Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, No. 21

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtFORTAS
PartiesJohn F. TINKER and Mary Beth Tinker, Minors, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al
Decision Date24 February 1969
Docket NumberNo. 21

393 U.S. 503
89 S.Ct. 733
21 L.Ed.2d 731
John F. TINKER and Mary Beth Tinker, Minors, etc., et al., Petitioners,

v.

DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.

No. 21.
Argued Nov. 12, 1968.
Decided Feb. 24, 1969.

Dan Johnston, Des Moines, Iowa, for petitioners.

Allan A. Herrick, Des Moines, Iowa, for respondents.

Page 504

Mr. Justice FORTAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner John F. Tinker, 15 years old, and petitioner Christopher Eckhardt, 16 years old, attended high schools in Des Moines, Iowa. Petitioner Mary Beth Tinker, John's sister, was a 13-year-old student in junior high school.

In December 1965, a group of adults and students in Des Moines held a meeting at the Eckhardt home. The group determined to publicize their objections to the hostilities in Vietnam and their support for a truce by wearing black armbands during the holiday season and by fasting on December 16 and New Year's Eve. Petitioners and their parents had previously engaged in similar activities, and they decided to participate in the program.

The principals of the Des Moines schools became aware of the plan to wear armbands. On December 14, 1965, they met and adopted a policy that any student wearing an armband to school would be asked to remove it, and if he refused he would be suspended until he returned without the armband. Petitioners were aware of the regulation that the school authorities adopted.

On December 16, Mary Beth and Christopher wore black armbands to their schools. John Tinker wore his armband the next day. They were all sent home and suspended from school until they would come back without their armbands. They did not return to school until after the planned period for wearing armbands had expired—that is, until after New Year's Day.

This complaint was filed in the United States District Court by petitioners, through their fathers, under § 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. It prayed for an injunction restraining the respondent school officials and the respondent members of the board of directors of the school district from disciplining the petitioners, and it sought nominal damages. After an evidentiary hearing the District Court dismissed the complaint. It up-

Page 505

held the constitutionality of the school authorities' action on the ground that it was reasonable in order to prevent disturbance of school disipline. 258 F.Supp. 971 (1966). The court referred to but expressly declined to follow the Fifth Circuit's holding in a similar case that the wearing of symbols like the armbands cannot be prohibited unless it 'materially and substantially interfere(s) with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.' Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966).1

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the case en banc. The court was equally divided, and the District Court's decision was accordingly affirmed, without opinion, 383 F.2d 988 (1967). We granted certiorari. 390 U.S. 942, 88 S.Ct. 1050, 19 L.Ed.2d 1130 (1968).

I.

The District Court recognized that the wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931). Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 86 S.Ct. 719, 15 L.Ed.2d 637 (1966). As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it. It was closely akin to 'pure speech'

Page 506

which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555, 85 S.Ct. 453, 464, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966).

First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 43 S.Ct. 628, 67 L.Ed. 1047 (1923), this Court, in opinions by Mr. Justice McReynolds, held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents States from forbidding the teaching of a foreign language to young students. Statutes to this effect, the Court held, unconstitutionally interfere with the liberty of teacher, student, and parent.2 See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, etc., 268

Page 507

U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L.Ed. 649 (1948); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195, 73 S.Ct. 215, 220, 97 L.Ed. 216 (1952) (concurring opinion); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487, 81 S.Ct. 247, 251, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 87 S.Ct. 675, 683, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968).

In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, supra, this Court held that under the First Amendment, the student in public school may not be compelled to salute the flag. Speaking through Mr. Justice Jackson, the Court said:

'The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.' 319 U.S., at 637, 63 S.Ct. at 1185.

On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools. See Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, 393 U.S. at 104, 89 S.Ct. at 270; Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, 262 U.S. at 402, 43 S.Ct. at 627. Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities.

II.

The problem posed by the present case does not relate to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of cloth-

Page 508

ing, to hair style, or deportment. Cf. Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 392 F.2d 697 (C.A.5th Cir. 1968); Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538, 30 A.L.R. 1212 (1923). It does not concern aggressive, disruptive action or even group demonstrations. Our problem involves direct, primary First Amendment rights akin to 'pure speech.'

The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of petitioners. There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners' interference, actual or nascent, with the schools' work or of collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone. Accordingly, this case does not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students.

Only a few of the 18,000 students in the school system wore the black armbands. Only five students were suspended for wearing them. There is no indication that the work of the schools or any class was disrupted. Outside the classrooms, a few students made hostile remarks to the children wearing armbands, but there were no threats or acts of violence on school premises.

The District Court concluded that the action of the school authorities was reasonable because it was based upon their fear of a disturbance from the wearing of the armbands. But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949); and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is

Page 509

the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputations, society.

In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of...

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  • Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox, No. 87-2013
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    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1989
    ...drawing lessons and stone sculpture lessons, comes immediately to mind). See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969); cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949). It cannot plausibly be asserted t......
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    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • April 13, 1972
    ...Moreover, James' own rights are sufficient to support his claim within the language of Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 "Students in school as well as out of school are `persons\' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundament......
  • Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public School Dist., No. 3:94-cv-411WS.
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    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Southern District of Mississippi
    • September 2, 1994
    ...v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993), and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), the Attorney General contends that the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs would result in an ......
  • IOTA XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University, No. 91-2684
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • May 10, 1993
    ...Chi's conduct against the substantial interests inherent in educational endeavors. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). The University certainly has a substantial interest in maintaining an educational environment free of d......
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2396 cases
  • Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox, No. 87-2013
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1989
    ...drawing lessons and stone sculpture lessons, comes immediately to mind). See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969); cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949). It cannot plausibly be asserted t......
  • Stull v. School Board of Western Beaver Jr.-Sr. HS, No. 71-1674.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • April 13, 1972
    ...Moreover, James' own rights are sufficient to support his claim within the language of Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 "Students in school as well as out of school are `persons\' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundament......
  • Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public School Dist., No. 3:94-cv-411WS.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Southern District of Mississippi
    • September 2, 1994
    ...v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993), and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), the Attorney General contends that the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs would result in an ......
  • IOTA XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University, No. 91-2684
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • May 10, 1993
    ...Chi's conduct against the substantial interests inherent in educational endeavors. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). The University certainly has a substantial interest in maintaining an educational environment free of d......
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    ...Speech, 46 GA. L. REV. 1157 (2012) (discussing the circuit split and arguing for the Court to grant certiorari to resolve it). (5.) 393 U.S. 503(1969). (6.) Id. at (7.) Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). (8.) Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007). (9.) Haz......
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