Todd v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps.
| Decision Date | 10 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 21-cv-00637 (SRN/ECW) |
| Parties | Marcus TODD, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 5, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Douglas P. Seaton and James V.F. Dickey, Upper Midwest Law Center, 8421 Wayzata Boulevard, Suite 105, Golden Valley, MN 55426, for Plaintiff.
Jacob Karabell and Leon Dayan, Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC, 805 Fifteenth Street, Northwest, Suite 1000, Washington, D.C. 20005; and Josie Doris Hegarty, AFSCME Council 5, 300 Hardman Avenue South, South Saint Paul, MN 55075, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 16] filed by Defendant American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 5 ("the Union"). Based on a review of the files, submissions, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motion.
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court ruled that public-sector employers and labor unions representing public-sector employees could, consistent with the First Amendment, compel public-sector employees to contribute to a union's collective bargaining costs even if the employees refused to join the union. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ. , 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). Approximately forty years later, in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018), the Supreme Court overruled Abood and held that such "fair-share" or "agency" fee arrangements violate employees’ First Amendment rights.
Plaintiff Marcus Todd is a security counselor who works for the Minnesota Department of Human Services ("DHS") in St. Peter, Minnesota. (Compl. [Doc. No. 1] ¶ 10.) When he began working for DHS in 2014, prior to Janus , Todd faced the choice of whether to join the local union organization, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME"), Council 5 (the "Union") and pay full membership dues, or decline to join and pay fair-share fees, an arrangement permitted by Minnesota's Public Employment Labor Relations Act ("PELRA"), Minn. Stat. § 179A.06. (Compl. ¶¶ 11, 12, 19.) Alleging that he joined the Union "against his will," Todd further asserts that his membership "provides no value to him" and he "disagrees with much of [the Union's] political advocacy." (Id . ¶ 18.) By virtue of signing the Union membership agreement in 2014, Todd authorized his employer, DHS, to deduct Union dues from his paychecks which DHS transmitted to the Union on his behalf.
Todd contends that in June 2018, the Union or one of its agents forged his signature on a new membership agreement (the "2018 membership agreement"). (Id . ¶ 20.) Beginning with his July 6, 2018 paycheck, the Union began deducting dues consistent with the allegedly forged 2018 membership agreement. (Id .) Two years later, in July 2020, Todd sent the Union written notification in which he resigned his membership and demanded that his dues deductions cease. (Id . ¶ 25.) Although the Union "processed" Todd's resignation, it continued to deduct union dues from his paychecks. (Id . ¶ 26.) The 2018 membership agreement only permitted members to opt out of dues payments during a designated annual period in May. (Id .) As applicable here, the opt-out date was in May 2021. (Id .) In August 2020, Todd again wrote the Union, demanding that it cease authorizing dues deductions, and asserted that his signature on the 2018 membership application was forged. (Id . ¶ 27.) The Union continued deducting dues. (Id .)
In September 2020, Todd's legal counsel wrote to the Union, demanding that it stop authorizing his dues deductions. Legal counsel for the Union responded, expressing the Union's belief that it made proper deductions under the terms of the 2018 membership agreement. Also, the Union observed that it had been making dues deductions pursuant to the 2018 membership agreement for over two years without Todd's objection. (Id .) Finally, the Union's counsel further advised Todd that he could revoke his authorization for the dues deductions during the next opt-out period between May 6 and May 21, 2021. (Id .)
In March 2021, Todd brought this action against the Union under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking an award of damages "for union dues unlawfully deducted" from his paychecks "without clear and compelling evidence of [his] freely given waiver of First Amendment rights." (Id . ¶ 38.) Todd's § 1983 claims apply to deductions made during the following periods: (1) pre- Janus , (Count 1); (2) post- Janus and prior to his July 2020 Union resignation, (Count 2); and (3) post-resignation, beginning in July 2020 and into the future (Count 3). Also under § 1983, Todd seeks a ruling that the Union's 15-day opt-out window is unconstitutional (Count 4). In addition to his federal claims, Todd asserts state law claims for conversion (Count 5), unjust enrichment (Count 6), civil theft (Count 7), tortious interference with contractual relations (Count 8), and unlawful wage deductions under Minn. Stat. § 181.79 (Count 9).
The Union viewed Todd's filing of this lawsuit as a continuing request to revoke his dues-deduction authorization, and thus instructed DHS to discontinue Todd's dues deductions as of his May 7, 2021 paycheck—the first paycheck within the May 6 through 21, 2021 opt-out period. (Altendorfer Decl. [Doc. No. 19] ¶¶ 3–4.)
The Union now moves to dismiss Todd's claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). It argues that his § 1983 claims in Counts 1 and 4 fail because Janus is inapplicable to employees who chose to join a union in exchange for receiving the benefits of union membership. (Def.’s Mem. [Doc. No. 18] at 6–10 & n.5; Def.’s Reply [Doc. No. 23] at 1–6.) In addition, although denying that forgery occurred, the Union contends that Todd's claims in Counts 2 and 3 fail because the Union's allegedly illegal conduct in forging a dues-deduction authorization, as Plaintiff alleges, is not "state action"—a necessary element for a § 1983 claim—and the Union is not a state actor. (Def.’s Mem. at 10–15; Def.’s Reply at 7–12.) Further, the Union asserts that because it has stopped authorizing Todd's dues deductions, his claims for prospective relief are now moot. (Def.’s Mem. at 15–16; Def.’s Reply at 12–13.) Finally, if the Court grants the dismissal of Todd's § 1983 claims, the Union moves for the dismissal without prejudice of Todd's supplemental state law claims for lack of jurisdiction. (Def.’s Mem. at 17.)
Relying on Rule 12(b)(1), the Union argues that the portion of Todd's § 1983 claims in Counts 1 through 4 for which he seeks declaratory and injunctive relief must be dismissed because Todd's dues deductions have ended. (Id . at 5 & n.3.) As to all other forms of relief in Counts 1 through 4, the Union moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Todd fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Id. )
A court deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) must first determine whether the defendant is mounting a facial attack or a factual attack on the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Branson Label, Inc. v. City of Branson , 793 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2015). If it is a facial attack, the court looks to the pleadings to consider whether the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient basis for jurisdiction and accepts all factual allegations as true. See id . Conversely, if it is a factual attack, the court may consider "matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits." Id . at 914-15 (quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp. , 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980) ). Here, the Union presents a factual attack with respect to Todd's claims for prospective relief because its argument is based on matters outside the pleadings, namely, a declaration regarding the current discontinuation of dues deductions from Todd's paychecks. (Altendorfer Decl. ¶¶ 4–6.) The Court will therefore consider this declaration in connection with the portion of the Union's motion that is based on Rule 12(b)(1).
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and views those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hager v. Ark. Dep't of Health , 735 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2013). However, the Court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Id. In addition, the Court ordinarily does not consider matters outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Here, the Court properly considers the allegations in the Complaint, along with the exhibits attached to it.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," it must contain facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Where a motion to dismiss is based on an affirmative defense, the moving party must show that it is entitled to the defense on the face of the complaint. Dadd v. Anoka Cty. , 827 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2016).
The Court begins with Todd's claim in Count 1 that the Union violated his First Amendment rights by deducting dues...
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