Tobin v. Chester & L. Narrowgauge R. Co

• Decision Date: 30 July 1896
• Citation: 25 S.E. 283,47 S.C. 387
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: TOBIN. v. CHESTER & L. NARROWGAUGE R. CO.

47 S.C. 387

25 S.E. 283

TOBIN.

v.CHESTER & L. NARROWGAUGE R. CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

July 30, 1896.

Injury to Personal Property—Railroad Company—Place of Residence—Venue.

Rev. St. 1893, § 1543, providing that a railroad corporation may sue and be sued "in any court of law or equity in this state, " does not refer to the place of trial; and within Code, § 146, which provides that actions for injuries to personal property shall be tried in the county in which defendant resides at the time of the commencement of the action, a railroad corporation is a resident of a county where its line is located, and where it maintains a public office, and an agent upon whom process may be served.

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Barnwell county; Aldrich, Judge.

Action by Laura C. Tobin against the Chester & Lenoir Narrow-Gauge Railroad Company for damages for an alleged Injury to plaintiff's cow while in course of transportation by defendant. Prom an order transferring the case from Barnwell county to Chester county, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Bellinger, Townsend & O'Bannon, for appellant.

A. G. Brice, for respondent.

JONES, J. This is an appeal from an order transferring this case from the court of common pleas for Barnwell county to that of Chester county. The action was commenced in Barnwell by service of summons and complaint on the defendant, at Chester, S. C, for damages for alleged injury to plaintiff's cow while in course of transportation over the line of the defendant company, and connecting lines from Guthriesville, in York county, to Barnwell, S. C. The defendant is a domestic railway corporation, under the laws of this state, its only line of railroad in this state lying in Chester and York counties, where its agencies are established and its business carried on, having its principal office in Chester county. It has no property and no agency in Barnwell county. His honor, James Aldrich, the presiding judge, held that the court was without jurisdiction to try the action, for the reason that the defendant was not a resident of the county of Barnwell, within the meaning of section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore transferred the case for trial to Chester county. Appellant appeals, upon the following ground: "That his honor, the presiding judge, erred in holding that the court of common pleas for Barnwell county was without jurisdiction to try this cause, for the reason that the defendant was not a resident of the county of Barnwell, whereas he should have held that, the defendant being a domestic railway corporation, organized under the laws of this state, its residence was only limited by the limits of the jurisdiction of the state creating it, and that said defendant was liable to be sued as a resident of any county within this state."

Section 146 of our Code provides that actions of this character—injury to personal property—shall be tried in the county in which the defendant resides at the time of the commencement of the action. We have no statute expressly providing for the place of trial of such actions against domestic corporations. Section 1543 of the Revised Statutes of 1893, providing that a railroad corporation incorporated in this state "may sue and be sued, " etc., "in any court of law or equity in this state, " etc., has no reference to the place of trial. Where, then, Is the residence of a domestic railroad corporation in this state? The case of Bristol v. Railroad Co., 15 111. 437, very strongly states the answer, as follows: "The residence of a corporation, if it can be said to have a residence, is necessarily where it exercises corporate functions. It dwells in the place...