Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co.

• Decision Date: 16 October 1942
• Docket Number: No. 8002.,8002.
• Parties: TOEBELMAN et al. (HAHN, Intervener) v. MISSOURI-KANSAS PIPE LINE CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

130 F.2d 1016 (1942)

TOEBELMAN et al. (HAHN, Intervener) v. MISSOURI-KANSAS PIPE LINE CO. et al.

No. 8002.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued July 13, 1942.

Decided October 16, 1942.

John J. Morris, Jr., of Wilmington, Del. (Rothbart & Rosenfield and J. M. Rosenfield, all of Chicago, Ill., and Harold B. Howard, of Wilmington, Del., on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellants.

Robert Burnett, of St. Louis, Mo. (Henry H. Stern and B. L. Liberman, both of St. Louis, Mo., and Herbert L. Cohen, of Wilmington, Del., on the brief), for intervening plaintiff-appellant.

Arthur G. Logan, of Wilmington, Del. (Logan & Duffy and H. Newton White, Jr., all of Wilmington, Del., on the brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before MARIS and GOODRICH, Circuit Judges, and SMITH, District Judge.

MARIS, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiffs, minority shareholders of Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Company (hereinafter called Mokan), brought a stockholders' derivative suit in the District Court for the District of Delaware. An additional minority stockholder intervened upon the first cause of action alleged in the complaint. Jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship.

The defendants moved to strike or dismiss the complaint. The court denied this motion. The defendants then moved for summary judgment and filed affidavits in support of their motion. The plaintiffs moved for leave to inspect certain designated books and records of Mokan under Civil Procedure Rule 34, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. Later the plaintiffs amended their motion and prayed that the motion for summary judgment be denied or in the alternative that a continuance be granted to permit the plaintiffs to obtain affidavits and take depositions of the defendants Maguire and Tringham and of Mokan's attorneys Logan and Hand and have discovery as provided by Civil Procedure Rule 56(f). The court denied the plaintiffs' motion but, with the consent of the parties, appointed an accountant to examine Mokan's books and records and to file the results of his examination in the form of an affidavit. After the examiner's report was filed the court entered summary judgment and dismissed the suit without a trial for the reasons set forth in its opinion. 41 F.Supp. 334.

It is now well settled that summary judgment may be entered for either party if the pleadings, depositions, admissions on file and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Civil Procedure Rule 56. Stated conversely, a substantial dispute as to a material fact forecloses summary judgment. McElwain v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 2 Cir., 1942, 126 F.2d 210; Miller v. Miller, 1941, 74 App.D.C. 216, 122 F.2d 209; Whitaker v. Coleman, 5 Cir., 1940, 115 F.2d 305. Upon a motion for a summary judgment it is no part of the court's function to decide issues of fact but solely to determine whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. Ramsouer v. Midland Valley R. Co., D.C.Ark., 1942, 44 F.Supp. 523. All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact must be resolved against the party moving for a summary judgment. Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corporation, 2 Cir., 1942, 127 F.2d 344.

In their bill of complaint the plaintiffs set forth five separate causes of action which they alleged Mokan had against the individual defendants. The court entered summary judgment for the defendants upon all five causes of action. Upon appeal the plaintiffs have tacitly abandoned two of the causes of action by restricting their arguments to the remaining three. We accordingly restrict our consideration to these three causes of action. As to each of them the same question must be asked — was there a substantial dispute as to a material fact, which, if resolved in favor of the plaintiffs, would entitle Mokan to recover from the defendants. Upon two of these causes of action we think the reply must be in the negative and that the entry of summary judgment thereon was proper. This is true as to the claim that the defendant Maguire received double commissions in 1930 without the knowledge of Mokan. The records clearly disclose that Mokan knew of the double commissions, that the commissions were not for the same services and that two courts of competent jurisdiction passed upon the matter adversely to the plaintiffs' present claim. This leaves no material fact for relitigation. The same is true as to the amount of the commissions paid to Maguire for his 1930 services. Those amounts were arrived at by settlement and arbitration. There is absolutely nothing in the record to sustain the plaintiffs' claim that the settlement was coerced or the arbitration fraudulent. Nor is there any genuine issue as to a material fact involved in the claim that in March, 1938, Maguire procured the issuance to W. E. Maguire & Company of certificates for 19,000 shares of Mokan stock upon an affidavit that the originals had been misappropriated, stolen, lost or destroyed, which affidavit was knowingly false, and that Maguire used his position of domination and control of Mokan to cause Mokan to enter into an agreement to indemnify the transfer agent against any loss connected with the transfer. The affidavit of Maguire is to the effect that 14,000 of the original shares have been cancelled and that certificates for 5,000 of the new shares are on deposit with the secretary of Mokan pending a suit by the holder of the original shares under an agreement by Maguire to cancel the new shares if he loses that suit. It would, therefore, appear that no possible damage can be sustained by Mokan as a result of the issuance of the 19,000 new shares, and that there is nothing left to try as to this cause of action.

