Tittle v. Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 March 1989
• Citation: 544 So.2d 883
• Parties: 8 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 701 Rodney K. TITTLE v. STEEL CITY OLDSMOBILE GMC TRUCK, INC.; and General Motors Corporation. 87-905.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 883

544 So.2d 883

8 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 701

Rodney K. TITTLE v. STEEL CITY OLDSMOBILE GMC TRUCK, INC.; and General Motors Corporation.

87-905.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 10, 1989.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 28, 1989.

S. Shay Samples, Robert D. Word III and Richard D. Stratton of Hogan, Smith, Alspaugh, Samples & Pratt, Birmingham, for appellant.

J. Fred Wood, Jr., Russell Q. Allison, and Terry McElheny of Dominick, Fletcher, Yeilding, Wood & Lloyd, Birmingham, for appellee Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc.

Charles L. Robinson and David W. Proctor of Johnston, Barton, Proctor, Swedlaw & Naff, Birmingham, for appellee General Motors Corp.

SHORES, Justice.

The plaintiff, Rodney K. Tittle, appeals a summary judgment entered in favor of defendants, Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. (hereinafter "Steel City"), and General Motors Corporation (hereinafter "General Motors").

Tittle purchased a 1981 Oldsmobile automobile from Steel City on October 9, 1981, and accepted delivery of it the same day. With the purchase of his automobile, General Motors provided Tittle with a document entitled "1981 Oldsmobile New Car Warranty." This writing provided that Steel City, as Tittle's Oldsmobile dealer, would repair and adjust defects in material or workmanship that occurred during the first 12 months or first 12,000 miles in which the car was in use. The document provided, further, that the warranty period would begin on the date the car was first delivered or placed in service. In addition to this warranty, Tittle purchased from General Motors Acceptance Corporation (hereinafter "GMAC"), the company with whom he financed the purchase of the car, a supplemental warranty that extended coverage of the original warranty to 36 months or 36,000 miles.

After Tittle accepted the automobile, he discovered numerous defects in it and repeatedly asked Steel City and GMAC to cure the problems. When Steel City proved unable, after a number of attempts Tittle sued on January 29, 1986, in Jefferson County Circuit Court, alleging that Steel City, GMAC, and General Motors had breached their respective express warranties as well as implied warranties of merchantability and fitness. Tittle founded his claims upon the federal Consumer Product Warranty Act, known commonly as the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., and upon Alabama's version of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter "U.C.C."), § 7-1-101 et seq., Ala.Code (1975). In their answers to the plaintiff's complaint, both Steel City and General Motors specifically pleaded the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.

to repair the vehicle, Tittle met with the zone representative for General Motors, Don Ackerman. Tittle alleges that Mr. Ackerman, as agent for General Motors, offered to extend the existing warranty on the vehicle for an additional 12 months or 12,000 miles if Tittle would allow Steel City another opportunity to repair the defects in the vehicle. Tittle agreed, but following several unsuccessful attempts to repair the vehicle, Tittle returned the car to Steel City.

Steel City and General Motors filed motions for summary judgment based upon the statute of limitations defense. During the hearing on the motions, the trial judge asked the parties to present the court with additional authorities supporting their respective positions. The court requested that the parties submit these authorities on or before April 1, 1988. General Motors responded to the trial court's request by providing it with four cases. Tittle, however, filed both a supplemental brief opposing the defendants' motion for summary judgment and an affidavit containing facts not alleged at the time the court heard the summary judgment motions.

On April 4, 1988, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Steel City and General Motors. The court found that Tittle's claims were barred by the statute of limitations at the time his complaint was filed. The trial court specifically noted that the plaintiff's case remained pending as to defendant GMAC, but made its order final with respect to Steel City and General Motors. See, Ala.R.Civ.P. 54(b). It is from this summary judgment that the plaintiff appeals. Apparently anticipating Tittle's argument on appeal, General Motors filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's affidavit from the record, on June 20, 1988.

The issue presented this Court for review is whether the trial court erred in entering summary judgment for these two defendants on the ground that Tittle's claim for breach of an express warranty was barred by the statute of limitations. In arguing this issue, the parties raise five questions this Court must address: first, what statute of limitations applies in cases brought under the Magnuson-Moss Act or the breach of warranty claims brought under Alabama's version of the U.C.C.?; second, does Ala.Code (1975), § 8-20-12, toll the statute of limitations for breach of warranty in consumer cases until the breach is discovered?; third, does the warranty issued by General Motors explicitly extend to the future performance of the vehicle?; fourth, is a repair and replacement warranty breached upon tender of the car or upon refusal or failure to repair an alleged defect?; and fifth, was Mr. Tittle's affidavit properly submitted to the trial court and included in the record on appeal, and, if so, did the affidavit present a genuine issue of material fact precluding the trial court's summary judgment?

I.

The Magnuson-Moss Act authorizes civil actions by consumers in state or federal court when suppliers, warrantors, or service contractors violate its provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). The Act, however, does not provide a statute of limitations for claims that arise under this legislation. Where a federal statute grants a cause of action, but does not include a statute of limitations governing the scope of that statute's application, federal common law requires that the court apply the state statute of limitations governing the state action most closely analogous to the federal claim. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,

103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). The state law action most analogous to Tittle's Magnuson-Moss warranty claim is an action for breach of warranty in a contract for sale. Thus, the statute of limitations that appropriately applies to Tittle's state breach of warranty action is the same statute of limitations that appropriately applies to his federal Magnuson-Moss claim. Under Alabama's version of the U.C.C., the statute of limitations that applies to an action for breach of any contract for sale is found in § 7-2-725, Ala.Code (1975).

II.

Section 7-2-725 provides:

"(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.

"(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered; however, a cause of action for damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods shall accrue when the injury occurs." (Emphasis added.)

General Motors and Steel City rely upon this statute to argue: Tittle purchased his car in October 1981; the purchase constituted a contract for sale under this statute; the vehicle was tendered at the time of purchase; thus, breach occurred at the time of purchase; on the undisputed facts, Tittle sued Steel City and General Motors more than four years after he accepted delivery of the car; therefore, Tittle's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations for breach of warranty actions.

While Tittle acknowledges that § 7-2-725 is the statute of limitations in contracts for sale, he contends that a more appropriate Code section exists regarding breach of warranty actions in cases involving the purchase of motor vehicles. Code of Alabama (1975), § 8-20-12, states in pertinent part:

"[A]ny civil action commenced under the provisions of this chapter must be brought within four years after the cause of action has accrued. The cause of action shall not have accrued until the discovery of the aggrieved party of the fact or facts constituting a violation of the provisions of this chapter." (Emphasis added.)

Tittle suggests that if § 7-2-725 and § 8-20-12 are construed with reference to one another, then a breach of warranty action will not accrue until the consumer discovers, or should have discovered, the defect. He contends that § 8-20-12 specifically states this rule, and that § 7-2-725 provides for this interpretation. We do not agree.

In order to accept Tittle's analysis, we must first accept the proposition that § 8-20-12 was intended by the legislature to apply to the purchase of consumer goods. This we can not do. The Alabama legislature passed the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act in 1981, § 8-20-1 et seq., Ala.Code (1975). At that time, the legislature declared the purpose of the Act:

"The legislature finds and declares that the distribution and sale of motor vehicles within this state vitally affect the general economy of the state and the public interest and the public welfare, and that in order to promote the public interest and the public welfare, and in the exercise of its police power, it is necessary to regulate motor vehicle manufacturers, distributors, dealers and their representatives and to regulate the dealings between manufacturers and distributors or wholesalers and their dealers in order to prevent fraud and other abuses upon the citizens of this state and to...