Tipton v. Atchison Co

Decision Date27 April 1936
Docket NumberNo. 664,S.F. RY,664
Citation104 A.L.R. 831,56 S.Ct. 715,80 L.Ed. 1091,298 U.S. 141
PartiesTIPTON v. ATCHISON, T. &CO
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. Herman A. Bachrack, of Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioner.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 142-144 intentionally omitted] Mr. Leo E. Sievert, of Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.

[Argument of Counsel from page 144 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner, a citizen of California, brought an action against the respondent in the superior court of the state to recover for injuries sustained in the course of his employment as a switchman. The complaint recites that the respondent, a Kansas corporation, is a common carrier by railroad in interstate commerce, authorized to transact business in California, and that the line on which the accident occurred is a highway of interstate commerce. The cause of petitioner's injury is alleged to have been a defective coupling apparatus upon a freight car, used in violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts.1 The complaint does not state that, at the time of the accident, petitioner was engaged in interstate commerce. After removal to the federal court, a demurrer was filed challenging the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained and leave to amend refused. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that as the petitioner, when injured, was not engaged in interstate commerce, he may seek redress only under the California Workmen's Compensation Act (Gen.Laws Cal.1931, Act 4749).2 The petitioner sought review by this court on the ground that the decision conflicts with adjudications of the California courts sustaining the right to maintain an action for damages in like circumstances. We granted certiorari.

The Safety Appliance Acts impose an absolute duty upon an employer and prescribe penal sanctions for breach. The earliest, that of 1893, affected only cars which were being used in interstate commerce. By the Act of 1903, the duty was extended to all cars used upon any railroad which is a highway of interstate commerce.3 The absolute duty imposed necessarily supersedes the common-law duty of the employer. But, unlike the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51—59), which gives a right of action for negligence, the Safety Appliance Acts leave the nature and the incidents of the remedy to the law of the states.4 The Safety Appliance Acts modify the enforcement, by civil action, of the employee's common-law right in only one aspect; namely, by withdrawing the defense of assumption of risk.5 They do not touch the common or statute law of a state governing venue, limitations, contributory negligence, or recovery for death by wrongful act.6

In Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 482, 60 L.Ed. 874, it was decided that, as the first Safety Appliance Act had been extended by later legislation to equipment used in intrastate transportation upon a railroad which is a highway of interstate commerce, an employee injured as the result of a violation of the act, in respect of a car so used, is entitled to recover for breach of the duty imposed on the carrier. Nothing more was there adjudicated. While the opinion discussed the power of Congress, in connection with such regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, not only to enlarge the common-law duty of the employer and thus alter substantive rights of the empoloyee, but also to afford a correlative remedy, the construction put upon the Safety Appliance Acts was that they remit the person injured to such remedy as the state law affords.

As respects an injury occurring during the course of employment in intrastate activities on a highway of interstate commerce, the question has arisen whether a state may substitute workmen's compensation for the common-law or statutory action whereby damages could have been recovered for violation of the Safety Appliance Acts. A number of courts have interpreted the discussion in the Rigsby Case as a denial of the power of the states to make the substitution. 7

This court has recently reaffirmed the principle that the Safety Appliance Acts do not give a right of action for their breach, but leave the genesis and regulation of such action to the law of the states. In Moore v. C. & O. Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 54 S.Ct. 402, 78 L.Ed. 755, it was held competent for a state to embody the provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts in its own statute and to provide that an employee, injured by violation of the federal acts, should have a cause of action under the local statute. In Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Railway Co., 292 U.S. 578 54 S.Ct. 573, 78 L.Ed. 1123, it was decided that an elective Compensation Act afforded appropriate redress to an employee injured in intrastate transportation as a result of violation of the Safety Appliance Acts; and it was said that those acts do not dictate or prescribe the method of the enforcement of the liability arising from the breach of the duty they impose, or extend to the field occupied by a state Compensation Act. In Fairport, etc., R. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589, 54 S.Ct. 826, 78 L.Ed. 1446, an action in a state court, based upon a violation of the Safety Appliance Acts, this court held that application of the doctrines of contributory negligence and last clear chance by the state court raised no federal questions reviewable here.

