Todd v. Com.
| Decision Date | 04 September 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-SC-1061-MR,84-SC-1061-MR |
| Citation | 716 S.W.2d 242 |
| Parties | Charles Edward TODD, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Randall L. Wheeler, Asst. Public Advocate, Frankfort, for appellant.
David L. Armstrong, Atty. Gen., Carl T. Miller, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.
This appeal is taken from the Estill Circuit Court in which Appellant Charles Edward Todd was convicted of wanton murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
On May 27, 1983, Todd summoned an ambulance for his mother from the residence of his aunt, Grace McKee. Mrs. McKee was an arthritic invalid with whom Appellant frequently stayed. Mrs. Todd also occasionally tended to her sister and evidently had been in the home since May 21.
When the ambulance driver arrived, he found Mrs. Todd on the living room floor and was told that she had fallen over a footstool. The driver thought this was suspicious inasmuch as the bruise on her injured leg was yellowish, indicating a trauma three to four days old; furthermore, she had additional bruises on other parts of her body. When he asked about Mrs. McKee, he was told by Todd that she was in her bedroom. Later in the day the ambulance dispatcher unsuccessfully attempted to contact the McKee home to advise where Mrs. Todd had been taken. Having also noticed a foul odor when he had been within the home, the driver subsequently indicated his concern for Mrs. McKee to the Beattyville Police Department.
When the police went to the home to investigate, there was no response, and Mrs. McKee could not be seen through her bedroom window. The officer and a deputy sheriff thereupon pried open the door and entered. After a search of the entry level of the house, Mrs. McKee's beaten body was discovered at the foot of the basement steps. According to the Lee County Coroner who was called to the scene, the condition of the body indicated that Mrs. McKee had been dead several days.
The local authorities notified the Kentucky State Police of the situation. They arrived shortly thereafter and conducted a thorough investigation of the scene. As a result of the search, many evidentiary items were seized among which were blood scrapings, a blood-stained pair of pants from the floor of Appellant's bedroom, and a hammer with blood found within a kitchen cabinet drawer. Defense moved below that these and all other items seized be suppressed as the result of a warrantless search.
Three days later a search warrant was obtained, and some bed linens and a cedar block of wood were taken. Suppression of these was sought based upon allegations that the affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient.
The Circuit Court ruled against a broad exclusion. However, it concluded that suppression of individual pieces of evidence could be raised and considered during the course of trial.
At trial Mrs. Hazel Todd, Appellant's mother, was called by the Commonwealth. In an attempt to establish her as an eyewitness to the crime, she was asked if she had not seen Mr. Todd push down and beat up Mrs. McKee. When Mrs. Todd denied this, she was asked whether she also denied having told the detectives that. Her response was, "I might have; I don't know." A recurrent theme of the prosecution's examination was that while hospitalized, she had described an assault by Mr. Todd upon his aunt which had led to her death; however, in each instance Mrs. Todd asserted that she just couldn't recall what she had told. With respect to this testimony defense counsel asked that the jury be admonished that evidence of any prior inconsistent statements be considered only for impeachment purposes and not as substantive proof:
1. If the witness Hazel Todd was heard to make a statement at another time and place which contradicts or is inconsistent with her testimony at trial, that statement made out of court (if she did make it) is not to be considered by you to any degree whatever as evidence of the defendant's innocence or guilt, but only insofar as it may have a bearing, if it does so, upon the truthfulness of the witness' testimony.
This was rejected.
During the trial the Court ruled that the Commonwealth could ask of local police officers whether they were familiar with the relationship between Mr. Todd and Mrs. McKee; however, specific instances were not to be mentioned. Subsequently, a policeman, a deputy sheriff, and the sheriff testified concerning prior reports relating to Mrs. McKee. Included in this information were the facts that Mrs. McKee had been found beaten, that food had apparently been thrown against her bedroom walls, that bullet holes were seen in those walls and in her mattress, that a shotgun with a broken stock was found in the McKee home, and that on one occasion a warrant for Mr. Todd's arrest had been executed. Cross-examination revealed that Mrs. McKee had been the one to have posted bond after this arrest. An admonition covering this was sought and granted:
2. The testimony concerning reports of previous difficulties between Charles Todd and Grace McKee, if believed by you, may not be considered by you to any extent whatever as evidence of his innocence or guilt in this case, but may be considered only insofar as it may tend to show his state of feeling toward Grace McKee, if it does so, at the time of the alleged offense for which he is being tried.
As part of the investigation and autopsy procedures, over five dozen photographs of the nude and battered body of Grace McKee were offered into evidence by the Commonwealth. Defense objected to all as unnecessarily inflammatory and probative of nothing which would not also be proven by oral testimony. Further, it was urged that a suggestion of sexual abuse or rape was inherent in one. A hearing was held in which the lower Court concluded that all were admissible except those either revealing the body altered by autopsy or suggesting sexual abuse or rape.
