Tingwall v. King Hill Irrigation District

• Decision Date: 24 January 1945
• Docket Number: 7156
• Citation: Tingwall v. King Hill Irrigation District, 66 Idaho 76, 155 P.2d 605 (Idaho 1945)
• Parties: A. W. TINGWALL, Respondent, v. KING HILL IRRIGATION DISTRICT, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

155 P.2d 605

66 Idaho 76

A. W. TINGWALL, Respondent, v. KING HILL IRRIGATION DISTRICT, Appellant

No. 7156

Supreme Court of Idaho

January 24, 1945

1. Waters and water courses

An irrigation district is not, strictly speaking, a "municipal corporation", but a "quasi municipal corporation" operating irrigation system in proprietary capacity, and any municipal powers thereof are only incidental.

2. Mandamus

Waters and water courses

An irrigation district's warrants for services rendered in maintenance and operation of its irrigation system were general obligations of district, and holder thereof could bring either an action at law against district to reduce warrants to money judgment or a mandamus proceeding against district's fiscal officers to compel levy of taxes against all lands in district to satisfy warrants.

3. Municipal corporations

A defense that sole remedy on unpaid municipal bonds is mandamus to compel assessment of taxes for payment thereof comes too late after bonds have been placed in judgment.

4. Judgment

An owner of money judgment, obtained against irrigation district in action at law on district warrants for services rendered in maintenance and operation of irrigation system, could keep judgment alive and toll statutes of limitations only by bringing action to renew judgment.

5. Limitation of actions

The statute of limitations runs against irrigation district warrants for services rendered in maintenance and operation of irrigation system, whether in action to place warrants in judgment or in mandamus proceeding to compel district's fiscal officers to levy taxes on lands in district to satisfy warrants.

6. Judgment

In suit on money judgment for civil cause of action, validity of claim on which judgment is founded is not open to inquiry whatever its genesis, as judgment is obligation to pay money in nature of debt on specialty, and recovery thereon can be resisted only on ground that court which rendered it was without jurisdiction or that it has ceased to be obligatory because of payment or other discharge.

7. Judgment

An attack on judgment in action to renew it is regarded as "collateral attack" and can avail only when there is want of jurisdiction of parties or subject-matter.

8. Judgment

A judgment cannot be collaterally attacked, though obtained by extrinsic fraud, unless its invalidity for such reason appears on face of judgment.

9. Judgment

Where complaint in action on irrigation district warrants for services rendered in maintenance and operation of irrigation system apprised district of claim sued on and stated cause of action and court had jurisdiction of parties and subject-matter, judgment for plaintiff was invulnerable to collateral attack in action to renew judgment, even if it was procured by fraud or collusion, in absence of showing of extrinsic fraud on face of judgment.

10. Judgment

Generally in action on judgment, no defense which accrued before rendition of judgment is admissible.

11. Judgment

Judgment against irrigation district on warrants for services rendered was res judicata, in action to renew judgment, as to all defenses which should or could have been raised in action wherein judgment was rendered.

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, for Elmore County. Hon. Chas. F. Koelsch Judge.

Affirmed.

E. H. Anderson and Charles F. Reddoch for appellant.

The plaintiff and his predecessors in interest, the Tingwall Stores Company had a complete, simple and ample remedy by registering the warrants with the treasurer of the district, which precluded a money judgment thereon. (I.C.A., sec. 42-904, chap. 134, Ida. S. L. 1925; I.C.A., sec. 42-317, Cal. Laws 1919, p. 667, amending sec. 52, Irr. Dist. Law; Moody v. Provident Irr. District (Cal. App.), 77 P.2d 253.)

A money judgment was and is not available to the plaintiff and its predecessor in interest, the Tingwall Stores Company, for the reason that the only remedy he or it ever had was in mandamus. (Moody v. Provident Irr. District, (Cal. App.), 77 P.2d 253; Rio Grande Junction Ry. Co. v. Orchard Mesa Irr. Dist., 64 Colo. 334, 171 P. 367; Henrylen Irr. Dist. v. Thomas, 64 Colo. 413, 173 P. 541; May v. School Dist. No. v, 24 Mont. 219, 61 P. 250.)

The judgment of March 16, 1936, issuing a peremptory writ of mandate, requiring levies to be made to pay the plaintiff's judgment is bar t othe present action. (Louis v. Brown Township, 109 U.S. 162, 27 L. ed. 892, 3 S.Ct. 92; Barney v. Texarkana, 185 Ark. 1123, 51 S.W.2d 509; Saul v. Freeman, 24 Fla. 209, 4 So. 577, 12 Am. St. Rep. 190.)

