Tircuit v. Ribicoff
Decision Date | 20 July 1961 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 13459. |
Citation | 199 F. Supp. 13 |
Parties | Arthur E. TIRCUIT, Plaintiff, v. Abraham A. RIBICOFF, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Frank C. Biggs and John T. McCully, Houston, Tex., for plaintiff.
Woodrow Seals, U. S. Atty., and Robert C. Maley, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for defendant.
The case is before the court upon motions for summary judgment by both parties.
This is an action under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g), to review a "final decision" of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. The decision in question was rendered July 26, 1960, by a hearing examiner in the Office of Hearings and Appeals, Social Security Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Tr. 6-13). This decision became the Secretary's "final decision" on October 18, 1960, when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 2). Said decision holds that plaintiff is not entitled to establishment of a period of disability under the provisions of Section 216(i) of the Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 416(i)) or to disability insurance benefits under the provisions of Section 223 of the Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 423).
Section 405(g) provides, inter alia, that It further declares that "The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." The next subsection, 205(h) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(h), expressly restricts the judicial remedy to the aforesaid manner of judicial review.
The issue then is whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Secretary's finding that plaintiff failed to establish that he is entitled to a period of disability under Section 216 (i) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S. C.A. § 416(i)), or to disability insurance benefits under Section 223 of the Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 423).
To be eligible for benefits, based on his application of April 14, 1959, plaintiff must have been under a continuous "disability" beginning not later than the date of filing his application (42 U.S.C.A. § 423(c)). The Act defines the term "disability" as "* * * inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or to be of long-continued and indefinite duration * * *" (42 U.S.C.A. § 416(i) (1)). Plaintiff's burden was to show that he was suffering from an impairment or a combination of impairments of sufficient severity to render him unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity.
Claimant alleges he first became unable to work in January 1959 due to a stroke and heart condition (Tr. 55, 57). In his request for a hearing, claimant stated as his reasons for disagreement with Bureau's determination:
(Tr. 6-7).
Plaintiff's alleged infirmities include: (1) generalized, moderate arteriosclerosis; (2) moderate hypertension; (3) decreased muscle strength in left arm and leg; (4) intermittent claudication on walking in left leg; (5) slight speech defect; and (6) moderate deafness (these alleged weaknesses are summarized in Tr. 9-11).
The medical evidence consists of the hospital summaries of claimant's treatment following his attack, reports from plaintiff's personal physician, and reports from consultants who have examined him. Initial report covers plaintiff's stay in Veterans Administration Hospital, Houston, from January 6, 1959, to February 16, 1959 (Tr. 63-65). Plaintiff's health is reported as "perfect" until January 4, 1959, when "one * * * morning he found that the was unable to move his left arm or leg." (Tr. 63). Claimant made a satisfactory recovery from his stroke (Tr. 64). At discharge from hospital claimant was "quite ambulatory"; "self-exercise of extremities and return to light work" were recommended (Tr. 64). In September 1959 claimant was examined by Veterans Administration for disability rating purposes. This examination revealed no heart disease nor pathological findings in cardiovascular...
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...Gotshaw v. Ribicoff, 4 Cir., 1962, 307 F.2d 840, 845; Snyder v. Ribicoff, 4 Cir., 1962, 307 F.2d 518, 520; Tircuit v. Ribicoff, S.D.Tex., 1961, 199 F.Supp. 13, 15. 8. The statutory definition of disability imposes the three-fold requirement (a) that there be a "medically determinable physic......
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