Tisdale v. Mayor H. Ford Gravitt
| Citation | 51 F.Supp.3d 1378 |
| Decision Date | 30 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:12–CV–00145–RWS. |
| Parties | Nydia TISDALE, Plaintiff, v. Mayor H. Ford GRAVITT, both individually and in his official capacity, City of Cumming, Georgia and Police Chief Casey Tatum, both individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the City of Cumming, Deputy Police Chief Walter Cook, individually, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Defendants' motion granted in part and denied in part; plaintiff's motion denied. Gerald R. Weber, Law Offices of Gerry Weber, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Hollie G. Manheimer, Stuckey & Manheimer, Inc., Decatur, GA, for Plaintiff.
Dana Kristin Maine, James Monroe Dervin, Kathleen Sullivan Dod, Freeman Mathis & Gary, Atlanta, GA, Dana Brent Miles, Kevin James Tallant, Miles, Patterson, Hansford, Tallant, LLC, Cumming, GA, for Defendants.
This case comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [63], Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on First and Fourth Amendment and Open Meeting Act Claims Against All Defendants [69], and Plaintiff's Consent Request for Redaction [84]. As an initial matter, the Request for Redaction [84] is GRANTED.
Relying on WSB–TV v. Lee, 842 F.2d 1266 (11th Cir.1988) and Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir.2000), Plaintiff asserts that filming public officials in public places is a protected form of expression. Plaintiff argues that Mayor Gravitt's “blanket bar” on filming violated the First Amendment. ( See Pl.'s MSJ Br., Dkt. [69–2] at 14.)
Defendants respond that any restriction on video recording at the City Council meeting was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. (Defs.' Mem. of Law in Support of MSJ (“MSJ Br.”), Dkt. [63–1] at 11.) Defendants contend that Defendant Gravitt's restriction on filming was reasonable and content neutral, and as such did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. ( Id. at 13.) For the reasons provided below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact whether Defendants' restriction on video recording unconstitutionally abridges speech in violation of the First Amendment.
As an initial matter, the Court agrees that Plaintiff has a First Amendment interest in filming public officials at a public meeting. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (). Prohibiting Plaintiff from video recording the meeting—even while permitting her to attend the meeting, take notes, or make audio recordings—impacted how she was able to obtain access to and present information about the City Council and its proceedings. See Blackston v. State of Ala., 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir.1994).
As the Eleventh Circuit has consistently recognized, “[t]he freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment is not inviolate.” Rowe v. City of Cocoa, Fla., 358 F.3d 800, 802 (11th Cir.2004). “[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee persons the right to communicate their views ‘at all times or in any manner that may be desired.’ ” Jones v. Heyman, 888 F.2d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.1989) (quoting Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981)). The Eleventh Circuit has held that city council meetings are “limited” public fora. Rowe, 358 F.3d at 802. “[T]he government may restrict access to limited public fora by content-neutral conditions for the time, place, and manner of access, all of which must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.” Id. at 803 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)) (other internal citations omitted). Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has consistently recognized that the government has a significant interest in “conducting orderly, efficient meetings of public bodies.” Id. (citing Jones, 888 F.2d at 1332).
Nevertheless, the Court finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether the restriction on video recording was narrowly tailored to serve the City of Cumming's significant government interest. To meet the narrow tailoring requirement, the regulation of speech One World One Family Now v. City of Miami Beach, 175 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 781, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989)) (internal modifications omitted). However, “this does not mean that a time, place, or manner regulation may burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests.” Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746).
Based on this record, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that Mayor Gravitt's restrictive policy announced at the April 17, 2012 meeting was a total ban on filming in City Council meetings. If the restriction was a total ban, it burdens more speech than necessary to further the City's interest in maintaining order and efficiency at its City Council meetings; consequently, the restriction was not narrowly tailored to serve the government interest. Because Plaintiff—the non-moving party for the purposes of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment—has presented evidence that could allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Mayor Gravitt announced a total ban, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's First Amendment rights. To the extent that Defendants move for summary judgment on grounds that no constitutional violation occurred, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must be DENIED.
Turning to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, if Mayor Gravitt's policy limited Plaintiff only from filming in the center aisle—in light of his belief that the location of Plaintiff's tripod could create a safety hazard and that her filming could disrupt the decorum of the meeting—the restriction may have been a constitutional time, place, and manner regulation. ( See Defs.' MSJ, Dkt. [63] at 13.) “[T]ime, place, and manner regulations must contain ‘narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards' ‘to guide the official's decision and render it subjective to effective judicial review.’ ” Burk v. Augusta–Richmond Cnty., 365 F.3d 1247, 1256 (11th Cir.2004) (quoting Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 324, 122 S.Ct. 775, 151 L.Ed.2d 783 (2002)). While Defendants take the position that Mayor Gravitt was not a policymaker such to confer municipal liability under Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), discussed infra at Part II.B.2, they concede “the absence of a policy or rule instructing him what to do.” (Defs.' MSJ, Dkt. [63–1] at 23.)
Consequently, if Mayor Gravitt applied “narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards,” the restriction on filming announced at the April 17, 2012 meeting is constitutional as a time, place, and manner restriction. Burk, 365 F.3d at 1256 (quoting Thomas, 534 U.S. at 324, 122 S.Ct. 775). Here, Plaintiff was prevented from filming when she attempted to use a tripod and stood in the center aisle. When Plaintiff returned to the meeting, she sat in a seat and took more video using a handheld camera. ( See Pl.'s SOMF, Dkt. [69–1] ¶ 30.) While Plaintiff claims that Deputy Police Chief Cook “ordered her to stop using the smaller video camera and to stop recording,” Defendants contend that Cook “simply reminded her that the Mayor asked that she not record the meeting.” ( Id.; Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s SOMF, Dkt. [83–1] at 18.) Neither party alleges that Plaintiff at that point stopped filming with her smaller camera. The record and the pleadings reflect that Plaintiff remained seated in the council chamber for the remainder of the meeting. Defendants, therefore, have presented sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could conclude that the restriction on filming was a time, place, and manner restriction.
The Court, on the present record, cannot conclude that Plaintiff's First Amendment rights were violated as a matter of law. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendants' First Amendment liability is DENIED.
Finally, Defendants also move for summary judgment on the alternative basis that even if Plaintiff's First Amendment rights were violated, no named Defendant can be held liable for the violation. The Court now considers whether any named Defendant can be held liable for a First Amendment violation arising from the restriction on filming at the City Council meeting, considering first the individual Defendants' claimed defense of qualified immunity before turning to the City Defendant's argument against municipal liability.
The individual Defendants in this case seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims against them in their individual capacities, claiming the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from being sued in their individual capacities. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). Officials are shielded “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). “To receive qualified immunity, a...
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Tisdale v. Gravitt
...51 F.Supp.3d 1378Nydia TISDALE, Plaintiffv.Mayor H. Ford GRAVITT, both individually and in his official capacity, City of Cumming, Georgia and Police Chief Casey Tatum, both individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the City of Cumming, Deputy Police Chief Walter Cook......