Todd v. Philadelphia & Reading Railway Co.
| Decision Date | 24 February 1902 |
| Docket Number | 294 |
| Citation | 51 A. 332,201 Pa. 558 |
| Parties | Todd, Appellant, v. Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued January 14, 1902
Appeal, No. 294, Jan. T., 1901, by plaintiffs, from judgment of C.P. No. 4, Phila. Co., June T., 1900, No. 949, on verdict for defendant, in case of Robert T., Todd and William D Todd, a minor, by Robert T. Todd, his father and next friend v. Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company. Reversed.
Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries to a boy ten years old. Before WILLSON, J.
The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.
At the trial the court gave binding instructions for defendant.
Verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appealed.
Error assigned was in giving binding instructions for defendant.
Judgment reversed and venire facias de novo awarded.
J. M. Vanderslice, with him Clarence Vanderslice, for appellants, cited: Rauch v. Lloyd, 31 Pa. 358; Kelly v. Penna. R.R. Co., 31 Pa. 372; Phila., etc., R.R. Co. v. Layer, 112 Pa. 418; Ely v. Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co., 158 Pa. 233; Fisher v. Monongahela Con. Ry. Co., 131 Pa. 292; Penna. R.R. Co. v. Werner, 89 Pa. 59; Schum v. Penna. R.R. Co., 107 Pa. 8; Holland v. Kindregan, 155 Pa. 160; Philpott v. Penna. R.R. Co., 175 Pa. 570; Regan v. Penna. R.R. Co., 189 Pa. 572; Devlin v. Beacon Light Co., 198 Pa. 583; Bard v. Phila., etc., Ry. Co., 199 Pa. 94; Foote v. American Product Co., 195 Pa. 190.
Gavin W. Hart, for appellee.
Before McCOLLUM, C.J., MITCHELL, DEAN, FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT and POTTER, JJ.
William D. Todd, the minor, who sues by his father, Robert T. Todd, alleges that he was injured while attempting to cross over a train of the defendant company, which, when he got on it, was standing still and obstructing the public crossing, and started, without any notice or warning before he got on it, that it was about to start. He testified, in May, 1901, that he was between eleven and twelve years of age, and that, in July of the preceding year, he, with some other boys, was on his way, on Germantown avenue, in the city of Philadelphia, to a swimming pool at Laurel and Beach streets. Germantown avenue runs in a northwesterly direction from Front street, and intersects Second street obliquely. When the boys reached the intersection of these two streets, they found, according to young Todd's testimony, the crossing at Second street obstructed by a train of the defendant; plaintiff and one of his companions sat down on the curb, and, after waiting a while, he said he was going to get across; that he got on the car, and, when on it, it started; that, before he got on, he had no notice that the train was about to start; that, when he was getting down, he came in contact with a car standing on a siding, and was thrown under the wheels of the car from which he was trying to alight, and sustained most serious injuries. The track of the railroad company does not cross Second street, but, at the intersection of the avenue and street, extends from the former up the latter. The obstruction was, as stated by the injured boy, not only over the Second street crossing, but extended up the street. He says there were more than three cars behind the car over which he crossed. There was other testimony that the end of the train was on Second street, north of Germantown avenue, and that the crossing of the street was completely obstructed.
The obstruction of a street crossing by a railroad company, in unnecessarily stopping its cars upon it, is unlawful. In plain terms, the act of March 20, 1845, declares the blocking up of a public crossing with locomotives or cars to be illegal, and prohibits it, under a penalty. The obstruction complained of in this case was prima facie evidence that the defendant was guilty of negligence, and, to establish its innocence, the burden was upon it to satisfy a jury that the obstruction had not continued for an unreasonable time, and could not have been avoided by the exercise of proper care and diligence. In other words, the burden was upon the company to prove that, under all the circumstances, there had not been an absence of care on its part. No such proof was offered; if any had been presented, the sufficiency of it would have...
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