Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District

Decision Date24 February 1969
Docket NumberNo. 21,21
Citation393 U.S. 503,21 L.Ed.2d 731,89 S.Ct. 733
PartiesJohn F. TINKER and Mary Beth Tinker, Minors, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Dan Johnston, Des Moines, Iowa, for petitioners.

Allan A. Herrick, Des Moines, Iowa, for respondents.

Mr. Justice FORTAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner John F. Tinker, 15 years old, and petitioner Christopher Eckhardt, 16 years old, attended high schools in Des Moines, Iowa. Petitioner Mary Beth Tinker, John's sister, was a 13-year-old student in junior high school.

In December 1965, a group of adults and students in Des Moines held a meeting at the Eckhardt home. The group determined to publicize their objections to the hostilities in Vietnam and their support for a truce by wearing black armbands during the holiday season and by fasting on December 16 and New Year's Eve. Petitioners and their parents had previously engaged in similar activities, and they decided to participate in the program.

The principals of the Des Moines schools became aware of the plan to wear armbands. On December 14, 1965, they met and adopted a policy that any student wearing an armband to school would be asked to remove it, and if he refused he would be suspended until he returned without the armband. Petitioners were aware of the regulation that the school authorities adopted.

On December 16, Mary Beth and Christopher wore black armbands to their schools. John Tinker wore his armband the next day. They were all sent home and suspended from school until they would come back without their armbands. They did not return to school until after the planned period for wearing armbands had expired—that is, until after New Year's Day.

This complaint was filed in the United States District Court by petitioners, through their fathers, under § 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. It prayed for an injunction restraining the respondent school officials and the respondent members of the board of directors of the school district from disciplining the petitioners, and it sought nominal damages. After an evidentiary hearing the District Court dismissed the complaint. It up- held the constitutionality of the school authorities' action on the ground that it was reasonable in order to prevent disturbance of school disipline. 258 F.Supp. 971 (1966). The court referred to but expressly declined to follow the Fifth Circuit's holding in a similar case that the wearing of symbols like the armbands cannot be prohibited unless it 'materially and substantially interfere(s) with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.' Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966).1

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the case en banc. The court was equally divided, and the District Court's decision was accordingly affirmed, without opinion, 383 F.2d 988 (1967). We granted certiorari. 390 U.S. 942, 88 S.Ct. 1050, 19 L.Ed.2d 1130 (1968).

I.

The District Court recognized that the wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931). Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 86 S.Ct. 719, 15 L.Ed.2d 637 (1966). As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it. It was closely akin to 'pure speech' which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555, 85 S.Ct. 453, 464, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966).

First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 43 S.Ct. 628, 67 L.Ed. 1047 (1923), this Court, in opinions by Mr. Justice McReynolds, held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents States from forbidding the teaching of a foreign language to young students. Statutes to this effect, the Court held, unconstitutionally interfere with the liberty of teacher, student, and parent.2 See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, etc., 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L.Ed. 649 (1948); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195, 73 S.Ct. 215, 220, 97 L.Ed. 216 (1952) (concurring opinion); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487, 81 S.Ct. 247, 251, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 87 S.Ct. 675, 683, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968).

In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, supra, this Court held that under the First Amendment, the student in public school may not be compelled to salute the flag. Speaking through Mr. Justice Jackson, the Court said:

'The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.' 319 U.S., at 637, 63 S.Ct. at 1185.

On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools. See Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, 393 U.S. at 104, 89 S.Ct. at 270; Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, 262 U.S. at 402, 43 S.Ct. at 627. Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities.

II.

The problem posed by the present case does not relate to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of cloth- ing, to hair style, or deportment. Cf. Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 392 F.2d 697 (C.A.5th Cir. 1968); Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538, 30 A.L.R. 1212 (1923). It does not concern aggressive, disruptive action or even group demonstrations. Our problem involves direct, primary First Amendment rights akin to 'pure speech.'