The pictures were sorted through in chambers; however, the sexually indicative one was erroneously included amongst those admissible and was subsequently introduced by the Commonwealth. Appellant objected and asked for a mistrial. This was denied; however, the Court offered to give an admonition which was not accepted.
Additionally, relating to the sexual aspect which was not to have been a part of this case, the Commonwealth developed that Mr. Todd had been given a "perk" test to aid in determining whether a rape had occurred and introduced pubic hairs identified as having been taken from the deceased and Charles Todd as part of the general investigation into the death. Objections and motions for mistrial with reference to both were overruled.
Prior to trial Mr. Todd sought psychiatric evaluation to aid in his defense. He was referred to the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center which reported that in all medical probability he was competent to stand trial and that "[i]f this was his condition on the day of the alleged crime then in probably (sic) this patient had a substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to have conformed his conduct to the requirement of the law on the day of the alleged crime." Appellant's motion for appointment of an independent psychiatric examiner to consider insanity, intoxication, and extreme emotional disturbance as defenses or mitigation was overruled.
Also, prior to trial Appellant moved for the dismissal of the petit jury panel inasmuch as it allegedly was not constituted in accordance with KRS 29A.050(4)(b). Were that statute followed, Mr. Todd argued, there would have been a total of 669 names in the juror wheel; instead there were between 608 and 610. It was further argued that women were demonstrably underrepresented in the petit jury in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, U.S. Constitution.
Having identified the relevant facts, we turn to the issues addressed by Mr. Todd. He begins by asserting that he was denied due process and equal protection when the lower Court denied his motion for evaluation by an independent psychiatrist. He urges that such would have aided in presenting a defense or mitigation through insanity, intoxication, or extreme emotional disturbance.
We would first note that Mr. Todd was indicted for wanton murder, KRS 507.020(1)(b). Particularly on point is the definition of the mental state of "wantonly" found within KRS 501.020 which concludes: "A person who creates such a risk [a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur] but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts wantonly with respect thereto." Accordingly, irrespective of a psychiatric examination, intoxication would not have been a factor in Mr. Todd's defense.
The Penal Code also addresses the question of extreme emotional disturbance. KRS 507.020(1)(a) establishes it as a mitigating element (to be negated by the Commonwealth upon production by the defendant) to a murder which was specifically intended. However, extreme emotional disturbance statutorily plays no role in the crime with which Mr. Todd was charged, wanton murder under KRS 507.020(1)(b). Extreme emotional disturbance under our code affects one's formation of the specific intent to murder, but as KRS 507.020 is drafted, it has no carry-over application to one's wanton behavior in creating a grave risk of death. Thus, Appellant cannot be heard to complain that he was unable to develop such through an independent psychiatric examination.
That aside, with the question of insanity, which is an actual defense, KRS 31.185 provides:
Any defending attorney operating under the provisions of this chapter is entitled to use the same state facilities for the evaluation of evidence as are available to the attorney representing the Commonwealth. If he considers their use impractical, the court concerned may authorize the use of private facilities to be paid for on court order by the county.
Appellant...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Chestnut v. State
...159 (1961); Wilson v. State, 263 Ind. 469, 333 N.E.2d 755 (1975); State v. Plowman, 386 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa Ct.App.1986); Todd v. Commonwealth, 716 S.W.2d 242 (Ky.1986); Commonwealth v. Grey, 399 Mass. 469, 505 N.E.2d 171 (1987); People v. Mangiapane, 85 Mich.App. 379, 271 N.W.2d 240 (Ct.App.1......
-
State v. Phipps
...899 (1989); State v. Clokey, 83 Idaho 322, 364 P.2d 159 (1961); State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 126 N.W.2d 285 (1964); Todd v. Commonwealth, 716 S.W.2d 242 (Ky.1986); State v. Hill, 242 Kan. 68, 744 P.2d 1228 (1987); Commonwealth v. Blanchette, 409 Mass. 99, 564 N.E.2d 992 (1991); People v.......
-
Bowling v. Haeberlin
...in denial of expert funds where, among other things, defendant "did not rely on or pursue an insanity defense"); Todd v. Commonwealth, 716 S.W.2d 242, 247 (Ky. 1986) (finding same where "nothing had been filed by [the defendant] to indicate that he intended to raise insanity as a defense");......
-
Fields v. Com.
...Law, Section 2-2(d)(3) (LEXIS 1998). See also Commentary to KRS 501.080 (quoted above). Today's majority also overlooks Todd v. Commonwealth, Ky., 716 S.W.2d 242 (1986), where this Court focused on the statutory language of KRS 501.030(3) and correctly explained the interaction of the sente......