Tindall v. Miller
| Decision Date | 12 October 1895 |
| Docket Number | 17,213 |
| Citation | 41 N.E. 535,143 Ind. 337 |
| Parties | Tindall et al. v. Miller et al |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Petition for Rehearing Overruled January 10, 1896.
From the Fayette Circuit Court.
The judgment is affirmed.
D. W McKee, J. I. Little, H. L. Frost and A. V. Brown, for appellants.
R Conner and J. M. McIntosh, for appellees.
By his last will Luther Hutchinson divided his property between his wife, Sarah Hutchinson, and his daughter, Julia Elliott. The real estate here in controversy was devised as follows:
Both devisees survived the testator, but each died before the bringing of this suit, the daughter dying before her mother.
After the death of the testator, the devisees, Julia and Sarah, apparently in the belief that they were the sole owners of the property so devised, sold and conveyed the same by deed duly executed.
The appellees claim under the deed so made. The appellants, who are the sole heirs of Julia Elliott, claim that the devise to her was of a contingent remainder, to vest only on the death of her mother Sarah; that as Julia died before Sarah, Julia's title never vested and her deed was void; and that on the death of Sarah the title to said real estate, by the terms of item third of the will, at once vested in appellants as the heirs of Julia Elliott.
Seeking the intention of Luther Hutchinson from the words of his will, it would seem that he meant to devise the property in question to his wife for life; remainder to his daughter or her heirs.
The fourth item of the will appears to bear out this view. In that item the testator provides that the residue of his property be converted into money, and the proceeds "be divided equal between my wife as my widow one-half, and my daughter Julia, or her heirs, the other half." In both items his daughter and her heirs seem to have been present to the mind of the testator.
If, then, we regard the rule that the intention of the testator must be our chief guide in the interpretation of a will, and also that all the words of a will should be given a meaning when possible; and if we also remember that the law favors vested rather than contingent titles, we can hardly have any difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the devise here in dispute was of a vested remainder to Julia Elliott, the enjoyment of which was postponed to her or to her heirs until the death of her mother, the life tenant.
"We affirm as an established principle," said this court in Amos v. Amos, 117 Ind. 37, 19 N.E. 543...
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