The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of petitioners. There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners' interference, actual or nascent, with the schools' work or of collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone. Accordingly, this case does not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students.

Only a few of the 18,000 students in the school system wore the black armbands. Only five students were suspended for wearing them. There is no indication that the work of the schools or any class was disrupted. Outside the classrooms, a few students made hostile remarks to the children wearing armbands, but there were no threats or acts of violence on school premises.

The District Court concluded that the action of the school authorities was reasonable because it was based upon their fear of a disturbance from the wearing of the armbands. But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949); and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputations, society.

In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,' the prohibition cannot be sustained....

To continue reading

Request your trial
2483 cases
  • Rumler v. BOARD OF SCH. TR. FOR LEXINGTON CTY. DIST. NO. 1 SCHOOLS
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
    • May 17, 1971
    ...that freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution? Of necessity the court's attention is directed to Tinker10 which directed that, "In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled......
  • Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, Civil Action No. 4:06-1042-TLW.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
    • September 8, 2009
    ..."shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). Courts have noted that the Constitution does not compel teachers and school officials "to surr......
  • Crownover v. Musick
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • May 1, 1973
    ...some conduct which is expressive or communicative may be entitled to First Amendment protection (Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. (1969) 393 U.S. 503, 505--506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731); second, 'certain forms of conduct mixed with speech may be regulated or prohibited.' (Cox v. Louis......
  • People v. Glaze
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • August 7, 1980
    ...Such an undifferentiated approach is not sufficient to limit the right to free expression. (See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. (1969) 393 U.S. 503, 508, 89 S.Ct. 733, 737, 21 L.Ed.2d 731; Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 101, 92 S.Ct. at 2293; Cohen v. Califo......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 firm's commentaries
  • U.S. Supreme Court: School District Cannot Fire Coach for Personal Religious Observance After Games
    • United States
    • LexBlog United States
    • June 29, 2022
    ...line at the completion of football games. The Court leaned on its holding in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), that the First Amendment’s protections extend to “teachers and students,” neither of whom “shed their constitutional rights to free......
  • CAS Legal Mailbag – 3/23/23
    • United States
    • LexBlog United States
    • March 24, 2023
    ...conditions required for regulating student speech as announced by the Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The United States Supreme Court reversed, ruling in favor of school officials, and in so doing announced an exception to the Tinker......
  • CAS Legal Mailbag ' 3/23/23
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
    • April 4, 2023
    ...conditions required for regulating student speech as announced by the Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 The United States Supreme Court reversed, ruling in favor of school officials, and in so doing announced an exception to the Tinker standar......
152 books & journal articles
  • The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and Citations
    • United States
    • Iowa Law Review No. 97-3, March 2012
    • March 1, 2012
    ...(1968) Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) Gaston Cnty. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (19......
  • The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and Citations
    • United States
    • Iowa Law Review No. 97-3, March 2012
    • March 1, 2012
    ...(1968) Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) Gaston Cnty. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (19......
  • Challenges facing LGBTQ youth
    • United States
    • Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law No. XXIV-2, January 2023
    • January 1, 2023
    ...257. RICHARD FOSSEY & TODD A. DEMITCHELL, STUDENT DRESS CODES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT ix (Rowman & Littlef‌ield eds., 2014). 258. Id. 259. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 260. Id. at 514. 261. 567 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (N.D. Fla. 2008). 262. Id. at 1375–79, 1362 (citing Tinker , 393 U.S. 503, 506). 263. Se......
  • The Children's Internet Protection Act: a Denial of a Student's Opportunity to Learn in a Technology-rich Environment
    • United States
    • Georgia State University College of Law Georgia State Law Reviews No. 19-3, March 2003
    • Invalid date
    ...technology; . . . (iii) . . . (C) Keyboarding and computer applications . . . ."). [432]. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). [433]. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). [434]. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. [435]. See Fraser, 478 ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT