Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 May 1981
• Docket Number: No. 21448,21448
• Citation: 278 S.E.2d 607,276 S.C. 284
• Parties: , 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4899 John Wendell TODD, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Company, and Equifax Services, Inc., Appellants.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 607

278 S.E.2d 607

276 S.C. 284, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4899

John Wendell TODD, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company,

Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance

Company, and Equifax Services,

Inc., Appellants.

No. 21448.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

May 13, 1981.

Harold W. Jacobs, of Nexsen, Pruet, Jacobs & Pollard, Columbia, for appellants S. C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., et al., and E. Ellison Walker, of McKay, Sherrill, Walker & Townsend, Columbia, for appellant Equifax Services, Inc.

Terry E. Richardson, Jr., of Blatt & Fales, Barnwell, and James P. Stevens, Jr., of Stevens, Stevens & Thomas, Loris, for respondent.

HARWELL, Justice:

John Wendell Todd commenced this action against South Carolina Mutual Insurance Company, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Company and Equifax Services, Inc., for alleged actions relating to the termination of Todd's employment relationship with the Farm Bureau defendants in February of 1979.

The amended complaint alleges five causes of action for (1) intentional interference with contractural relations, (2) extreme and outrageous conduct, (3) bad faith termination of the employment contract, (4) invasion of privacy, and (5) conspiracy to so damage the plaintiff. Each cause of action alleges actual and punitive damages of $200,000 with an aggregate of $1,000,000 prayed for. The complaint is drawn up such that each cause incorporates all prior allegations.

The defendants answered and have demurred to the last four causes of action, principally for alleged failure to state an action or to set forth facts sufficient to support the causes of action. Todd meanwhile served notice upon Equifax of a motion for the production, inspection and copying of documents relating to its investigation and files on him and to records of a voice stress analysis test. Equifax then moved to quash the motion, listing several grounds but on appeal relying solely upon a Fifth Amendment privilege argument.

In addition, the defendants interposed various motions to strike and to make the allegations in the complaint more definite and certain.

In two orders the trial judge largely granted Todd the relief he sought and largely denied the defendants the relief they sought. Only the defendants appealed. Their exceptions shall be dealt with in the order presented.

I

Does the second cause of action state facts sufficient to support a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrage?

The second cause of action of the amended complaint alleges as follows:

"11. The plaintiff alleges and incorporates Paragraphs 1-10 above as if fully repeated herein.

"12. That the defendants' actions and those of their agents, servants, and employees were reckless, wilful, wanton, oppressive and constituted extreme and outrageous conduct.

"13. That by reason of said extreme and outrageous conduct, and as a proximate result thereof, the plaintiff was damaged in his economic relations in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand ($200,000) Dollars, actual and punitive damages."

The appellants argue that the cause of action is fatally defective since alleged damages to economic relations are not appropriate to a cause of action for infliction of emotional distress.

When a pleading is demurred to for alleged failure to state a cause of action, it must be liberally construed in favor of the pleader and sustained if the facts and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom entitle him to relief on any theory of the case. Turner v. A B C Jalousie Company of North Carolina, Inc., 251 S.C. 92, 160 S.E.2d 528 (1968); Pilkington v. McBain, S.C., 262 S.E.2d 916 (1980); Whale Branch Corporation v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, S.C., 268 S.E.2d 583 (1980).

When the pleading is reviewed in this light, it becomes apparent that a cause of action is stated. The second cause of action expressly incorporates the first ten paragraphs of the amended complaint. Paragraph 10 states that Todd has "suffered from extreme emotional distress, nervousness, worry, loss of sleep, headaches; ... all to his damage ..." The allegations as incorporated thus support the cause of action for purposes of the demurrer. Ford v. Hutson, S.C., 276 S.E.2d 776. Of course, we intimate no opinion as to the ultimate viability of the plaintiff's claim. Rumph v. RWF, Inc., S.C., 268 S.E.2d 584, 585 (1980). The trial judge therefore did not err by overruling the demurrer to this cause of action. We agree with the appellants however that the purported claim of damages to economic relations is unclear. As such it is at least subject to clarification or deletion upon a proper motion.

