Todd v. Montoya

Citation877 F.Supp.2d 1048
Decision Date24 June 2012
Docket NumberNo. CIV 10–0106 JB/KBM.,CIV 10–0106 JB/KBM.
PartiesByron TODD, Plaintiff, v. Tomas MONTOYA, Ron Torres, Director of the Metropolitan Detention Center, and The Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County, Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of New Mexico

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Erlinda O. Johnson, Law Office of Erlinda Ocampo Johnson, LLC, Ryan J. Villa, The Law Offices of Robert R. Cooper, Albuquerque, NM, for the Plaintiff.

Carlos M. Quinones, Quinones Law Firm, Santa Fe, NM, for Defendant Tomas Montoya.

Jeffrey L. Baker, Renni Zifferblatt, Jeffrey L. Baker & Associates, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants Ron Torres and the Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Tomas Montoya's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment Based upon Qualified Immunity and Other Grounds, filed January 30, 2012 (Doc. 94)(Jan. 30, 2012 MSJ). The Court held a hearing on April 5, 2012. The primary issues are: (i) whether Defendant Tomas Montoya is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity under the facts presented; (ii) whether the Court should permit Plaintiff Byron Todd to have additional discovery under rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to challenge Montoya's assertion of qualified immunity; (iii) whether the Court should enter summary judgment on Todd's tort claims under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, N.M.S.A.1978, §§ 41–4–1 to –30 (“NMTCA”); and (iv) whether the Court should permit Todd to have additional discovery under rule 56(d) to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding Montoya's liability under the NMTCA. The Court will grant the Jan. 30, 2012 MSJ. The Court concludes that, on the facts presented, Todd has not met his burden to overcome Montoya's qualified-immunity defense. Likewise, Todd has not satisfied the standards under rule 56(d) to obtain additional discovery to overcome Montoya's qualified-immunity defense. Todd has also not met his burden to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding Montoya's liability under the NMTCA. Lastly, Todd has not met the requirements under rule 56(d) to merit additional discovery regarding his NMTCA claim against Montoya.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Todd attempts to dispute many of Montoya's asserted facts. In contravention of D.N.M.LR–Civ. 56.1(b), however, Todd does not distinguish between Montoya's asserted facts which he intends to dispute and additional asserted facts he intends to present. D.N.M.LR–Civ. 56.1(b) provides in relevant part:

The Response must contain a concise statement of the material facts cited by the movant as to which the non-movant contends a genuine issue does exist. Each fact in dispute must be numbered, must refer with particularity to those portions of the record upon which the non-movant relies, and must state the number of the movant's fact that is disputed. All material facts set forth in the Memorandum will be deemed undisputed unless specifically controverted. The Response may set forth additional facts other than those which respond to the Memorandum which the non-movant contends are material to the resolution of the motion. Each additional fact must be lettered and must refer with particularity to those portions of the record upon which the non-movant relies.

D.N.M.LR–Civ. 56.1(b). While the Court does not believe that any sanction is appropriate for Todd's failure to comply with this local rule, the Court notes that it may have some difficulty in determining whether Todd intends to present additional asserted facts or intends to dispute Montoya's asserted facts.

There have been two summary judgment motions filed in this case, with the most recent motion being the Jan. 30, 2012 MSJ and the earlier motion being the motion for summary judgment filed on April 13, 2011. See Defendant Tomas Montoya's Motion for Summary Judgment Based upon Qualified Immunity and Other Grounds, and Supporting Memorandum (Doc. 61)(Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ). Because the parties incorporate their factual sections from their previous filings regarding the Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ, the Court will present both sets of facts in chronological order.

