Toegemann v. Rich
| Decision Date | 26 May 2010 |
| Docket Number | C.A. PC 09-6830 |
| Parties | ARTHUR J. TOEGEMANN, v. LOUISE RICH, LOUIS LACASCIO, THE CITY OF CRANSTON, and THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
DECISION
Before this Court are four separate motions-three motions to dismiss and one motion to adjudge in contempt. Plaintiff Arthur J Toegemann ("Plaintiff"), pro se, brought suit in tort against Defendants Louise Rich ("Rich"), Louis LaCascio ("LaCascio") the City of Cranston (the "City"), and the State of Rhode Island (the "State"), seeking $12, 000, 000 in damages. Defendants LaCascio, the City, and the State move to dismiss pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), on the basis that the applicable statute of limitations has expired. Defendant LaCascio further moves that Plaintiff be adjudged in contempt of a Court Order, specifically that granted by this Superior Court on December 6, 1996. Plaintiff did not file an objection to any of the aforementioned motions. However, the matter was heard on February 16, 2010, and Plaintiff was present and verbally objected to the motions. For the reasons that follow, this Court hereby grants all motions.
Facts and Travel
This action is the most recent in a series of actions commenced by the Plaintiff, Arthur J. Toegemann, against Defendants Louis LaCascio and Louise Rich, over the past twenty-four years. The Plaintiff's most recent Complaint, filed on November 27, 2009, is an action in tort against LaCascio, Rich, the City of Cranston, and the State of Rhode Island, seeking $12 000, 000 in damages. The litigation centers around a series of events which allegedly took place in November of 1984. Count One of the Complaint is directed at LaCascio and Rich and alleges that on November 4, 1984, LaCascio and Rich "conspired to and did call the Plaintiff on the telephone and threaten to shoot him; did knowingly press a false charge of vandalism against the Plaintiff; [and] did maliciously sue the Plaintiff for $220, 000." (Compl. Count 1.) Count Two, directed at the City of Cranston, alleges that in November of 1984, "the City of Cranston, by its Police Department, City Solicitor Peter Palombo, Jr. and mayor [sic] Edward DiPrete abetted Louise Rich's malicious use of process, so that the Plaintiff was accused, detained, evaluated, arraigned and convicted of malicious destruction." Id. at Count 2. Count Three, also concerning the City, alleges that in November of 1984, the City "refused to provide Plaintiff with a ballot for the national election while he was institutionalized at the Institute of Mental Health" and that the City "then recorded that the Plaintiff had voted." Id. at Count 3. Finally, Count Four-not directed at a particular party, but could be construed as being directed toward the State-alleges that in November of 1984, "Plaintiff was wrongfully lifted up off the floor by his neck and rendered unconscious by an attendant during a forensic psychiatric evaluation at the Rhode Institute of Mental Health [sic]." Id. at Count 4.
Defendants LaCascio, the City, and the State moved to dismiss the present action shortly after the Complaint was filed. Defendants LaCascio and the State moved to dismiss pursuant to Superior Court Rule 12(b)(6), on the basis that the facts and allegations asserted in Plaintiff's Complaint are time barred. Defendant City moved to dismiss pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6), alleging insufficient process and insufficient service of process, in addition to the statute of limitations defense.
On February 2, 2010, Defendant LaCascio moved to adjudge Plaintiff in contempt of a court order. Specifically, LaCascio maintains that Plaintiff's commencement of the instant action is in direct contravention of a prior Court Order dated December 6, 1996 (the "Order"). (Def. Mem. Ex. F: Protective Order). The Order restrained and enjoined Plaintiff from "filing any further actions or any motion or other pleading against [Gregory Rich, in his capacity as executor of the Estate of Louis Rich, Louis LaCascio and Carole LaCascio] pertaining to or in connection with any allegations contained in the complaint in [PC 94-4410], Providence County Superior Court C.A. Nos. 86-498 and 86-499 (consolidated), or in the complaint filed by plaintiff in the U.S. District Court (C.A. 94-067B)." Id. LaCascio seeks not only that Plaintiff be adjudged in willful contempt, but that Plaintiff be ordered to pay all attorney's fees, costs and expenses associated with the instant litigation. LaCascio also requests that this Court order Plaintiff to release and/or discharge any and all notices filed by Plaintiff in the Warwick land evidence records pertaining to LaCascio's real estate.
