Tittle v. Giattina, Fisher & Co., Architects, Inc.

Decision Date03 April 1992
Citation597 So.2d 679
PartiesJessie Leon TITTLE, as Administrator of the Estate of Stephen Warren Tittle, Deceased v. GIATTINA, FISHER & COMPANY, ARCHITECTS, INC., et al. 1910067.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Jeffrey W. Bennitt of Kizer & Bennitt, Birmingham, for appellant.

L. Graves Stiff III and Thomas L. Selden of Starnes & Atchison, Birmingham, for appellee Giattina, Fisher & Co. Architects, Inc.

Charles S. Wagner, Asst. County Atty., for appellee Jefferson County Com'n.

INGRAM, Justice.

Jessie Leon Tittle, the plaintiff, appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants, Giattina, Fisher & Company, Architects, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "architects"), and Jefferson County, the Jefferson County Commission, and David Orange, in his official capacity as a Jefferson County commissioner (all three hereinafter collectively referred to as "the County defendants"), in Tittle's wrongful death action, which he filed as personal representative of the estate of Stephen Warren Tittle.

On October 25, 1988, Stephen Warren Tittle was arrested by the Birmingham police department on a charge of armed robbery. After spending less than six hours in the Birmingham city jail, he was transferred to the Jefferson County jail. On October 28, at about 2:00 a.m., Stephen was found dead, hanging from a six-inch pipe above his bunk.

The plaintiff alleged that the architects had negligently designed the Jefferson County jail and that their negligence had proximately caused the death. On October 17, 1990, the plaintiff later added a claim against the County defendants. All defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court entered a summary judgment for the defendants and the plaintiff appealed.

The plaintiff first contends that the architects owed the decedent a duty to design the jail so as to prevent his suicide. This Court has stated:

"In deciding whether to impose a duty in a construction context, the trial court should analyze six factors:

" ' "(1) [T]he extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the other person; (2) the foreseeability of harm to him; (3) the degree of certainty that he suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury; (5) the moral blame attached to such conduct; and (6) the policy of preventing future harm." ' "

Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. Providence Hospital, 454 So.2d 496, 502-03 (Ala.1984) (quoting Howe v. Bishop, 446 So.2d 11 (Ala.1984) (Torbert, C.J., concurring in the result and quoting United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 45 N.C.App. 400, 406-07, 263 S.E.2d 313, 318, review denied, 300 N.C. 374, 267 S.E.2d 685 (1980))).

No case has been decided in Alabama directly on point with the facts presented here. However, our research has revealed a decision from Illinois that addresses the same issue.

La Bombarbe v. Phillips Swager Associates, Inc., 130 Ill.App.3d 896, 86 Ill.Dec. 28, 474 N.E.2d 942 (1985), addressed the issue whether the defendant, an architectural firm, had a "duty of care to prevent the suicide of the decedent." 86 Ill.Dec. at 29, 474 N.E.2d at 943. In analyzing the issue of the defendant architect's duty owed to a prisoner, the Illinois court held that foreseeability is "by no means the only element of duty." The court stated that " '[t]he likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it and the consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant' " were all elements to be considered in determining whether there was a duty. Id., 86 Ill.Dec. at 30, 474 N.E.2d at 944 (quoting Lance v. Senior, 36 Ill.2d 516, 518, 224 N.E.2d 231, 233 (1967)). Illinois precedent had held that "an architect owes a duty, to those who would be likely to use the structure, to exercise care that the design is safe for the building's intended use." Id. (citing Miller v. DeWitt, 59 Ill.App.2d 38, 208 N.E.2d 249 (1965), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 37 Ill.2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967); Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 Ill.App.2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966)). Also, Illinois law had established that a "jailor [has a duty] to protect inmates known to be likely to commit suicide from doing so." Id. (citing Delasky v. Village of Hinsdale, 109 Ill.App.3d 976, 65 Ill.Dec. 454, 441 N.E.2d 367 (1982)). However, in La Bombarbe the court held that an architect had no duty to design a jail in such a manner as to prevent an inmate from committing suicide.

The court based its decision not upon foreseeability (which the court found), but upon those other elements of duty:

"The reason that such a duty should not be imposed on [the defendant] is illustrated by the newsletter article which plaintiff has cited to indicate the foreseeability of inmate suicides. The article refers to a study by the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives. According to the article, the study stresses the importance of jailers' identifying suicide-prone inmates. The article then states:

" 'Such precautions as barless windows and doors, tearaway blankets and television monitors should not be substituted for human interaction. The precautionary tools used to prevent suicide are insufficient and oftentimes are designed for the convenience of jail personnel and not for the benefit of the inmate, the study said.' (Emphasis added.) (12 Criminal Justice Newsletter No. 24, p. 3 (December 7, 1981).)

"The magnitude of the burden placed on architects to eliminate all fixtures, such as grilles, that might be of aid in the commission of a suicide and, at the same time, to design an attractive and feasible cell at a reasonable cost would seem to be great. Yet, according to the article, the resultant design would be insufficient to protect the inmate from his self-inflicted destruction. The cost of placing this relatively useless burden upon architects would likely cause further increase in the already extremely high cost of housing prisoners."

Id., 130 Ill.App.3d at 944-45, 86 Ill.Dec. 28, 474 N.E.2d 942.

The La Bombarbe court also...

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6 cases
  • Vinson v. Clarke County, Ala.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama
    • June 17, 1998
    ...inmates who exhibit suicidal tendencies and upon the subsequent interaction between inmate and jailer." Tittle v. Giattina, Fisher & Co. Architects, Inc., 597 So.2d 679, 681 (Ala.1992). Alabama counties do not participate in the jailer's or sheriff's duties in this area. See Turquitt, 137 F......
  • Bruzga v. PMR Architects, P.C.
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • April 21, 1997
    ...designing and constructing buildings, not providing mental health care for suicidal individuals. See generally Tittle v. Giattina, Fisher & Co., 597 So.2d 679, 681 (Ala.1992). Thus, neither PMR nor Capitol Fire is similar to the typical defendants who have been found liable under the second......
  • Taylor v. Smith
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • March 12, 2004
    ...a balancing test, not unlike the test this Court has used in making other public-policy decisions (see Tittle v. Giattina, Fisher & Co., Architects, Inc., 597 So.2d 679 (Ala.1992): 1) the likelihood of injury in similar cases; 2) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against liability; an......
  • Patton v. Thompson
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • November 9, 2006
    ...liability arising out of a suicide involved custodial cases. See City of Crossville v. Haynes, 925 So.2d 944; Tittle v. Giattina Fisher & Co., Architects, 597 So.2d 679 (Ala.1992); Popham v. City of Talladega, 582 So.2d 541 (Ala.1991); Keeton, 558 So.2d 884. Prison officials have a duty to ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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