A. F. James and Edwin Snow for respondent.

The remedies open to the holder of a dishonored municipal warrant are either, (1) an action at law against the corporation, or, (2) mandamus to compel payment or to compel a levy to satisfy the warrant. The holder is not limited to mandamus proceedings. (44 C.J., p. 1175, sec. 4137 (92); Goldsmith v. City of Baker City (Ore.), 49 P. 973, followed in Seton v. Hoyt, 55 p. 967 at p. 969, col. 2; Traveler's Insurance Co. v. City of Denver (Colo.), 18 P. 556 (3); Raton Water Works Co. v. Town of Raton (N. Mex.), 49 P. 898 (11); Raton Water Works Co. v. Town of Raton, 174 U.S. 360, 19 S.C.R. 719; Cleveland National Bank v. Board of Education of City of Cleveland (Okla.), 179 P. 464 (1).

There is under the laws of this state but one method of procedure for keeping alive a judgment for the recovery of money and that is an action to renew the judgment. (Bashor v. Beloit , 20 Ida. 592 (8), 119 P. 55.)

The right to renew a judgment is not dependent upon the right or lack of right to have an execution issued. (Bashor v. Beloit, 20 Ida. 592 (3); Caxton Printers Ltd. v. Ulen, 59 Ida. 688 (5), 86 P.2d 468.)

An attack on a judgment in a suit to renew such judgment is regarded as a collateral attack on the judgment and can avail only when there is want of jurisdiction either of the parties or of the subject matter. (Edward Thompson Co. v. Thomas, 49 F.2d 500 D.C.; Sharon v. Terry, 36 F. 337 (1); 31 Am. Jur. sec. 620, p. 208-9 and p. 60, sec. 389 (6); Bank of EauClaire v. Reed (Ill.), 83 N.E. 820-1.)

Budge, J. Ailshie, C.J., and Givens, Holden and Miller, JJ., concur.

OPINION

Budge, J.

In the years 1920 and 1921 appellant, King Hill Irrigation District, issued certain warrants for labor and other services in connection with the maintenance and operation of its irrigation system, which were acquired by the Tingwall Stores Company. Thereafter on April 13, 1926, Tingwall Stores Company filed a suit in the district court of Elmore county to recover a judgment on said warrants. May 13, 1926, judgment against the King Hill Irrigation District on the warrants was entered. Sometime after the rendition of the judgment, A. W. Tingwall, respondent, became the owner of said judgment, and on September 12, 1932, obtained a judgment in the district court of Elmore county in renewal of the judgment of May 13, 1926. August 24, 1938, A. W. Tingwall filed the present action to renew the judgment of September 12, 1932.

No defenses were interposed to the taking of the first or second judgments. In the present action to renew the second judgment appellant interposed certain defenses, hereinafter referred to.

The trial court held that all defenses interposed were without merit, entered a renewal judgment on May 8, 1943, from which judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

It is not controverted that appellant is an irrigation district organized under the laws of this state, and owns and operates an irrigation system. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an irrigation district is not, strictly speaking, a municipal corporation, but a quasi-municipal corporation operating its irrigation system in a proprietary capacity, and such municipal powers as it may have are only secondary or incidental. (Lewiston Orchards Irr. Dist. v. Gilmore, 53 Ida. 377, 23 P.2d 720; Eldridge v. Black Canyon Irr. Dist., 55 Ida. 443, 43 P.2d 1052; Sudler, Wegener & Co. v. Hillsdale Irr. Dist., 63 Ida. 546, 123 P.2d 420; Tingwall & Duffy v. King Hill Irr. Dist., 64 Ida. 207, 129 P.2d 898.)

In American Falls Reservoir Dist. v. Thrall, 39 Ida. 105, 228 P. 236, it was held that assessments levied against land in an irrigation district constituted a general obligation of the district.

It is urged by appellant that no action for money judgment was ever maintainable on the warrants issued in 1920 and 1921, and acquired by respondent, that the only remedy at any time available to the warrant-holder was a proceeding for writ of mandate against the proper officers of the district to compel levies for the payment of such warrants.

In our opinion the above contention cannot be sustained.

The warrants here in question were general obligations of the appellant Irrigation District. (American Falls Reservoir Dist. v. Thrall, supra.) The holder of the warrants had two remedies, first, an action at law against the corporation to reduce the warrants to a money judgment or, second mandamus against the fiscal officers of the irrigation district to compel a levy against all the land within the district to satisfy the warrants. (44 C.J. p. 1175, sec. 4137; Walnut Township v. Jordan (Kan.), 16 P. 812; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Denver (Colo.), 18 P. 556; Goldsmith v. Baker City (Ore.), 49 P. 973; Frankl v. Bailey (Ore.), 50 P. 186; Smith v. Polk County (Ore.), 112 P. 715; Cleveland Nat'l Bank v. Bd. of Education (Okla.), 179 P. 464; Farwell v. San Jacinto Etc. Irr. Dist. (Cal.), 192 P. 1034; People v. Honey Lake Valley Irr. Dist. (Cal.), 246 P. 819; Heffleman v. Pennington County (S.D.), 52 N.W.851; Mills County Nat. Bank v. Mills County (Ia.), 25 N.W. 884; Grand Lodge v. City of Bottineau (N.D...