Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
| Citation | 278 S.E.2d 607,276 S.C. 284 |
| Docket Number | No. 21448,21448 |
| Parties | , 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4899 John Wendell TODD, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Company, and Equifax Services, Inc., Appellants. |
| Decision Date | 13 May 1981 |
Page 607
v.
SOUTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company,
Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance
Company, and Equifax Services,
Inc., Appellants.
Page 608
[276 S.C. 286] Harold W. Jacobs, of Nexsen, Pruet, Jacobs & Pollard, Columbia, for appellants S. C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., et al., and E. Ellison Walker, of McKay, Sherrill, Walker & Townsend, Columbia, for appellant Equifax Services, Inc.
[276 S.C. 287] Terry E. Richardson, Jr., of Blatt & Fales, Barnwell, and James P. Stevens, Jr., of Stevens, Stevens & Thomas, Loris, for respondent.
HARWELL, Justice:
John Wendell Todd commenced this action against South Carolina Mutual Insurance Company, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Company and Equifax Services, Inc., for alleged actions relating to the termination of Todd's employment relationship with the Farm Bureau defendants in February of 1979.
The amended complaint alleges five causes of action for (1) intentional interference with contractural relations, (2) extreme and outrageous conduct, (3) bad faith termination of the employment contract, (4) invasion of privacy, and (5) conspiracy to so damage the plaintiff. Each cause of action alleges actual and punitive damages of $200,000 with an aggregate of $1,000,000 prayed for. The complaint is drawn up such that each cause incorporates all prior allegations.
The defendants answered and have demurred to the last four causes of action, principally for alleged failure to state an action or to set forth facts sufficient to support the causes of action. Todd meanwhile served notice upon Equifax of a motion for the production, inspection and copying of documents relating to its investigation and files on him and to records of a voice stress analysis test. Equifax then moved to quash the motion, listing several grounds but on appeal relying solely upon a Fifth Amendment privilege argument.
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In addition, the defendants interposed various motions to strike and to make the allegations in the complaint more definite and certain.
[276 S.C. 288] In two orders the trial judge largely granted Todd the relief he sought and largely denied the defendants the relief they sought. Only the defendants appealed. Their exceptions shall be dealt with in the order presented.
Does the second cause of action state facts sufficient to support a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrage?
The second cause of action of the amended complaint alleges as follows:
"11. The plaintiff alleges and incorporates Paragraphs 1-10 above as if fully repeated herein.
"12. That the defendants' actions and those of their agents, servants, and employees were reckless, wilful, wanton, oppressive and constituted extreme and outrageous conduct.
"13. That by reason of said extreme and outrageous conduct, and as a proximate result thereof, the plaintiff was damaged in his economic relations in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand ($200,000) Dollars, actual and punitive damages."
The appellants argue that the cause of action is fatally defective since alleged damages to economic relations are not appropriate to a cause of action for infliction of emotional distress.
When a pleading is demurred to for alleged failure to state a cause of action, it must be liberally construed in favor of the pleader and sustained if the facts and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom entitle him to relief on any theory of the case. Turner v. A B C Jalousie Company of North Carolina, Inc., 251 S.C. 92, 160 S.E.2d 528 (1968); Pilkington v. McBain, S.C., 262 S.E.2d 916 (1980); Whale Branch Corporation [276 S.C. 289] v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, S.C., 268 S.E.2d 583 (1980).
When the pleading is reviewed in this light, it becomes apparent that a cause of action is stated. The second cause of action expressly incorporates the first ten paragraphs of the amended complaint. Paragraph 10 states that Todd has "suffered from extreme emotional distress, nervousness, worry, loss of sleep, headaches; ... all to his damage ..." The allegations as incorporated thus support the cause of action for purposes of the demurrer. Ford v. Hutson, S.C., 276 S.E.2d 776. Of course, we intimate no opinion as to the ultimate viability of the plaintiff's claim. Rumph v. RWF, Inc., S.C., 268 S.E.2d 584, 585 (1980). The trial judge therefore did not err by overruling the demurrer to this cause of action. We agree with the appellants however that the purported claim of damages to economic relations is unclear. As such it is at least subject to clarification or deletion upon a proper motion.
Does the third cause of action state an action for bad faith termination of Todd's employment contracts with the Farm Bureau companies?
In this State an employment contract terminable at the will of either party may be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason at all. Ross v. Life Insurance Company of Virginia, 273 S.C. 764, 259 S.E.2d 814 (1979). In Ross this Court expressly found that the plaintiff had conceded that his employment contract was terminable at will. The demurrer to the action for wrongful termination of employment was therefore sustained by the trial court and affirmed on appeal.
The appellants here demurred to Todd's cause of action for bad faith termination alleging that Todd's employment contract was terminable at will upon [276 S.C. 290] ten days notice. The appellants answer, in fact, sets forth the alleged contract provision.
We are constrained, however, to uphold the action of the trial judge in overruling the demurrer. The demurrer attacks the
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four corners of the pleading only. The matters raised by the appellants simply are not...To continue reading
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Rouse v. Nielson, Civ. A. No. 3:92-0520-19.
...283 S.C. 520, 522, 324 S.E.2d 79 (1984). Likewise, plaintiff's conspiracy claim also fails pursuant to Todd v. S.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Cos., 276 S.C. 284, 278 S.E.2d 607 (1981) because it merely restates the first cause of action for a § 1983 Accordingly, the undersigned hereby RE......
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...A.2d at 54. We find South Carolina law, though not so explicit, to be in the same vein. See Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 276 S.C. 284, 294, 278 S.E.2d 607, 612 (1981) ("punitive damages may be justified for aggravated, unjustified interference with the contractua......
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In re Derivium Capital, LLC, Civil Action No. 05-15042-JW
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Kuznik v. Bees Ferry Associates, 3242.
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