Titan Indemnity Company v. Cameron, CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-5435 (E.D. Pa. 7/30/2002)

• Decision Date: 30 July 2002
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-5435.
• Citation: Titan Indemnity Company v. Cameron, CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-5435 (E.D. Pa. 7/30/2002) (E.D. Pa. 2002)
• Parties: TITAN INDEMNITY COMPANY v. SCOTT C. CAMERON, and CITY OF EASTON, and ANDREW RAPP, Executor of the Estate of John E. Rapp, Deceased.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

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TITAN INDEMNITY COMPANY v. SCOTT C. CAMERON, and CITY OF EASTON, and ANDREW RAPP, Executor of the Estate of John E. Rapp, Deceased.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-5435.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

July 30, 2002.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

THOMAS J. RUETER, Magistrate Judge.

Titan Indemnity Company ("Titan") filed this Complaint for Declaratory Judgment against its insureds, defendants the City of Easton ("Easton") and former Easton police officer, Scott C. Cameron ("Cameron"). Titan seeks a declaration that it has no duty under a Law Enforcement Officers' Liability Policy issued to Easton (the "Policy") to indemnify defendant Cameron with respect to a civil judgment entered against him on August 27, 2001 in favor of Andrew Rapp ("Rapp"), Executor of the Estate of John E. Rapp, deceased (the "Civil Judgment"). (Complaint at 1-2.)

The case before the court brings to mind Chief Justice Rehnquist's observation "that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). This action arises out of a shooting by defendant Cameron on December 24, 1998 during the course of his employment as a police officer for the City of Easton. Officer Cameron was on duty that Christmas Eve as a uniformed canine patrol officer. He attempted to render assistance to John E. Rapp (the "decedent"), who appeared to be unconscious at the wheel of his parked but running truck situated on the side of a road in a wooded area. The headlights of the truck were on. It was a dark winter night and the area was not well illuminated. When Cameron roused the decedent, the decedent, who was drunk at the time, cursed at Cameron, and struck him with his truck knocking him to the ground. After Cameron partially rose to his feet, decedent struck him a second time with his truck. Cameron drew his service duty weapon, a Smith & Wesson 9mm. semi-automatic pistol, and fired one bullet in the direction of the truck intending to stop the truck before decedent injured others or himself further. The bullet struck and killed the decedent. The time between (1) Cameron first being struck and knocked down by the truck and (2) Cameron firing his weapon, was less than five seconds.

The issue of Cameron's "intent" is central to the determination of whether Titan must indemnify Cameron under the Policy for the judgment entered against him in the underlying civil action. In its Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (Document No. 1) and its Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 22), Titan contends that Cameron expected or intended to cause bodily injury to decedent and, under the terms of the Policy, Titan is not required to indemnify Cameron for the Civil Judgment. Rapp and Cameron argue that Cameron, while intending to fire his weapon, did not expect or intend to injure the decedent and, therefore, Titan is required to indemnify Cameron under the terms of the Policy. (Cameron's Response at 7-15; Rapp's Response at 3-13.) With the parties' consent, the issue of Cameron's "intent" was heard at a non-jury trial conducted on June 25, 2002, with the court acting as the finder of fact.¹

The court must also decide: (1) defendant Cameron's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Cameron's Motion") (Document No. 19)²; and (2) defendant Rapp's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Rapp's Motion") (Document No. 20).³ The issue raised in these motions is whether the Policy is ambiguous and/or illusory as to the coverage provided for civil rights violations. Oral argument on this issue was presented at the June 25, 2002 trial.

For the reasons set forth below, judgment is entered in favor of defendants Rapp, Cameron and the City of Easton to the extent that Titan must indemnify Cameron for the Civil Judgment pursuant to Part I.E.1 of the Policy, since the court finds that Cameron did not intend to cause bodily injury to decedent or to violate decedent's constitutional rights. Rapp and Cameron's Motions for Summary Judgment are denied to the extent they seek a finding that the Policy is ambiguous and/or illusory. Titan's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Titan's request for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that it owes no duty to indemnify Cameron under the Policy is denied.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52, the court makes the following:

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. This is a declaratory judgment action filed by Titan against its insureds, Easton and Cameron.

2. Titan seeks a declaration that it has no duty under a Law Enforcement Officers' Liability Policy issued to Easton to indemnify defendant Cameron for a judgment entered against him on August 27, 2001 in favor of defendant Andrew Rapp, Executor of the Estate of John E. Rapp, deceased.