In consolidated Case Nos. 86-498 and 86-499, Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed following a non-jury trial before this Superior Court on February 5, 1991. Subsequent appeals and petitions concerning this matter, including a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, were denied. (Def. Mem. 2.) During the course of litigating this matter, Plaintiff caused a notice of lien to be filed on LaCascio's property. Plaintiff was required to remove such notice of lien by court order. A motion by Plaintiff to stay the order of removal was denied. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff also filed a district court action against LaCascio in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island (C.A. No. 94-067B). After determining the action to be a re-filing of a complaint previously dismissed by the District Court, the court issued an order on July 29, 1994 restraining and enjoining Plaintiff from filing further papers with the federal district court. See Def. Mem. Ex. D: District Court Order. Further appeals and petitions by Plaintiff were denied.
On December 4, 1994, this Superior Court dismissed Plaintiff's second Superior Court action, C.A. No. 94-4410, with prejudice. (Def. Mem. Ex. 6: Order for Summary Judgment.) Subsequent motions filed by Plaintiff were denied. Ultimately, the Superior Court issued the above mentioned Protective Order on December 6, 1996, restraining and enjoining Plaintiff from bringing an action stemming from the allegations common to the Complaints filed in the previously dismissed Superior Court and District Court matters. (Def. Mem. Ex. F: Protective Order.)
This matter was heard by this Court on February 16, 2010. After a thorough examination of the memoranda and supporting material submitted, as well as the arguments raised during the hearing, this matter is now ripe for decision.
"The sole function of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint." McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217, 225 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Rhode Island Affiliate, ACLU, Inc. v. Bernasconi, 557 A.2d 1232, 1232 (R.I. 1989)) (internal quotations omitted). In determining whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this Court "assumes the allegations contained in the complaint to be true and views the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs." Giuliano v. Pastina, Jr., 793 A.2d 1035, 1036-37 (R.I. 2002) (quoting Martin v. Howard, 784 A.2d 291, 297-98 (R.I. 2001)). Rhode Island courts have traditionally held that "a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts that could be proven in support of the claim." Siena, M.D. et al. v. Microsoft Corporation, 796 A.2d 461, 463 (R.I. 2002) (citing Bruno v. Criterion Holdings, Inc., 736 A.2d 99, 99 (R.I. 1999)).
Because "the sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, " Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 149 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Rhode Island Affiliate, ACLU, Inc. v. Bernasconi, 557 A.2d 1232, 1232 (R.I. 1989)), the Court's review is confined to the four corners of that pleading. Barrette v. Yakavonis, 966 A.2d 1231, 1234 (R.I. 2009). "If a trial justice, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, considers matters outside the scope of the complaint, the motion is converted into a motion for summary judgment." Foley v. St. Joseph Health Services of Rhode Island, 899 A.2d 1271, 1278 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Ouimette v. Moran, 541 A.2d 855, 856 (R.I. 1988)).
Although pro se litigants are not entitled to greater rights than are those represented by counsel, courts have at times allowed them greater latitude. Gary v. Stillman White Co., Inc., 522 A.2d 737, 741 (R.I. 1987) (citing Rubin v. Rubin, 188 N.J.Super. 155, 159, 457 A.2d 12, 14 (1982); Rodriguez v. Mallory Battery Co., 188 Conn. 145, 149-50 n. 8, 448 A.2d 829, 831 n. 8 (1982)). Our Supreme Court has recognized that Id. Nevertheless, "the courts of this state cannot and will not entirely overlook established rules of procedure, 'adherence to which is necessary [so] that parties may know their rights, that the real issues in controversy may be presented and determined, and that the business of the courts may be carried on with reasonable dispatch.'" Id. (citing O'Connor v. Solomon, 103 Conn. 744, 746, 131 A. 736, 736 (1926)).
Statutes of limitations are traditionally employed to "promote certainty and finality and avoid stale claims." Roe v. Gelineau, 794 A.2d 475, 485 (R.I. 2002). In other words, they ...
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