Todd v. Bradley

• Decision Date: 27 July 1923
• Citation: 99 Conn. 307,122 A. 68
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: TODD v. BRADLEY ET AL.

122 A. 68

99 Conn. 307

TODD v. BRADLEY ET AL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 27, 1923

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Donald T. Warner Judge.

Action by James E. Todd, trustee, against Walter H. Bradley and others, to recover property or the value of property conveyed or concealed with intent to defraud creditors. Judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appeals. No error.

See also, 97 Conn. 563, 117 A. 808.

Robert C. Stoddard and Frederick H. Wiggin, both of New Haven, and William C. Mueller, of Meriden, for appellant.

Benjamin Slade and Harry W. Asher, both of New Haven, for appellees.

BURPEE, J.

In December, 1915, the defendant Walter H. Bradley was adjudicated a bankrupt in the United States District Court, and the plaintiff was appointed trustee of his estate. In June, 1916, this trustee brought seven separate actions against Bradley and his wife, in some of which his minor daughters and other persons were joined as defendants. The cause of action set up in each of the complaints is the same and the allegations are identical, except that in each different property is specified and made the peculiar object of action. In the case which bears the docket number 12261, Walter H. Bradley, Anna M. Bradley, his wife, and the Meriden National Bank were summoned as defendants, and the property specified is the equity in 25 shares of its capital stock which it is alleged that the bank holds as collateral security for a note of $5,000 signed by Anna M. Bradley, and has discounted for the use and benefit of Walter H. Bradley; and for relief the plaintiff claims a decree that the bank sell this stock, and, after paying the note, pay the balance of the proceeds to the plaintiff, or $1,200 damages, with " such other relief as to law and equity may pertain." The material facts set forth in this complaint as the basis of the cause of action are that the defendant Bradley, since about the year 1900, with the connivance and assistance of his wife and at times of other persons, has been continuously pursuing a course of conduct of transferring all of his property, except a small part of little value, to his wife or daughters or to certain business associates, without consideration, and with the intent and effect of concealing it from his creditors, and of hindering, delaying, and defrauding them. Evidently these are the facts upon which the pleader relies, and only " a plain and concise statement" of them was required and is sufficient under our rules of practice. General Statutes, § § 5630, 5637. But the plaintiff has inserted in the complaint paragraphs in which he sets out some of the evidence by which he expected to prove the essential facts, describing therein the means and methods used by the bankrupt defendant in general transactions with the other defendants and the devices by which he had retained for himself the property or the income of property fraudulently conveyed to others, and telling how the bankrupt's wife, since his illness, had assumed control of such transactions, and asserting that they had concealed their acts from the plaintiff and the bankrupt's creditors until they were revealed in the bankruptcy proceedings, and that since that time the plaintiff and his attorneys " have been engaged in unearthing and exposing the measure of the frauds practiced upon them." These matters are merely evidential and unnecessary description. Therefore the trial court did not err in granting the defendants' motion to expunge them. General Statutes, § 5639. Their exclusion did not weaken the complaint. The allegation that the defendants concealed their acts until the bankruptcy proceedings in 1915 was not necessary to avoid the statute of limitations, because it is never necessary to anticipate a defense. New Haven Trust Co. v. Nelson, 73 Conn. 477, 47 A. 753. Moreover, it appears in the complaint that the fraudulent acts set out as the ground of action took place within six years of the beginning of the suit. The record further discloses that during the trial all evidence offered to show the acts and conduct of the defendants, or any of them, which are described in the expunged parts of the complaint, was admitted, together with all evidence tending to prove the " course of conduct" of any of the defendants at any time in fraudulently transferring and concealing the bankrupt defendant's property from his creditors. Therefore the granting of the motion to expunge was not only not erroneous, but was not harmful to the plaintiff.

In their answer the defendants denied the remaining allegations of the complaint in each action, and for a special defense set up that the right of action stated did not accrue within six years before the commencement of the suit. This assertion the plaintiff denied in each case. Then, by consent of the parties, all of the seven cases were placed on the jury list for the trial of all issues of fact. Thereafter one of them was tried by the jury, and, on their answers to interrogatories concerning issues raised by the pleadings and their verdict thereon, the court directed judgment to be entered for the defendants. From this judgment no appeal has been taken, but thereupon the defendants filed a third defense in the six remaining cases in the nature of a plea of res adjudicata, asserting that the issues in these untried actions are the same as those raised by the interrogatories answered by the jury in the action tried and decided. This the plaintiff denied in his reply, and moved that the six remaining cases be struck from the jury docket and placed on the court list, and that the issues raised by the third defense be tried first. The court granted this motion, heard the parties on these issues, and found them in favor of the plaintiff. Thereafter one of these cases, No. 12261 on the court docket, was assigned for hearing by the court without objection by any party, and it was then agreed by counsel for all parties that the evidence produced during its trial, which covered the course of conduct of the defendant Walter H. Bradley, in his financial transactions with the other defendants from about the year 1900 to the date of his bankruptcy in 1915, should be used by the court in deciding also the other untried cases. This the trial court has done, and has found all the issues in each of the six cases for the defendants.

Among the issues so found was the one raised in the second defense setting up the statute of limitation. The appellant now claims that this part of the judgment is not supported by the pleadings and facts proved, and is erroneous. It seems to have been inadvertently included in the statement of its decision made by the trial court, because, in the mass of evidence and multitude of technical claims and contentions, the court in the end lost sight of an issue which evidently was not seriously presented by any party and was not essential to the determination made and declared. It did not injuriously affect the appellant, because the record plainly reveals that the judgment rendered was founded on other grounds, and, if those were legal and substantial, the judgment will stand on them.

In its finding the trial court distinctly states:

" 81. The defendant Walter H. Bradley did not, with intent and effort to hinder or defraud his creditors, conspire with any of the other defendants to transfer, convey, or conceal his property as alleged in said complaints.

82. None of the defendants ever connived with or assisted the defendant Walter H. Bradley to conceal from his creditors his property as alleged in said complaints.

83. None of the property involved in any of these cases was with fraudulent intent or without consideration taken in the name of the other defendants, or friends and business associates of the defendant Walter H. Bradley.

84. None of the property referred to in the said complaints and sought to be recovered belonged to said Walter H. Bradley at the time of his adjudication as a bankrupt."

These facts overthrow the foundations of these actions. While they remain in the finding, manifestly the judgments of the court cannot be successfully attacked. It is not remarkable, therefore, that the appellant, apparently realizing this effect, asks to have them struck from the finding. The reasons he gives are that these facts " are found contrary to the evidence and without evidence." Whether they were found " contrary to the evidence" is not for this court to decide.

The appellant skillfully selects and marshals parts of the evidence to support his positions in relation to the transactions which he claims were fraudulent, asks this court to note the character of the explanations and verbal statements made by the defendants concerning them, and insists that, taking all the facts together, " the conclusion of a conspiracy to defraud is irresistible," and that " he has established his case beyond a reasonable doubt." His counsel assert in their brief that they " can demonstrate the impossibility of the truth of the * * * findings" of the court, and complain that the court refused to find facts in accordance with the testimony of certain witnesses. In reality they request this court to try the questions of fact raised in these cases, take the plaintiff's view of the evidence, and approve his inferences. We can only repeat what this court has often said respecting such requests, that it is within the province of the trial court only to determine, on conflicting evidence, what the facts are, and, if its inferences and conclusions from the facts were made logically, reasonably, and in accordance with the principles of law, they are final. Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 368, 59 A. 487, in which it is declared that:

" The law upon this subject

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