This brings us to the remaining cause of action to which all parties refer as the accounting phase. The plaintiffs allege that Mokan is a holding company having no business activities other than to vote shares of stock which it owns in two operating companies (Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company and Kentucky Natural Gas Company) and receive dividends thereon; that the defendant Maguire dominated and controlled Mokan and its board of directors during the fiscal years 1938 and 1939; that the defendants have wasted and expended over $250,000 for administrative expenses of Mokan during 1938 and 1939 and for the same period $423,668.84 which is unitemized in the annual report to stockholders but referred to as having been "incurred and charged during the fiscal year to the reserve for legal and other expenses to be incurred in the prosecution and settlement of claims and other matters arising during or prior to receivership"; that grossly excessive payments for and in the guise of administrative expenses, salaries and legal and engineering expenses consumed the bulk of dividends of $1,216,222.50 received by Mokan on its Panhandle stock; that the defendants, in an attempt to conceal the extent of those expenditures set up a so-called "reserve for legal and other expenses incurred in the prosecution and settlement of claims or other matters arising during or prior to receivership"; that said reserve account was set up October 27, 1938 retroactively to September 30, 1937; that no disclosure was made to shareholders as to the disbursements which were charged to this account; that Mokan issued 25,244 shares of $5 par common stock and 97,879 shares of $1 par common stock during 1939 without consideration; and that Mokan has paid no dividends. The plaintiffs seek discovery and an accounting from the defendants for all of the sums alleged to have been wasted and dissipated.

The defendants filed no answer to this cause of action, but, as previously stated, moved for summary judgment in their favor upon it. The defendant Tringham filed an affidavit and exhibits in support of the defendants' motion for summary judgment upon this cause of action. He recited therein that Mokan had been in receivership, that several matters had arisen prior to and during the receivership which required the employment of counsel, that upon the partial termination of the receivership Mokan assumed the conduct of these matters, specifically, the defense of a claim by Mayo for 54,000 shares of Mokan stock and of a claim for expenses of an ancillary receivership in Illinois, the prosecution of anti-trust cases against Cities Service Company, Columbia Gas, Columbia Oil, a claim against Frank P. Parish for mismanagement of Mokan prior to receivership and an action against Hillman Land Company; that 50% of the dividends received from Panhandle was applied to the repayment of a debt of $1,100,000 which has been paid in full; that the reserve account was set up upon recommendation of two auditing firms, adopted by the board of directors and approved at stockholders' meetings and was not intended to and did not conceal any expenses or disbursements; that the expenditures for legal and other expenses charged to reserve, were in all cases approved by the board of directors and by the stockholders at the annual meetings, of which notice was given to all stockholders; that the same is true of the administrative expenses; that the activity of Mokan's officers and attorneys caused an increase in Panhandle's earnings; that the management of Mokan has struggled to free Panhandle from the Columbia Gas system; that 105,000 shares of stock were paid by Mokan for services and 39,066 shares were transferred to Mayo, as trustee, in settlement of his suit for 54,000 shares, the settlement having been made on advice of counsel and approved by the board of directors and the stockholders; that the attorney for the plaintiffs was given such information as he requested; that neither the plaintiffs nor intervening plaintiff appeared at the annual stockholders' meeting of 1939; that neither the plaintiffs nor the intervening plaintiff raised any question with respect to the balance sheets and reports...