Tolbert v. City of Birmingham
Decision Date | 16 June 1955 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 427 |
Parties | , 63 A.L.R.2d 901 Mae TOLBERT v. CITY OF BIRMINGHAM et al. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Geo. Rogers and W. A. Jenkins, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant.
Wm. L. Clark, Birmingham, for appellee City of Birmingham.
Bainbridge & Mims, Beddow & Jones and Robt. W. Gwin, Birmingham, for individual appellees.
Appellant, plaintiff below, brought suit against the City of Birmingham to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained on October 31, 1949, as the result of a fall on a defective public sidewalk. To comply with Code 1940, Tit. 62, § 659, plaintiff filed with the City Clerk of Birmingham on November 22, 1949, a sworn statement of claim reciting the following:
The original suit was filed on December 22, 1949.
The City demurred to the complaint and on November 1, 1950, moved for a non-suit on the ground that Mrs. L. A. Latham, as lessee, and Dr. Dan C. Donald and Mrs. Dan C. Donald, as owners, of the property abutting the defective sidewalk should have been joined as parties-defendant for the reason that they are 'the persons primarily liable for the condition of the sidewalk at the placed referred to in the plaintiff's complaint.' The City's motion for non-suit contains an averment to the effect that on May 24, 1950, the City's attorney of record informed the plaintiff's then attorney of record of the names of the parties that should have been joined with the City as parties-defendant. Plaintiff answered the motion, denying each and every allegation and demanding strict proof. Evidence on the motion was then taken orally before the court. Thereupon the court, on November 2, 1950, entered judgment that said parties should have been joined as defendants and that 'unless the complaint is amended so as to join said parties as defendants the motion for a nonsuit will be granted.' The complaint was then amended on November 24, 1950, by adding said parties as defendants and amended further on March 24, 1952, by adding the following to the one count of the amended complaint:
The newly joined defendants, Mrs. Latham and the Donalds, interposed a plea, separately and severally, that 'the cause of action, as alleged in the plaintiff's complaint as last amended, is barred by the statute of limitations of one year.' Plaintiff demurred to this plea.
The City demurred to the complaint as last amended. The grounds assigned all go to the sufficiency of the sworn statement, supra, filed with the City Clerk on November 22, 1949, to meet the requirements of Code 1940, Tit. 62, § 659, supra. This section applies specially to the City of Birmingham and provides as follows:
For requirement for filing of tort claims against cities generally, see Code 1940, Tit. 37, §§ 476, 504. The specific defects pointed out by the demurrer are that the complaint shows on its face that the sworn statement filed with the city clerk (1) 'does not sufficiently state the place where the accident occurred', (2) 'does not show with sufficient certainty whether the alleged accident occurred on Third Avenue North between 23rd and 24th Streets or on 24th Street between 2nd and 3rd Avenues, or on 21st Street between 2nd and 3rd Avenues', and (3) 'does not state the street and house number of plaintiff' nor 'with sufficient certainty the residence address of the plaintiff.'
Judgment was rendered overruling plaintiff's demurrer to the plea of the statute of limitations and sustaining the City's demurrer to the complaint as last amended. Plaintiff's motion for a non-suit being granted, she brought this appeal for review of said rulings.
Argument is made on behalf of the City that to permit a claimant 'to ignore the requirements of the statute pertaining to the joinder of persons liable with the City and thereby place such persons in a position where they can set up the statute of limitations as a defense after being joined upon order of the trial court, the power to defeat the purpose of the mandatory provisions of the statutes referred to is within the hands of the attorneys for the claimant.' It is further argued 'that the term 'personal defense' as used in Section 503 [Code 1940, Tit. 37] was never intended to apply to a defense under the statute of limitations which is allowed to operate as a result of a deliberate failure on the part of the claimant's attorneys to join as parties defendant the persons primarily liable'; and that 'a contrary conclusion by this Court in this case would virtually emasculate the mandatory provisions pertaining to the joinder of the persons who are primarily obligated to respond in damages to a claimant.'
Code 1940, Tit. 7, § 26, prescribes a limitation of one year within which an action for personal injuries must be commenced. It is shown by the complaint that the injuries were sustained on October 31, 1949. And the record shows that the action against defendants Mrs. Latham and the Donalds was commenced on November 24, 1950, more than a year after the injuries were sustained, by adding them as parties-defendant in the suit against the City, which was commenced within the one year period. In this situation, it seems clear that the demurrer to the plea was properly overruled.
We have held that, as against a party added by amendment, the statute of limitations continues to run until the amendment is filed making him a party to the suit. Ruffin v. Crowell, 253 Ala. 653, 658, 46 So.2d 218; Birmingham Gas Co. v. Sanford, 226 Ala. 129, 133, 145 So. 485; Sibley v. Bowen, 222 Ala. 13, 14, 130 So. 547; Roth v. Scruggs, 214 Ala. 32, 34, 106 So. 182, 185. As stated in the last cited case of Roth v. Scruggs:
In discussing the question in Sibley v. Bowen, supra [222 Ala. 13, 130 So. 548], we said the following:
We see nothing in § 503, Tit. 37, Code 1940, supra, which has the effect of suspending the running of the statute of limitations as to persons who are jointly liable with the City. Section 503 is as follows:
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