Tingling v. Miller

• Decision Date: 14 March 1893
• Parties: TINGLING et al. v. MILLER et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

26 A. 491

77 Md. 104

TINGLING et al.

v. MILLER et al.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 14, 1893.

Appeal from circuit court, Carroll county.

Bill by Margaret Yingling and Ephraim Yingling, her husband, against Henry H. Miller, Elias Myerly, Noah Shaffer, and Nimrod Armstrong, trustees of the German and English Evangelical Lutheran Congregation of Manchester, in Carrod county, for the construction of the will of Henry Tasto, deceased. A decree was rendered, from which the complainants appeal. Reversed.

Argued before ALVEY, C. J., and ROBINSON, BRYAN, McSHERRY, PAGE, BRISCOE, and FOWLER, JJ.

Jas. A. C. Bond, for appellants.

Joseph M. Parke and Wm. H. Thomas, for appellees.

FOWLER, J. This appeal involves the construction of the will of the late Henry Tasto, of Carroll county, in this state, and the particular clause involved is as follows: "I give, devise, and bequeath unto my daughter Margaret (intermarried to Ephraim Yingling) my other farm, * * * as described in a deed * * * to her, my said daughter, during her natural life, upon the condition that she pay to the trustees (or church council) of the Emmanuel Lutheran Church in Manchester, Carroll county, the sum of three hundred dollars, * * * in trust for the express use and benefit of the needy poor of said church or congregation, and to be by them judiciously applied or appropriated to the express use aforesaid until fully exhausted, and after her death to her children then living, (if any,) share and share alike, and, if none," then over. It is contended by the appellant that the condition annexed to the foregoing devise is void because the beneficiaries who were to receive the bounty of the testator are not designated with such clearness and precision as is required by the well-settled law of Maryland, and this contention is based upon a long line of decisions of this court, beginning with the case of Dashiell v. Attorney General, 5 Har. & J. 392. In the case just cited it was held that the statute of 43 Eliz. c. 4, generally known as the "Statute of Charitable Uses," was not in force in this state, and that "independent of that statute a court of chancery cannot, in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction, sustain and enforce a bequest to charitable uses which, if not a charity, would on general principles be void." It was accordingly held in that case, and was never disputed in this state until the passage of the act of 1888, c. 249, that a charitable bequest like the one we are now considering cannot be sustained or administered in a court of equity, and must therefore be declared void.

But it is contended on the part of the appellee, and was so held by a divided court below, that section 305a of the act just mentioned effectually removes all difficulty, and makes this bequest valid. We regret we cannot agree to this view, for the object of the testator was certainly a most worthy one. The section relied on by the appellee is as follows: "No devise or bequest of real and personal property to charitable uses shall be deemed or held to be void by reason of any uncertainty with respect to the donees thereof, provided the will or codicil making the same shall also contain directions for the formation of a corporation to take the same, and, within the period of twelve months from the grant of probate of such will or codicil, a corporation shall be formed in correspondence with such directions, capable...