II

Does the third cause of action state an action for bad faith termination of Todd's employment contracts with the Farm Bureau companies?

In this State an employment contract terminable at the will of either party may be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason at all. Ross v. Life Insurance Company of Virginia, 273 S.C. 764, 259 S.E.2d 814 (1979). In Ross this Court expressly found that the plaintiff had conceded that his employment contract was terminable at will. The demurrer to the action for wrongful termination of employment was therefore sustained by the trial court and affirmed on appeal.

The appellants here demurred to Todd's cause of action for bad faith termination alleging that Todd's employment contract was terminable at will upon ten days notice. The appellants answer, in fact, sets forth the alleged contract provision.

We are constrained, however, to uphold the action of the trial judge in overruling the demurrer. The demurrer attacks the four corners of the pleading only. The matters raised by the appellants simply are not alleged in the complaint. This Court recently stated in Preston H. Haskell Company v. Morgan, S.C., 262 S.E.2d 737, 738-739 (1980):

"While much of the record submitted to the lower court, and printed in the transcript on appeal, might have been proper for consideration under a motion for a summary judgment, they cannot be considered on a demurrer. We do not, however, intimate that the demurring parties would have been entitled to prevail under a motion for summary judgment.

"The demurrer, though still permitted and sometimes appropriate as a means of attacking the pleadings of an adversary, is an antiquated vehicle which should be sparingly used. Normally, any ground of demurrer can be asserted by way of motion for a summary judgment, and that approach is more apt to fairly and succinctly present the issues to the court."

III

Does the fourth cause of action state facts sufficient to support a cause of action for invasion of privacy?

The fourth cause of action provides:

"17. The plaintiff realleges and incorporates Paragraphs 1-16 above as if fully repeated herein.

"18. That the aforesaid actions and accusations by the defendants have been publicized and communicated to third persons and the general public by the defendants with express, reckless, and wanton disregard of the plaintiff's right to privacy.

"19. That said publicity has unreasonably placed the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.

"20. That by reasons of said invasion of privacy and as a proximate result thereof, he was damaged in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand ($200,000) Dollars, actual and punitive damages."

This Court has approved the following as a fairly comprehensive definition of what constitutes an actionable invasion of the right of privacy:

"The unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's private activities, in such manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities." Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606, 608 (1957).

The trial judge found facts sufficient to satisfy the terms of the definition and thus support the cause of action and overcome the demurrer challenge. This was not error.

The analysis here is similar to that of the second cause of action above. The issue is simply whether facts are alleged in the first sixteen paragraphs of the amended complaint which support the cause. Clearly there are. Subparagraphs 8(d) and 8(e) of the complaint allege that the appellants wrongfully accused Todd of leaking information from an investigation of fire loss claims to an arsonist and that the appellants published these accusations to the public. Drawing the facts and inferences liberally in favor of the respondent as we are required to for purposes of the demurrer, Preston H. Haskell Company v. Morgan, supra, the inference can be drawn that the alleged circumstances of Todd's employment termination had wrongfully been made public. These allegations alone will support the cause of action.

We again emphasize that we are not reviewing the substantive strength or weakness of the respondent's cause of action. That is a matter left to the trial of the action. We have only concluded that a cause of action was stated.

IV

Does the amended complaint properly set forth a fifth cause of action for conspiracy?

The fifth cause of action simply takes all the prior allegations and alleges that the acts were done in furtherance of a conspiracy among the defendants. Damages are then sought for injury resulting from the conspiracy.

Conspiracy is the conspiring or combining together to do an unlawful act to the detriment of another or the doing of a lawful act in an unlawful way to the detriment of another. Charles v. Texas Company, 192...