In McMahon v. Montour R. Co., 270 U.S. 628, 46 S.Ct. 207, 70 L.Ed. 769, cited by the petitioner, the judgment of the state court was reversed, not because that court had held that remedy for breach of the duty imposed by the Safety Appliance Acts was afforded by the state Workmen's Compensation Law, but because of its erroneous decision that the federal acts were inapplicable to the cars used in intrastate operations of the railroad, although it was a highway of interstate commerce.8

California is at liberty to afford any appropriate remedy for breach of the duty imposed by the Safety Appliance Acts. Her choice in the matter raises no federal question, and the federal courts are as much bound as those of California to conform to the remedial procedure she has adopted. There is nothing to prevent her prescribing workmen's compensation, elective or compulsory, in lieu of a common-law or statutory action for disability or death arising from a breach of the duty imposed. The question is: Has California, as the petitioner insists, excepted from the scope of yer Workmen's Compensation Act injuries sustained by an employee engaged in intrastate transportation? The Circuit Court of Appeals thought she had not. Whether this conclusion is right depends upon the force and effect of two District Court of Appeal decisions, which the Supreme Court of the state refused to review.

Ballard v. Sacramento Northern Railway Company, 126 Cal.App. 486, 14 P.(2d) 1045, 15 P.(2d) 793, was an action by the administratrix of a brakeman who was killed as a result of a violation of the Safety Appliance Acts. The defendant's railroad was a highway of interstate commerce, but the decedent was not engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident. The complaint contained no count based upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Nevertheless, the court, in affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, dealt with the trial court's charge as to contributory negligence as if the action were one brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,9 and referred to the amending Act of 1910,10 conferring on state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction of actions for damages under the Liability Act, which has no bearing upon actions brought under the Safety Appliance Acts. The railway company insisted that the state Workmen's Compensation Act afforded the only redress for the dece ent's death. In overruling the contention, the court cited Smithson v. A., T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 174 Cal 148, 162 P. 111, a case dealing not with the Safety Appliance Acts, but with the Federal Employers' Liability Act, saying that the two statutes correspond in force and effect. The court added (126 Cal.App. 486, at page 495, 14 P.(2d) 1045, 1049, 15 P.(2d) 793): 'By subdivision (c) of section 69 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (St.1917, p. 877), it is expressly provided that where interstate commerce questions are presented, resort to the courts is not prohibited.'

In Walton v. So. Pac. Co. (Cal.App.) 48 P.(2d) 108, 115, plaintiff, as administratrix, sued for the death of her husband, an employee of the defendant. The first and third counts were based upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act; alleged the decedent and the defendant were engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident; and described the negligence alleged to have caused the decedent's death. The second count was founded upon the Federal Boiler Inspection Act.11 A trial resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff. Holding that the decedent was not engaged in interstate transportation, the court proceeded to discuss the count framed under the Boiler Inspection Act. It overruled the defendant's contention that the cause of action was barred, basing its decision upon the section of the state Code of Civil Procedure limiting the time within which to bring an action for death. In this connection the court referred to Moore v. C. & O. Ry. Co., supra, as deciding that the Safety Appliance Acts do not affect the time of bringing suit or govern the right to recover for death; and also noted the statement in Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co., supra, that the right to recover damages sustained by the injured employee 'sprang from the principle of the common law' and was left to be enforced accordingly or, in the case of death, 'according to the applicable statute,' and that the safety acts 'do not extend to the field occupied by the State Compensation Act.' Correctly holding that the same principles apply in an action under...

To continue reading

Request your trial
51 cases
  • Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. United States, Civ. No. R-77-0180.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Eastern District of California
    • November 28, 1978
    ...23 L.Ed.2d at 180. Crane reaffirmed a line of earlier decisions to the same effect. For example, Tipton v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 298 U.S. 141, 56 S.Ct. 715, 80 L.Ed. 1091 (1936), held that "the Safety Appliance Acts leave the nature and the incidents of the remedy to the law of the st......
  • Rush v. Thompson, 39851.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • May 12, 1947
    ...(7) The court erred in refusing to give to the jury, as requested by the defendant, defendant's Instruction 11. Tipton v. Santa Fe, 298 U.S. 141, 56 S. Ct. 715; Also authorities cited under point (2). (8) The verdict of the jury and judgment of the jury was and is excessive. Taylor v. Lumag......
  • Fleming v. Richardson
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • September 17, 1946
    ...72. These acts impose an absolute duty upon an employer and prescribe penal sanctions for breach. Tipton v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 298 U.S. 141, 56 S.Ct. 715, 80 L.Ed. 1091, 104 A.L.R. 831. The Federal Safety Appliance Act is remedial to protect employees and the public from injuries ......
  • Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co Webb v. Illinois Central Railroad Co Herdman v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co Ferguson v. Cormack Lines
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • February 25, 1957
    ...Sess. 8—9, 45—46. 19 Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492, 34 S.Ct. 635, 58 L.Ed. 1062. 20 Tipton v Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 298 U.S. 141, 56 S.Ct. 715, 80 L.Ed. 1091; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U.S. 473, 34 S.Ct. 646, 58 L.Ed. 21 53 Stat. 1404. For this Court's i......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT