Tischner v. Rutledge

• Decision Date: 30 June 1904
• Citation: Tischner v. Rutledge, 35 Wash. 285, 77 P. 388 (Wash. 1904)
• Parties: TISCHNER v. RUTLEDGE et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

77 P. 388

35 Wash. 285

TISCHNER v. RUTLEDGE et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 30, 1904

Appeal from Superior Court, Lincoln County; C. H. Neal, Judge.

Action by Robert Tischner against William Rutledge and others.From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendants other than H. G Anderson appeal.Affirmed.

Thayer & Belt, for appellants.

Martin & Grant, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This is an action of unlawful detainer.The facts are not in dispute and are substantially these: On April 9, 1900, the respondent, being the owner of a store building and the lands on which the same was situate in the city of Davenport, in this state, leased the same to the defendant Anderson at a rental of $33.33 per month, payable monthly, for a term terminating on the 8th day of April, 1901, 'with the privilege at the same rate and terms each year thereafter from year to year.'Anderson held under the lease until September 30, 1902 when he transferred his interests in the premises to the appellantWilliam Rutledge, who in turn sublet a portion thereof to the appellantG. K. Birge.On February 23, 1903the respondent caused notice to be served on the appellants and the defendant Anderson, notifying them that the lease would be terminated on April 8, 1903, and that they were required to quit the possession of the premises and surrender the same to the respondent on that day.In the month following the appellantWilliam Rutledge notified the respondent that he elected to continue to hold possession of the premises under the clause of the lease above quoted, and that he would refuse to surrender possession on the date named by the respondent.Demand for possession was again made on April 8th, which being refused this action was brought under the statutes of forcible entry and detainer to recover such possession.The case was tried before the court without a jury, and resulted in findings of fact substantially as above outlined, from which the trial court concluded as a matter of law that the respondent was entitled to recover and entered a judgment accordingly.

This appeal is taken by Rutledge and Birge, the defendant Anderson not joining therein.Anderson appeared separately and by separate counsel in the court below, and the respondent moves to dismiss the appeal, because, as he contends, the notice of appeal was not served on Anderson as required by statute.The record shows an acceptance of service of the notice over the signature of Anderson, but unaccompanied by any proofs of its genuineness.It is said that this is insufficient, because the court will not take judicial notice of the signatures of persons other than public officers or officers of the court, and that the signature of persons other than such officers must be accompanied by proofs of their genuinencess.It is undoubtedly true that a court will not notice judicially the signature of a defendant unaccompanied by proofs of its genuineness, when it is sought to show thereby the service of an original process by which the defendant is brought into court( Downs v. Board of Directors,4 Wash. 309, 30 P. 147); but this is as far as the rule extends.After a party has once appeared in an action, he may be served with all notices and motions pertaining to that proceeding, and his signature to an acceptance of service thereof is entitled to recognition by the court without other proof of its genuineness than the court requires of any fact it knowns...