Tiwari v. Friendlander
| Decision Date | 14 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-00884-GNS-CHL |
| Parties | DIPENDRA TIWARI, et al. PLAINTIFFS v. ERIC FRIENDLANDER, et al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' and Intervenor Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration (DN 68), Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (DN 79), Defendants' and Intervenor Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (DN 84), Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike (DN 87), Plaintiffs' Motion to Withdraw their Motion to Strike (DN 89), Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike and Substitute (DN 90), and Defendants' and Intervenor Defendant's Motions in Limine (DN 93, 94). The matter is ripe for adjudication. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' and Intervenor Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion to Withdraw their Motion to Strike, and Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike and Substitute; DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, and Defendants' and Intervenor Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration; and DENIES AS MOOT Defendants' and Intervenor Defendant's Motions in Limine.1
Plaintiffs Dipendra Tiwari and Kishor Sapkota are both Nepalese immigrants to the United States who partnered in 2017 to form Plaintiff Grace Home Care, Inc. ("Grace"), a home health services agency ("HHA") (collectively "Plaintiffs"). (Tiwari Aff. ¶ 15, DN 79-3). HHAs provide "part-time or intermittent health and health related services to a patient in his or her place of residence . . . as required by a plan of care prescribed by a license physician." 902 KAR 20:081 § 2. Plaintiffs hope was to provide these services to the Nepalese-speaking community in the Louisville Metro area because of an unmet need for services in a patient's native language. (Tiwari Aff. ¶ 15). To open the agency, Plaintiffs were required to obtain a Certificate of Need ("CON") from the Commonwealth of Kentucky's Cabinet for Health and Family Services ("Cabinet"). The Commonwealth's CON program, established in 1980, requires anyone wishing to establish a "health facility," or make any substantial change to an existing health facility, to first obtain a CON.2 KRS 216B.061(1). The purpose of the statute is to: (1) improve the quality of healthcare in the Commonwealth; (2) improve access to healthcare facilities, services, and providers; and (3) create a cost-efficient healthcare delivery system. See KRS 216B.010. The program is meant to accomplish these goals by preventing the "proliferation of unnecessary health-care facilities, health services, and major medical equipment . . . ." Id.
Plaintiffs applied for a CON and were denied because Grace did not show a need for its services in the area. (. Plaintiffs then filed suit against various state officials and agencies, alleging the CON program, as applied to HHAs, violated theDue Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Compl., DN 1; Am. Compl., DN 15). Kentucky Hospital Association, Inc. ("KHA"), intervened, and Defendants and KHA moved to dismiss. . The Court granted in part and denied in part the motion, allowing Plaintiffs' claim for violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to proceed against Eric Friedlander, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the Cabinet, and Adam Mather, in his official capacity as Inspector General of Kentucky ("Defendants"). (Mem. Op. & Order 1, DN 67). Furthermore, the Court found that Grace had standing, but ordered Plaintiffs to show cause why they have standing as individuals. (Mem. Op. & Order 1).
Defendants and KHA jointly moved for reconsideration on the Court's Order denying the motion to dismiss. (Defs.' & Intervenor Def.'s Joint Mot. Reconsideration, DN 68). Plaintiffs responded to the Court's show cause order, and moved for summary judgment. (Pls.' Br., DN 72; Pls.' Mot. Summ. J., DN 79). Defendants and KHA responded to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment with a cross-motion.3 (Defs.' & Intervenor Def.'s Mem. Supp. Joint Mot. Summ. J. & Resp. Pls.' Mot. Summ. J., DN 84 [hereinafter Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.]). Fully briefed on the matter, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have standing, grants Defendants' and KHA's Motion for Summary Judgment, denies Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and denies as moot Defendants' and KHA's Motion for Reconsideration.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact that would preclude entry of judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of stating the basis for the motion and identifying evidence in the record that demonstrates an absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the non-moving party must then produce specific evidence proving the existence of a genuine dispute of fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
While the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving party must do more than merely show the existence of some "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (citation omitted). Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate that a genuine factual dispute exists by "citing to particular parts of the materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient" to overcome summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Although both parties recognize Grace has standing to pursue these claims, Defendants and KHA dispute whether the individual Plaintiffs have standing. Plaintiffs assert that although it is enough for Grace to have standing, they too have standing to bring the case because the CON laws prohibit them from opening an agency, whether through Grace or another entity. (Pls.' Br. 2).Defendants and KHA maintain that each party must have standing on their own to proceed, and that Plaintiffs do not suffer an injury separate from their status as shareholders. (. Furthermore, Defendants and KHA argue that any harm Plaintiffs suffer individually from their inability to open another HHA is speculative. (Intervenor-Def.'s Br. 2-6; Defs.' Br. 4-5).
Plaintiffs' standing must be established as a threshold matter. See Nikolao v. Lyon, 875 F.3d 310, 315 (6th Cir. 2017). To establish standing a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he or she suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, (2) that the injury was caused by the defendant, and (3) that the injury would likely be redressed by the requested judicial relief. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). "'At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice'; more is required to defeat a motion for summary judgment, and even more is required for a decision on the merits." Sch. Dist. of City of Pontiac v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).
The Supreme Court has held that "the presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III's case-or-controversy requirement." Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 53 n.2 (2006) (citation omitted). Specifically, "when one party has standing to bring a claim, the identical claims brought by other parties to the same lawsuit are justiciable." Phillips v. Snyder, 836 F.3d 707, 714 (6th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Parsons v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 801 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2015) ( ; Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. Grayson Cty., 591 F.3d 837, 843 (6th Cir. 2010) . Therefore, Plaintiffs must show that at least one named Plaintiff has standing to bring these claims.
"[E]ach form of relief sought must pass the court's justiciability requirements for the plaintiff." Priorities USA v. Benson, 448 F. Supp. 3d 755, 761 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000)); see also Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) ( . Ultimately, "[a]t least one plaintiff must have standing to seek each form of relief requested in the complaint." Town of Chester v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017).
In this instance, neither party disputes that Grace and the individual Plaintiffs not only pursue the same claims but seek the same relief. Accordingly, because Grace has standing, Plaintiffs have standing. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 652 (6th Cir. 2007) ...
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