Tobacco Accessories and Novelty Craftsmen Merchants Ass'n of Louisiana v. Treen

Decision Date29 July 1982
Docket NumberNo. 80-3854,80-3854
Citation681 F.2d 378
PartiesTOBACCO ACCESSORIES AND NOVELTY CRAFTSMEN MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION OF LOUISIANA, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David C. TREEN, as Governor of Louisiana, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

William E. Rittenberg, New Orleans, La., Peter Meyers, Washington, D. C., Frederick J. King, Jr., New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Laughlin McDonald, Atlanta, Ga., for amicus curiae-American Civil Liberties Union.

Kendall L. Vick, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul A. Eckert, Staff Atty., New Orleans, La., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before COLEMAN, POLITZ and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Circuit Judge:

This case presents a pre-enforcement facial challenge to the constitutionality of Louisiana's Drug Paraphernalia Law, La.R.S. 40:1031-36 (Louisiana Act). Invoking 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, plaintiffs 1 charge that the Louisiana Act is vague and overbroad, not rationally related to a legitimate state interest and infringes on first amendment guarantees. The district court upheld its validity. 501 F.Supp. 168. We affirm.

Background

The Louisiana Act is patterned after the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act (Model Act) drafted by the Department of Justice 2 as part of the response to the explosive growth of illegal drug traffic across the country. The Model Act seeks to avoid the constitutional infirmities which resulted in successful challenges to various state and local drug paraphernalia laws. 3

The Louisiana Act defines drug paraphernalia as "all equipment, products and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use, or designed for use ..." with a controlled substance, La.R.S. 40:1031(A)(1), 4 and lists examples. 5 The Act then identifies twelve factors which must be considered when determining whether a particular object is to be considered drug paraphernalia. La.R.S. 40:1032(1)-(12). 6 Criminal liability is imposed for the sale, distribution, or display of drug paraphernalia, La.R.S. 40:1033(A) & (B), and for its use, 40:1033(C). 7

Appellants and amicus curiae raise first, fifth and fourteenth amendment challenges to the Louisiana Act. We consider each assertion raised, first addressing overbreadth and vagueness, mindful that:

In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail. The court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge and, assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally protected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.

Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1189 (1982).

Overbreadth

A law is facially overbroad if it "does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of (government) control, but ... sweeps within its ambit other activities that constitute an exercise" of constitutionally protected rights. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97, 60 S.Ct. 736, 741, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940). The overbreadth doctrine not only shields protected speech, but has been a vital force counteracting any deterrence to such speech. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). 8

The only constitutionally protected activity implicated by the Louisiana Act is the first amendment commercial speech right of vendors of items which fall within the definition of drug paraphernalia. The Louisiana statute makes it unlawful for any person, "knowing the drug related nature of the object, to display for sale or possess with the intent to distribute, any drug paraphernalia." La.R.S. 40:1033(B).

The overbreadth doctrine, however, "does not apply to commercial speech." Hoffman Estates, 102 S.Ct. at 1192 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980)). The Court has refused to apply the overbreadth doctrine in the commercial speech context in part because persons advertising goods or services for a profit are not likely to be lightly deterred. 9

Further, in the case at bar, as in Hoffman Estates:

insofar as any commercial speech interest is implicated here, it is only the attenuated interest in displaying and marketing merchandise in the manner that the retailer desires .... The ordinance is expressly directed at commercial activity promoting or encouraging illegal drug use. If that activity is deemed 'speech,' then it is speech proposing an illegal transaction, which a government may regulate or ban entirely.

102 S.Ct. at 1192 (citing Central Hudson Gas and Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973)). There is no constitutionally protected conduct implicated by the Louisiana Act; the commercial speech doctrine offers appellants no succor.

Vagueness

Under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide meaningful and fair warning of the proscribed conduct and adequate standards to ensure even-handed enforcement. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). A number of factors are considered in determining the degree of vagueness constitutionally permissible. In Hoffman Estates, the Court stated that a successful challenge to the facial validity of an economic regulation requires a showing that the legislation is impermissibly vague in all applications, explaining that "economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject-matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action." 102 S.Ct. at 1193. Further, the Court noted that "a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed." Finally, "the most important factor affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights." Id. Mindful of these guidons, we evaluate appellants' vagueness challenge to the Louisiana Act.

Appellants maintain that the Act is vague because (1) the phrase "used, intended for use, or designed for use" fails to apprise persons of characteristics which would distinguish innocent items from drug paraphernalia; (2) the Act imposes criminal liability on the seller based on the intent of the buyer (transferred intent); (3) the Act fails to provide guidelines sufficient to avoid discriminatory enforcement; and (4) the prohibitory sections, 1033(A) & (B), fail to require that the seller have the specific intent that the questioned item be used with a controlled substance. We address these contentions seriatim.

"Intended for Use"

Appellants insist that defining drug paraphernalia as items "used" or "intended for use," with a controlled substance fails to differentiate purely innocent items from prohibited items, and thus fails to provide adequate warning of the verboten conduct. The district court found that this language, in the context of the total statutory scheme, clearly requires criminal intent on the part of the person charged with violating the statute, and therefore does provide fair warning of proscribed activities.

Obviously, many items may be used in both a lawful and unlawful manner. 10 To prosecute a person for the sale of an item, both intended and understood to be used lawfully, would run afoul of the due process clause. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108, 92 S.Ct. at 2298. The drafters of both the Model Act and the Louisiana Act addressed this problem by infusing the requirement of specific intent into the definition of drug paraphernalia and by providing examples. The Act condemns only items used, intended for use, or designed for use with a controlled substance.

The "intended for use" language applies to the state of mind of the individual charged with the offense of selling, distributing, or displaying drug paraphernalia. The vendor of an item which may be used innocently, incurs no criminal vulnerability unless he believes or intends that the ambivalent item will be used with a controlled substance. 11 No item bears the stigma of drug paraphernalia under La.R.S. 40:1033(A) & (B), absent the seller's intent that it be used with a controlled substance. Further, no wholesaler or manufacturer can be convicted on the basis of the retailer's intent. Therefore, the concern appellants raise that an individual could be prosecuted based on intent transferred from a third party is misplaced, at least at this stage, when the only question before us is the facial validity of the Act. In light of the protection of the scienter requirement, and considering that this is an economic regulation, we conclude that the Louisiana Act's "intended for use" language is not impermissibly vague.

Discriminatory Enforcement

Continuing in their challenge, appellants charge that the Louisiana Act is vague because it fails to provide adequate guidelines to avoid the danger of discriminatory enforcement. We find no merit in this contention. The Louisiana Act contains guidelines facially adequate to prevent discriminatory enforcement and to provide a consistent and uniform determination of items within the definitional bounds of drug paraphernalia. 12 In this regard the Louisiana Act differs significantly from the Model Act. In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the Model Act refers to the factors "a court or other authority should consider in addition to all other logically relevant factors." The Louisiana ...

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