Todd v. Board of Election Com'rs
| Decision Date | 01 October 1895 |
| Citation | 104 Mich. 474,64 N.W. 496 |
| Parties | TODD v. BOARD OF ELECTION COM'RS OF KALAMAZOO, CALHOUN, BRANCH, HILLSDALE, AND EATON COUNTIES. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Supplemental opinion. For former opinion, see 62 N.W. 564.
Myron H. Walker (E. M. Irish and Howard & Roos, of counsel), for relator.
Fred A Maynard, Atty. Gen. (Moses Taggart, of counsel), for respondents.
A brief opinion was filed in this case upon the hearing, and is found in 62 N.W. 564. The provision of the constitution empowering the legislature to enact laws to preserve the purity of elections and the provisions of the statute are sufficiently stated in that opinion. For want of time, a written opinion upon the constitutional question was then withheld. If the effect of this act, as is strenuously argued by the learned counsel for the relator, is to "subvert or impede the right to vote," it is clearly unconstitutional. If, on the contrary, if neither subverts nor impedes, but only regulates that right, it is constitutional. As experience has disclosed corruption, fraud, venality, and assaults upon the purity of the ballot, the legislatures of the several states have enacted laws to prevent them. Few, if any, of these enactments, have escaped attack in the courts, and the charge against them has usually been that they are unconstitutional and infringe upon the sacred and constitutional rights of the citizen. The registry law of this state was attacked. So also, were the laws providing for the present system,-the quasi Australian ballot. The effect of these laws has been to render voting more inconvenient, to require greater care on the part of the elector, and to sometimes deprive him of his vote. The elector who has failed, through forgetfulness or other reason, to register on the days provided by the law must lose his vote, unless he was sick or absent from the township on business, and without intent to avoid registration. The elector may not desire to vote for any man upon the ballot, and in that case he must erase the name of the objectionable candidate, and write another name, or mark some name for the same office upon another ticket, or lose his vote for that office. He may innocently make certain marks prohibited by law, or he may innocently show his ticket, either of which will cause the loss of his vote. These and other similar provisions designed to secure an honest election, and to preserve "this most precious right to those who are entitled to enjoy it," have been sustained by the courts. The constitution does not guaranty that each voter shall have the same facilities with every other voter in expressing his will at the ballot box, or, to apply the rule to the present case, it does not guaranty to each voter the right to express his will by a single mark. The constitutionality of the law is not to be tested by the fact that one voter can cast his ballot by making one mark while another may be required to make two or more to express his will. When each has been afforded the opportunity and been provided with reasonable facilities to vote, the constitution has been complied with. All else is regulation, and lies in the sound discretion of the legislature, to whom alone such regulation is committed. Courts cannot hold them unconstitutional because, in their judgment, they are harsh or unwise, or have their origin in partisan purposes. Constitutional laws often have their origin in such purposes, and unconstitutional laws are often based upon pure motives and honest intentions. Courts have nothing to do with the motives of legislators, nor the reasons they may have for passing the law. The polar star of interpretation to guide them is the language of the constitution itself, and the sole question always is, does the law destroy or abridge the right?
It is well, perhaps, to refer to some of the decisions of this court as to the power of the legislature to pass acts to maintain the purity of elections, which is expressly conferred upon them by Const. art. 7, � 6. In Chateau v. Jacob, 88 Mich. 170, 50 N.W. 102, a candidate for alderman claimed the right to have his name appear upon the official ballot as a candidate on the Citizens' Committee's independent ticket. He had the right to be a candidate, but it was held he had no right to have his name printed upon the official ballot, because it did not appear that he was selected by any assemblage of electors of his ward, and that anybody could vote for him by writing his name upon the ballot. In Common Council v. Rush, 82 Mich. 532, 46 N.W. 951, it was held that parties might place a county ticket upon the official ballot as the law then stood, and, if they desired to vote for any state ticket, they could erase the county ticket, and place their own in its stead. In that case one voter would be put to more trouble in preparing his ballot than another. In Attorney General v. May, 99 Mich. 538, 58 N.W. 483, we said that every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of the law, citing the authorities. In Attorney General v. Common Council of City of Detroit, 78 Mich. 545, 44 N.W. 388, it was said: In Common Council v. Rush, supra, we held that it was See, also, Attorney General v. McQuade, 94 Mich. 439, 53 N.W. 944. Other decisions by this and other courts might be cited and quoted from, but the above are sufficient to establish the rule by which courts must be governed in determining the constitutionality of acts passed by the legislature for the purity of elections. The rule is thus stated by Justice Cooley: "All such reasonable regulations of the constitutional right which seem to the legislature important to the preservation of order in elections, and guard against fraud, undue influence, and oppression, and to preserve the purity of the ballot box, are not only within the constitutional power of the legislature, but are commendable, and at least some of them absolutely essential." Cooley, Const. Lim. 753. See, also, Paine, Elect. � 301.
In the light of this well-established rule, let us examine the official ballot, to ascertain what the voter is required to do in order to cast his vote under this law. When he enters the booth with his ballot, he seeks that portion of it representing his political affiliations. We will assume that the law was in force at the election in question; that relator was first nominated by the Free Silver party; that he was also the nominee of all the other parties, except the Republican; and that he elected to have his name appear upon the ballot on the Free Silver ticket. The ballot, aside from the vignettes and instructions, would be as follows:
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