Tinnon v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, Civ. A. No. 414.
Decision Date | 21 November 1958 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 414. |
Citation | 167 F. Supp. 675 |
Parties | W. H. TINNON, Plaintiff, v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
Thomas B. Tinnon, Mountain Home, Ark., Charles R. Garner, Ft. Smith, Ark., for plaintiff.
Herschel H. Friday, Jr., Little Rock, Ark., for defendant.
The plaintiff, W. H. Tinnon, is a citizen of Arkansas and resides in the town of Cotter in Marion County, Arkansas. The defendant is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Missouri, and is engaged in the operation of railroads in the State of Arkansas.
On May 29, 1957, the plaintiff filed his complaint in which he alleged that on or about October 1, 1910, while a citizen and resident of the State of Missouri, he entered into a contract of employment with the defendant as a railroad locomotive fireman in which it was agreed, among other things, that plaintiff would continue in the employment of defendant under the terms and conditions of the written contract and agreement between the defendant and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers, a duly constituted labor organization, which written agreement was for the benefit of the plaintiff and others similarly situated; that the plaintiff at all times material herein is and has been a member in good standing of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers and/or Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers; that contracts or agreements made or existing at all times material herein between the defendant and either of the said brotherhoods were made and are kept in force for the benefit of the plaintiff and other members of the brotherhoods.
That on about August 22, 1930, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers entered into a written contract and agreement with the defendant for the benefit of the plaintiff and other employees of the defendant by the terms and conditions of which it was provided in Article 44 thereof, "no engineer shall be discharged, suspended or have notation placed against his record without just or sufficient cause." That this contract was in full force and effect on November 7, 1955.
That the plaintiff entered upon the performance of his contract and duly performed all of the conditions of the contract, agreement of scheduled wages at any and all times in force and effect until he was discharged without just cause by the defendant. The plaintiff further alleged:
"On or about the 18th day of November, 1955, while plaintiff was engaged in duly carrying out his contract of employment, the defendant, without any fault on the part of the plaintiff, and specifically without just or sufficient cause, did discharge plaintiff from its employment and refused to permit him to carry out his agreement."
That immediately prior to his discharge the plaintiff was employed as a locomotive engineer and was earning, under the terms and conditions of his contract of employment, $8,500 annually; that by reason of the wrongful discharge plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $12,625 that he would have and could have earned between the 18th day of November, 1955, and the 18th day of May, 1957, as wages; that plaintiff was damaged in the further sum of $96,000 that he would and could have earned between May 18, 1957, and May 18, 1969, his reasonable life expectancy.
The prayer is that plaintiff recover $108,000, with interest and costs.
In due time the defendant filed its answer in which the defendant admitted that the plaintiff was originally employed by defendant as a locomotive fireman in 1910, but denied that under the contract of employment plaintiff was to continue in the employment of the defendant under the terms and conditions of the contract or agreement between defendant and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers.
The defendant also denied that the contract or contracts between it and the labor organizations was made for the benefit of the plaintiff.
Admitted that an agreement was entered into effective September 1, 1930, between the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the defendant and that Article 44 of said agreement is as follows:
That the agreement above referred to was in effect on the 7th day of November, 1955, and was in effect at the time of the trial. Denied that the plaintiff was discharged from his employment without just cause and admitted that on or about November 16 the plaintiff was dismissed from the service of the defendant, and alleged that said dismissal was just and for sufficient cause and based upon admitted violations of the operating rules then in effect. The prayer of the answer was that the plaintiff recover nothing and that the complaint of plaintiff be dismissed.
After some two or three pre-trial conferences the cause proceeded to trial to a jury. The trial of the case to a jury began on September 10, 1958, and was concluded the next day, September 11.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and as grounds therefor stated:
At the conclusion of all of the testimony, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the following grounds:
Action on the motion to dismiss was reserved by the court and the motion for directed verdict in favor of defendant was denied. The case was argued and submitted to the jury which considered the case until the afternoon of September 12, when the jury reported that it was unable to reach a verdict, and an order of mistrial was entered.
On September 20, 1958, the defendant, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 50, F.R.Civ.Proc., 28 U.S.C.A., moved the court to enter judgment for it in accordance with its motion for a directed verdict filed at the close of all of the evidence. This motion substantially reiterates the grounds as alleged in the motion for a directed verdict.
On October 2, 1958, prior to the consideration by the court of the motion of defendant for judgment in accordance with its motion for a directed verdict, the plaintiff filed his motion for leave to dismiss without prejudice, which motion was on October 18, 1958, denied, and the questions...
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Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Service, Inc.
...S.W.2d 158 (1955). Therefore any discharge, whether it be with or without cause cannot constitute a breach of contract. Tinnon v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 167 F.Supp. 675, aff'd 282 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. Thus, defendants conclude, Arkansas law requires consideration from the employee in addition ......
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Tinnon v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company
...for a directed verdict. This was granted and judgment was entered. The appeal is from that judgment. The trial court's opinion, found at 167 F.Supp. 675, is detailed. It sets forth (a) the facts, few of which are disputed, (b) Article 44 of the collective bargaining agreement, effective Sep......
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Freeman v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co.
...990, 167 S.W.2d 895, and as recently as 1956 in Smithey v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., supra, and 1958 in Tinnon v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, D.C., 167 F.Supp. 675, affd. 8 Cir., 282 F.2d Also see Hanson v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, 7 Cir., 282 F.2d 758, fo......