Timpson v. McMaster

• Decision Date: 04 February 2020
• Docket Number: C/A No. 6:16-cv-1174-DCC
• Citation: 437 F.Supp.3d 469
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Johnny TIMPSON, BY AND THROUGH his, Conservator, Sandra TIMPSON, and Sandra Timpson, in her individual capacity, Plaintiff, v. Henry MCMASTER, et al., Defendants.

437 F.Supp.3d 469

Johnny TIMPSON, BY AND THROUGH his, Conservator, Sandra TIMPSON, and Sandra Timpson, in her individual capacity, Plaintiff,

v.Henry MCMASTER, et al., Defendants.

C/A No. 6:16-cv-1174-DCC

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Greenville Division.

Signed February 4, 2020

Patricia L. Harrison, Patricia Logan Harrison Law Office, Columbia, SC, Robert C. Childs, III, Childs Law Firm, Greenville, SC, for Plaintiffs.

Evan Markus Gessner, Patrick John Frawley, Nicholson Davis Frawley Anderson and Ayer, Lexington, SC, for Defendants Anderson County Disabilities and Special Needs Board, Horace Padgett, Dale Thompson John King and Tyler Rex.

Daniel C. Plyler, Davidson Wren and Plyler PA, Columbia, SC, for Defendants South Carolina Department of Disabilities and Special Needs

Kenneth Paul Woodington, William Henry Davidson, II, Davidson Wren and Plyler PA, Columbia, SC, for Defendants South Carolina Department of Disabilities and Special Needs, William Danielson and Beverly Buscemi.

Damon C. Wlodarczyk, Christopher McKenzie Wasson, Riley Pope and Laney, Columbia, SC, for Defendants South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services and Christian Soura.

Knox L. Haynsworth, III, Brown Massey Evans McLeod and Haynsworth, Greenville, SC, for Defendants Greenville County Disabilities and Special Needs Board and Thrive Upstate.

James William Logan, Jr., Logan and Jolly LLP, Anderson, SC, for Defendant Henry McMaster.

OPINION AND ORDER

Donald C. Coggins, Jr., United States District Judge

Federal courts resolve cases and controversies, not crusades. That is a constitutional directive . Despite this well-established limitation on federal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs' counsel in this case have sought to wage a ground war against the South Carolina disability and Medicaid system. In the process of this crusade, Plaintiffs' counsel have neglected to focus on what is important: Johnny Timpson. Within the tens of thousands of pages of filings on the docket lies a potentially meritorious (and relatively straightforward) case involving the care, treatment, and provision of services to Johnny Timpson. However, that is not the case Plaintiffs' counsel intended to present to the jury. Instead, Plaintiffs' counsel sought to personally attack various state officials and government programs, interrogate the then-United Nations' Ambassador about her social life, and subpoena the sitting Governor of the State of South Carolina to a trial about which he had no personal knowledge . Despite this, through extensive Court involvement in pretrial matters, the jury was presented with a full and robust case related to the alleged negligent care and abuse of Johnny Timpson.

Make no mistake about it, the disability system in South Carolina is broken and is in need of repair. Programs are underfunded. Waitlists are long. And patients are not adequately informed about the programs for which they qualify. Recognizing this situation, Plaintiffs' counsel began filing cases more than a decade ago seeking to fix some of these problems. After protracted litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued Doe v. Kidd , 501 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2007), which recognized a private right of action under the Medicaid Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the failure to provide individuals with services they are entitled to with reasonable promptness. Several appeals later, Doe 's counsel¹ prevailed and were justifiably awarded significant attorneys' fees and costs by the Fourth Circuit. See Doe v. Kidd , 656 F. App'x 643 (4th Cir. 2016).

Since that time, Plaintiffs' counsel have continued to file lawsuits on behalf of individuals with disabilities. See, e.g., Kobe et al. v. Mann et al. , No. 3:11-cv-01146-MBS (D.S.C. 2011); Stogsdill et al. v. Sebelius et al. , No. 3:12-cv-00007-JFA (D.S.C. 2012); Valentine et al. v. State of South Carolina et al. , No. 3:18-cv-00895-JFA, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, 2019 WL 8324709 (D.S.C. 2019). Throughout this and other litigation, Plaintiffs' counsel have maintained that these cases are essentially enforcement actions as her clients are all acting as "private attorneys general."² Despite the numerous cases filed in the last decade, this is the first such case to go to trial before a jury. From inception, however, this case has been riddled with procedural and substantive defects, many of which are discussed below.