Todd also provides two separate affidavits under rule 56(d) asserting that he needs additional discovery to have the ability to properly dispute Montoya's asserted facts. In his most recent response to Montoya's motion for summary judgment, Todd asserts that he has sufficient evidence to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact to avoid the entry of summary judgment and requests, as an alternative ground, that the Court permit him to have additional discovery. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Montoya's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment at 3 [Doc. No. 94], filed February 27, 2012 (Doc. 96)(Response to Jan. 30, 2012 MSJ). Specifically, he states: “Although Plaintiff does not believe it is necessary, should the Court believe that additional discovery is necessary to rule on Defendant's Motion, the Court should defer ruling until said discovery can be completed.” Response to Jan. 30, 2012 MSJ at 3. Consequently, the Court will evaluate Todd's requests for additional discovery under rule 56(d) in the analysis section of this Memorandum Opinion and Order once it has determined, on the facts presented, whether entry of summary judgment is appropriate. This course of action is also the more practical one given that Todd, in response to the significant majority of Montoya's asserted facts, has asserted that he “is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny these allegations, and is in need of further discovery.” E.g., Response to Defendant Tomas Montoya's Motion for Summary Judgment Based upon Qualified Immunity and Other Grounds, and Supporting Memorandum ¶ 2, at 2, filed May 23, 2011 (Doc. 67)(Response to Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ). It will be more efficient for the Court to address this argument one time rather than each time Todd makes it—particularly given that Todd makes this argument over fifty times. If Todd makes this argument in response to an asserted fact, the Court will consider the fact undisputed for purposes of deciding the Jan. 30, 2012 MSJ, but will separately consider whether additional discovery under rule 56(d) is appropriate such that the Court should deny the motion for summary judgment. See D.N.M.LR–Civ. 56.1(b) (“All material facts set forth in the Memorandum will be deemed undisputed unless specifically controverted.”).

This dispute revolves around a fight between several inmates in which an inmate named Patrick Wilks and an inmate named Joseph Armijo attacked Todd. The Bernalillo County Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) hired Montoya as a detention center or corrections officer, where he began working on October 19, 2007. See Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 1, at 2 (setting forth this fact); Affidavit of Defendant Tomas Montoya ¶ 3, at 1, filed April 13, 2011 (Doc. 61)(“Montoya Aff.”); Response to Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 1, at 2 (not disputing this fact). On January 13, 2008, Montoya was assigned to oversee the inmates in the Fox–7 housing unit (“F–7”) at the MDC. See Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 2, at 2 (setting forth this fact); Montoya Aff. ¶ 4, at 1; Response to Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 2, at 2 (not disputing this fact). Inmates in the F–7 on January 13, 2008 consisted of general population inmates. See Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 3, at 2; Montoya Aff. ¶ 5, at 1; Response to Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 3, at 2 (not disputing this fact). General population inmates are free to move about F–7 among other general population inmates, except that they cannot enter the cells of other inmates and must remain at all times at least arm's length apart from the staff station area that the corrections officer on duty occupies. See Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 4, at 2–3 (setting forth this fact); Montoya Aff. ¶ 7, at 2.1

Montoya had no authority or discretion to determine which inmates were classified as general population inmates and which were permitted to be in F–7. See Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 5, at 3 (setting forth this fact); Montoya Aff. ¶ 6, at 2; Response to Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 5, at 3 (not disputing this fact).2

On January 13, 2008, and on other dates when Montoya worked in F–7, his work post consisted of the staff station. See Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 6, at 3 (setting forth this fact); Montoya Aff. ¶ 6, at 2.3 In front of the staff station is a large brick wall in a half oval, and there is access to the staff station by walking up three steps and then entering around the sides of the half oval brick wall; this wall is about six feet high from the floor level on the inmates' side of the wall. See Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 7, at 3 (setting forth this fact); Montoya Aff. ¶ 9, at 2; Response to Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 7, at 3 (not disputing this fact). The staff station consists of a top desk with a drop-down computer terminal with a telephone on the top desk and a chair located behind the desk. See Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 8, at 3 (setting forth this fact); Montoya Aff. ¶ 10, at 2; Response to Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 8, at 3 (not disputing this fact).

Generally, Montoya, during his shift in F–7, would be at the staff station observing inmates from an elevated position. See Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 9, at 3 (setting forth this fact); Montoya Aff. ¶ 11, at 2; Response to Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 9, at 4 (not disputing this fact). Corrections officers use the drop-down computer terminal located at the staff station desk to look for an open cell for a new inmate who was already classified to be in F–7, to look up account balances of inmates with Canteen Services,4 and to review the legal and criminal history of inmates within MDC's files. See Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 10, at 3 (setting forth this fact); Montoya Aff. ¶ 12, at 2; Response to Apr. 13, 2011 MSJ ¶ 10, at 4 (not disputing this fact).

Montoya's review of inmates' legal or criminal history as stated in their MDC files was as a precaution for his...

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