Titan Indem. Co. v. City of Brandon, Miss.
| Decision Date | 30 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:96-CV-820WS. |
| Citation | 27 F.Supp.2d 693 |
| Parties | TITAN INDEMNITY COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BRANDON, MISSISSIPPI, and Bruce Kirby, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
Benjamin E. Griffith, Griffith & Griffith, Cleveland, MS, for Titan Indem. Co.
Mark C. Baker, Baker Law Firm, Brandon, MS, for City of Brandon, Mississippi.
Dale Danks, Jr., Keyes, Danks, Coxwell & Leonard, Jackson, MS, for Bruce Kirby.
Before the court is plaintiff Titan Indemnity Company's motion for summary judgment against defendants City of Brandon, Mississippi, and Bruce Kirby pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 Plaintiff Titan Indemnity Company is the insurer of defendants pursuant to the provisions of a law enforcement liability insurance policy. By the present motion for summary judgment, plaintiff asks this court for a holding that it has no obligation to defend or indemnify the defendants in a civil action in federal court filed by Rex Harris charging the defendants, the City of Brandon, Mississippi, and Bruce Kirby, a Brandon City policeman, with excessive force. Although defendants oppose the motion, this court is persuaded to grant it.
At the center of this action is the underlying complaint of Rex Harris, a third party, filed October 7, 1996, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division, against Bruce Kirby "Individually as a member of the Police Department of the City of Brandon, Mississippi, and as a Metro Narcotics Agent of the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics." In the underlying complaint, Harris alleges that Kirby intentionally and without justification beat, assaulted, threatened and injured him.
Prior to November 8, 1996, Titan Indemnity Company (hereinafter "Titan"), pursuant to the provisions of a law enforcement liability insurance policy, provided a defense for Bruce Kirby (hereinafter "Kirby") and the City of Brandon, Mississippi (hereinafter "Brandon") in that action, subject to a reservation of rights.
On November 8, 1996, Titan commenced this Declaratory Judgment action in this court, seeking an adjudication that it has no duty to defend or indemnify its insureds, defendants Brandon and Kirby. Although Titan acknowledges the insurance contract between it and the defendants herein, Titan points to various factors which, according to Titan, nullify its obligation under the insurance contract to defend or indemnify the insureds.
Defendants oppose the summary judgment motion on the ground that there exist material and disputed issues of fact, namely, that the policy provisions at issue are conflicting and ambiguous. Defendants argue that the term "multi-jurisdictional law enforcement organization" was not defined in the policy and, thus, subject to confusion and ambiguity.
As earlier stated, this court finds plaintiff's summary judgment motion well taken. This court is satisfied that the relevant policy terms are not ambiguous and that the express language of the insurance contract excludes coverage for any conduct undertaken by defendants as members of a multi-jurisdictional law enforcement organization.
On June 7, 1994, Brandon, along with other state and local government entities, entered into an Interlocal Cooperation Agreement, referred to and known as the Capitol Cities Metro Narcotics Unit. This was a joint, cooperative effort among its member entities2 to enforce the criminal laws of the State of Mississippi regarding controlled substances. Several months later, in November, 1994, Brandon sought and obtained law enforcement officers' liability insurance coverage from Titan.
In its application for law enforcement liability insurance, Brandon disclosed the existence of its membership in a multi-jurisdictional law enforcement organization. Thereafter, Titan, through it agents, sent a letter to Brandon offering coverage for the Capitol Cities Metro Narcotics Unit as a multi-jurisdictional law enforcement organization, along with specific questions regarding Brandon's role in the organization. Brandon, which disputes having ever received this letter, never responded to this inquiry and request for information.
Subsequently, Titan issued an insurance policy to Brandon naming the City of Brandon, Mississippi, as its insured, with coverage of $500,000.00 for any occurrence covered under the policy. The subject policy obligates Titan to "pay all sums the insured legally must pay as damages because of personal injury or property damage to which this insurance applies caused by an occurrence resulting from law enforcement activities." The policy defines "occurrence" as "an event and includes continuous or repeated exposure to the same condition that results in: (1) personal injury or property damage the insured did not expect or intend; or (2) personal injury or property damage, although expected or intended by the insured, if an objectively good faith reason existed to cause such injury or damage."
The Titan policy also contains a coverage restriction for multi-jurisdictional law enforcement organizations found at section III. D.6. Specifically, section III.D.6 states:
6. No person or organization is an insured with respect to the conduct of any partnership, joint venture, multi-jurisdictional law enforcement organization or multi-jurisdictional penal institution that is not shown as named insured in the Declarations.
On October 7, 1995, Rex Harris filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division, wherein he alleges that on October 6, 1995, defendant Kirby intentionally, wrongfully and without just cause wilfully, maliciously, vigorously, viciously, and wantonly assaulted, beat and threatened Harris at a location in Jackson, Mississippi. Harris alleges that defendant Kirby beat and kneed him in the groin despite being repeatedly told by a fellow narcotics agent that Harris was the "wrong man." According to Harris' allegations in the complaint, these intentional acts of defendant Kirby were executed without just cause, probable cause or justification, while defendant was working as a Metro Narcotics Agent for the Capitol Cities Metro Narcotics Unit.
Upon receiving notice of the Harris lawsuit, Brandon and Kirby tendered to Titan for defense and indemnification the claims asserted by Harris in his lawsuit. Titan pursuant to the terms of the law enforcement liability insurance policy, provided at that time and continues to provide Brandon and Kirby with a defense, subject to the reservation of rights contained in the policy.
On November 8, 1996, Titan filed its Complaint for Declaratory Relief in this court, seeking an adjudication that it was under no duty to defend or indemnify Brandon or Kirby in the Harris lawsuit because: (1) coverage is excluded for intentional acts for which no objectively good faith reason exists; (2) under allegations of the underlying complaint, Kirby was not acting within the scope of his duties as police officer for the City of Brandon, Mississippi; and (3) the multi-jurisdictional law enforcement organization was not shown as a named insured in the Declarations.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant has demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 819 (5th Cir.1993); Daly v. Sprague, 675 F.2d 716 (5th Cir.1982). Thus, pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,3 summary judgment is mandated in any case where a party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to the case and on which that party has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Rule 56(c) further requires that the court enter summary judgment if the evidence favoring the non-moving party is not sufficient for the trier of fact to enter a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir.1993). When the moving party has carried the Rule 56(c) burden, the opposing party must present more than a metaphysical doubt about the material facts in order to preclude the grant of summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In response to a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party is required to respond with proof of a prima facie case, sufficient for a trier of fact to enter a verdict in its favor. Washington v. Armstrong World Indus., 839 F.2d 1121, 1122-1123 (5th Cir.1988) ().
No one disputes that Mississippi law governs this dispute. This court has diversity jurisdiction pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332,4 inasmuch as the parties are citizens of different states5 and the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.00.6 In a diversity action such as this, the general rule is that the court will apply the law of the state where the cause of action occurred unless with respect to some particular issue another state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence or the parties. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); Davis v. National Gypsum Co., 743 F.2d 1132, 1133 (5th Cir.1984). In the instant case, because the incident triggering the protection of the subject insurance policy occurred in Mississippi and because the insurance contract was to be performed in Mississippi, this court will apply Mississippi law.
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