Plaintiffs got their day in court so that a jury could answer a series of truly important questions about Johnny Timpson's care, treatment, and provision of services. The jury had a full and fair opportunity to evaluate Plaintiffs' claims under the appropriate legal standards and with extensive leeway afforded to Plaintiffs' counsel; however, the jury determined that a defense verdict was appropriate. Following the jury's verdict, Plaintiffs filed a Motion Pursuant to Rule 59, Rule 50, and Rule 60 ("Motion to Reconsider"). ECF No. 386. After evaluating the filings of the parties and the evidence in this case, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

This case was removed to this Court from the Court of Common Pleas for Greenville County, South Carolina. ECF No. 1. On July 18, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, which named fourteen defendants: (1) Nikki Haley, Governor of the State of South Carolina; (2) the Anderson County Disabilities and Special Needs Board ("ACDSNB"); (3) Horace Padgett, Chairman of ACDSNB; (4) Dale Thompson, former executive director of ACDSNB; (5) John King, former director of ACDSNB; (6) Tyler Rex, Director of ACDSNB; (7) the South Carolina Department of Disabilities and Special Needs ("DDSN"); (8) William Danielson, Chairman of DDSN Commission; (9) Beverly Buscemi, Director of DDSN; (10) the South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS"); (11) Christian Soura, Director of DHHS; (12) Alexander McNair, Chairman of the Board of Thrive Upstate, formerly known as the Greenville County Disabilities and Special Needs Board ("Thrive Upstate"); (13) John Cocciolone, Director of Thrive Upstate; and (14) Unknown Actors at DHHS, DDSN, ACDSNB, and/or Thrive Upstate. ECF No. 41. The Amended Complaint alleged five causes of action against each Defendant :³ (1) violation of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act ("SCTCA"); (2) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); (3) violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; (4) violation of the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act and Separation of Powers; and (5) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.

The Amended Complaint is barely cognizable.⁴ Federal law requires that a plaintiff plead a plausible claim for relief against any named defendants. The rules are fairly simple—the Complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief" and "a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (emphasis added). The pleadings in this case fall short of that standard, as Plaintiffs were still trying to articulate who they were suing and what they were suing about more than a year into this litigation.

For example, on February 16, 2017, after she was confirmed as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Defendant Haley asked that Governor Henry McMaster be substituted as a party defendant. ECF No. 78. In response, Plaintiffs took the position that Defendant Haley may have also been named in her individual capacity as well as her official capacity. ECF No. 80. To that end, Plaintiffs contended they were "entitled to take the deposition of Nikki Haley to establish facts alleged in their Amended Complaint and to determine whether she may be liable, in her individual capacity, for any of the claims alleged in the amended complaint."⁵ Id. at 2. It is important to note that Plaintiffs only named "Nikki Haley, Governor of the State of South Carolina" as a party defendant and made no reference to Defendant Haley in her individual capacity.

On February 23, 2017, the Office of the Governor filed a Motion for a Protective Order regarding Plaintiffs' Notice of Deposition of Defendant Haley, arguing that Governor McMaster was automatically substituted as a party when he became Governor. ECF No. 82; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) ("An action does not abate when a public officer who is a party in an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the action is pending. The officer's successor is automatically substituted as a party." (emphasis added)).

The Motion further noted that counsel for the Office of the Governor "does not have the ability to control or produce Nikki Haley for a deposition" and stated that "Plaintiffs' counsel ha[ve] not served a subpoena on Nikki Haley to date." ECF No. 82 at 4. Succinctly summarizing the problem with Plaintiffs' position, the Motion concluded by stating: "Plaintiffs should not be allowed to take this ‘fishing expedition’ deposition of the former Governor and current United Nations Ambassador when the Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to even remotely establish a basis for liability against Nikki Haley [individually]." Id. at 4–5. Similarly, in its Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Motion for Protective Order Regarding Defendant Haley, the Office of the Governor declared:

Plaintiffs' Complaint does not contain any allegations that Nikki Haley is individually liable. Plaintiffs have sued Haley in her official capacity only. Despite the absence of any allegations of individual liability, Plaintiffs maintain that they are entitled to take Haley's deposition in an effort to determine the possible existence of a new claim against Haley for individual liability. To expand the scope of discovery to issues not encompassed by the pleadings and allow a fishing expedition deposition in the hopes of establishing a new claim is not permissible.

ECF No. 104 at 2.

A torrent of motions and briefing followed...