 A.L.R. 1480.
After the defendant became insolvent in 1931, the commissioner had exclusive authority to...
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