Todd Shipyards Corporation v. Donovan

• Decision Date: 13 March 1962
• Docket Number: No. 19285.,19285.
• Citation: 300 F.2d 741
• Parties: TODD SHIPYARDS CORPORATION and The Travelers Insurance Company, Appellants, v. P. J. DONOVAN, Deputy Commissioner, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Employee Compensation, Seventh Compensation District, et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

300 F.2d 741 (1962)

TODD SHIPYARDS CORPORATION and The Travelers Insurance Company, Appellants, v. P. J. DONOVAN, Deputy Commissioner, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Employee Compensation, Seventh Compensation District, et al., Appellees.

No. 19285.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

March 13, 1962.

Andrew P. Carter, of Monroe & Lemann, New Orleans, La., Ernest A. Carrere, Jr., of Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, New Orleans, La., for appellants.

Gene S. Palmisano, Asst. U. S. Atty., Ralph Jackson, New Orleans, La., Kathleen Ruddell, U. S. Atty., New Orleans, La., Charles Donahue, Solicitor of Labor, Herbert P. Miller, Asst. Solicitor, George M. Lilly, Attorney, U. S. Department of Labor, Washington, D. C., of counsel, for appellees.

Before HUTCHESON, WISDOM, and BELL, Circuit Judges.

WISDOM, Circuit Judge.

In this action Todd Shipyards Corporation and its insurer sued to set aside a compensation award under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 921. Ferdinand Lange, the claimant, suffered a heart attack while at work. The Deputy Commissioner for the Bureau of Employee Compensation of the Department of Labor awarded Lange compensation based on total disability. The appellants contend that the case presents solely a medical question: Was there a causal connection between the claimant's myocardial infarction, which might have occurred anywhere and at any time, and the claimant's employment? They argue that the record contains no medical testimony in support of the Commissioner's finding that the infarction was caused by the nature of Lange's employment and arose out of and in the course of the employment; they aver that two outstanding authorities on cardiovascular diseases, who testified, refused to say that the infarction was the result of the work Lange had been doing. The district court upheld the Commissioner, granting a summary judgment for the defendant. We affirm.

The appellants' argument has the lure of logic and the appeal of oracular authority. But the logic is false; and, with due deference, it seems to us that the heart specialists gave Delphic oracles. The appellants oversimplify the case. The problem this case presents is not solely a medical one, but is compounded of inextricably mingled elements of fact, medical opinion, and inference. Thus, the occurrence of Lange's heart attack immediately following strenuous activities in itself raises an inference of a causal relationship between the activities and the attack. It is true that the distinguished heart specialists, having a proper regard for their oath, as honest scientists were unwilling to say categorically that Lange's activities in his employment caused the infarction. But they were unwilling to say that it did not cause the infarction. Their unwillingness to make a flat choice between the two inferences does not relieve the Commissioner of his responsibility to select the more reasonable inference in the light of the evidence as a whole and the "common sense of the situation."¹ We review the findings of the Commissioner and the holdings of the district court, not the opinions of the medical experts.

This Court and many courts have upheld findings of triers of the fact who reached conclusions contrary to the weight of the medical testimony. In Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 1959, 361 U.S. 107, 80 S.Ct. 173, 4 L.Ed.2d 142, the Supreme Court said:

"The jury\'s power to draw the inference that the aggravation of petitioner\'s tubercular condition, evident so shortly after the accident, was in fact caused by that accident, was not impaired by the failure of any medical witness to testify that it was in fact the cause. Neither can it be impaired by the lack of medical unanimity as to the respective likelihood of the potential causes of the aggravation, or by the fact that other potential causes of the aggavation existed and were not conclusively negated by the proofs. The matter does not turn on the use of a particular form of words by the physicians in giving their testimony. The members of the jury, not the medical witnesses, were sworn to make a legal determination of the question of causation. They were entitled to take all of the circumstances, including the medical testimony into consideration." (Emphasis supplied.)

In Southern Stevedoring Co. v. Voris, 5 Cir., 1955, 218 F.2d 250, 255, this Court sustained the district court's finding:

"I see little, if any, medical testimony that the stroke was due or hastened by the prior injury. In my opinion, however, where the medical testimony to the contrary is not conclusive, lay testimony, and the surrounding facts and circumstances, may be sufficient to fill the gap. Hence, if this finding, standing alone, be somewhat inaccurate, it would not affect the outcome of the case."

See John W. McGrath Corp. v. Hughes, 2 Cir., 1961, 289 F.2d 403. If the issue is one of disability, the testimony of laymen who may have observed a claimant over a long period of time at any hour of the day may be more trustworthy than medical testimony. If the issue is one of causal relationship, medically, between injury and employment, medical testimony may be more trustworthy than lay testimony; still, fact-finders are not bound to decide according to doctors' opinions if rational inferences lead in the other direction.

Dr. George E. Burch, a nationally known authority on cardiovascular diseases and cardiology and a Professor of Medicine at Tulane University, whom the plaintiff called as a witness, made a written report in which he stated:

"It would be impossible for me to say that this infarction was the result of the type of work in which he was engaged since he has been doing this same type of work for 38 years without any difficulty."

He testified:

"I couldn\'t find any evidence that he had had any symptoms or signs of heart disease prior to this, except what I said a moment ago, the changes that one would expect in a man who is going through the aging process. * * * Now, we do know that stress at the time when people have difficulties with their heart, or if they are in the process of developing difficulty with the heart, will add extra loads on the heart, and can precipitate trouble. But to say that that particular experience that he had, which I gather he has been going through before, actually precipitated this, or that he would not have had it if he were not doing that particular job, or working somewhere else, I don\'t see how I could say that. On the other hand, it would be impossible to say that it didn\'t do it. It is just like the straw that broke the camel\'s back. If he were in the process of developing this and the stress did come about, it is possible that it could have precipitated it. On the other hand, a man his age is prone to develop infarction and a statement is made that 1 out of 2 people are going to develop or die of heart disease. It is difficult to say this one did, but I couldn\'t say that he didn\'t. * * *

"Q Doctor, back to stress again, you have testified that stress does precipitate this type of infarct?

"A That\'s right. I think stress can. When someone is in the process of developing this, I think the stress might, it is possible to precipitate it.

"Q I believe it is your testimony that it is impossible to say that this stress that Mr. Lange experienced did not cause this?

"A That\'s right. I couldn\'t say that it didn\'t.

"Q In other words, it could have?

"A Yes." (Emphasis supplied).

Dr. Theodore Bloch, an established heart specialist, called by the employer, concluded his testimony as follows:

"Q. It has been testified here `It would be impossible for me to say this infarction was a result of the type of work in which he,

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