A. The Policy.

3. At the time of decedent's death on December 24, 1998, Easton maintained a Law Enforcement Officers' Liability Policy with Titan, Policy number 90-HP-01971, which was in effect from January 1, 1997 until January 1, 1998.

4. Pursuant to the terms of the Policy, Titan agreed to:

pay all sums the insured legally must pay as damages because of personal injury or property damage to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence resulting from law enforcement activities. This includes governmental action directed toward the prevention and control of crime in the course of public employment.

(Policy, Part III.A.1.)

5. Titan assumed "the right and duty to defend any claim, suit or action asking for these damages even if it is groundless or fraudulent. This includes but is not limited to . . . civil or criminal suits brought under the Civil Rights Act." (Policy, Part III.A.2.)

6. The term "insured" included "[a]ll law enforcement officers of the law enforcement agency." (Policy, Part III.D.) The law enforcement agency insured by the Policy was the "City of Easton, Pennsylvania." (Policy, Declarations.) The parties do not dispute that Cameron was a law enforcement officer for Easton, and hence an "insured" under the Policy.

7. The Policy defined the term "occurrence" to mean an event and includes continuous or repeated exposure to the same condition that results in:

1. Personal injury or property damage the insured did not expect or intend, or

2. Personal injury or property damage, although expected or intended by the insured, if an objectively good faith reason existed to cause such injury or damage.

(Policy, Part I.E.)

8. The term "personal injury" was defined to mean, inter alia:

1. Bodily Injury. Any physical harm to a person's health including sickness or disease. . . .

2. False arrest, wrongful detention or imprisonment.

. . .

7. Assault and battery.

. . .

10. Violation of civil rights.

(Policy, Part I.F.)

B. The Events Of December 24, 1998.

9. On December 24, 1998, Cameron was a police officer for the City of Easton, Pennsylvania. Cameron had received many commendations and citations for his work as a police officer. (N.T., 8/23/01, at 5-7.) Cameron's supervisor indicated that Cameron was a good police officer. Id. at 36.

10. At the time of the incident, Cameron was married and his wife was expecting their first child. Id. at 2.

11. Cameron was on duty that Christmas Eve as a uniformed canine patrol officer on the four o'clock to midnight shift. Id. at 11.

12. Several hours into his shift, Cameron drove his patrol car into an area known as Hackett's Park to allow his dog a break. Id. at 15.

13. The parties acknowledge that it was a dark night, and that Hackett's Park was not a well illuminated area. Id. at 14, 16, 18. See also N.T., 8/17/01, at 9, 10, 12, 26.

14. As he entered the park, Cameron noticed a pick-up truck parked along the side of Hackett Avenue. Hackett Avenue goes through the park and is surrounded by a wooded area. The headlights of the truck were on. Cameron did nothing at that time because the truck did not look suspicious. (N.T., 8/23/01, at 16-18.) Cameron had seen vehicles pull over in that area before because the road connected the city with outlying townships. Cameron knew from experience that drivers at times stopped in that area to check maps. Id. at 17.

15. When he left the park ten to fifteen minutes later, the truck had not moved. The headlights of the truck remained on and the engine was running. Id.

16. Cameron became concerned because the running truck had remained parked in the same spot for ten to fifteen minutes. Id. Cameron pulled up next to the truck and shined his right side alley light to illuminate the inside of the vehicle. Id. at 18.

17. Cameron saw a white male, later identified as John E. Rapp, in the driver's seat slumped over toward the steering wheel with his eyes closed. Id. at 18-19. Cameron feared that the man was experiencing a "medical problem," or was in "great distress." Id. at 18.

18. Cameron blew his air horn, but the male did not rouse. Id. at 19.

19. Cameron immediately pulled his patrol car in front of the truck, and went back to the truck to render assistance. Id.

20. Cameron pulled his police car in front of the truck even though it was contrary to police regulations. Cameron explained that it is to a police officer's advantage to park the patrol car behind the vehicle the officer is approaching. Since Cameron did not have any suspicions that he was entering into a dangerous situation, but was simply approaching the vehicle to render assistance, he placed his vehicle in front of the truck. Id.

21. Cameron illuminated the inside of the cab of the truck with his flashlight to check on the driver, as well as for his own safety. Id. at 24.

22. Cameron approached the truck and tapped on the window with his hand. The man in the vehicle roused and looked around, then slumped forward again. Cameron then tapped harder on the window to get the driver's attention. The man roused and looked around again. Id. at 24.

23. The man looked in...