Toledo-Colon v. Puerto Rico

• Decision Date: 21 September 2011
• Docket Number: Civil No. 10–2217 (GAG).
• Citation: 812 F.Supp.2d 110
• Parties: Edwin TOLEDO–COLON, Plaintiff, v. Commonwealth of PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

812 F.Supp.2d 110

Edwin TOLEDO–COLON, Plaintiff,

v.Commonwealth of PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 10–2217 (GAG).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Sept. 21, 2011.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez–Garcia, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Lumy Mangual–Mangual, P.R. Department of Justice–Federal Litigation, Katherine A. Quinones–Garcia, Luis E. Gonzalez–Ortiz, Gonzalez–Ortiz Law Offices P.S.C., San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GUSTAVO A. GELPÍ, District Judge.

Plaintiff Edwin Toledo–Colon filed a complaint against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“Commonwealth”), the Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources (“DOL”), the Puerto Rico Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the Vocational Rehabilitation Administration (“VRA”), as well as individual defendants in their personal and official capacities ¹ (collectively “Defendants”).

This action is brought pursuant to the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. ; the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. ; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. ; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff also brings state claims alleging violations of Puerto Rico Law 115 of December 20, 1991 (“Law 115”), P.R. Laws Ann. tit 29, § 194(a); Puerto Rico Law 44 of July 2, 1985 (“Law 44”), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, §§ 501 et seq. ; and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico (“Articles 1802 and 1803”), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141–5142.

Commonwealth, DOL, DOJ, and VRA moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the claims against them (Docket No. 25). Co-defendants Myrna Cambrelen (“Cambrelen”), Carmen Diaz–Trinidad (“Diaz–Trinidad”), and Marideli Arrieta (“Arrieta”) joined the motion to dismiss (Docket No. 32). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (Docket No. 36). Subsequently, co-defendants Maria Benitez (“Benitez”) and Nydia Colon (“Colon”) also joined the motion to dismiss (Docket No. 54).

After reviewing the pleadings and pertinent law, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' motions to dismiss (Docket No. 25).

I. Legal Standard

“The general rules of pleading require a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Gargano v. Liberty Intern. Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir.2009) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This short and plain statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is “[t]he proper vehicle for challenging a court's subject-matter jurisdiction.” Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362 (1st Cir.2001). Rule 12(b)(1) is a “large umbrella, overspreading a variety of different types of challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 362–363. A moving party may base a challenge to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction solely on the pleadings. Med. Card Sys. v. Equipo Pro Convalecencia, 587 F.Supp.2d 384, 387 (D.P.R.2008) (citing Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d at 363).

A motion to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is subject to a similar standard of review as a motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Boada v. Autoridad de Carreteras y Transportacion, 680 F.Supp.2d 382, 384 (D.P.R.2010) (citing Negron–Gaztambide v. Hernandez–Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir.1994)). “When a district court considers a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, it must credit the plaintiff's well-pled factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Merlonghi v. U.S., 620 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir.2010) (citing Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d at 363).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an action against him for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The court must decide whether the complaint alleges enough facts to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In so doing, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir.2008). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint alleged—but it has not show[n]—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

II. Factual and Procedural Background

VRA operates the Vocational Rehabilitation Program in Puerto Rico. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 18, § 1064(a). Edwin Toledo–Colon (“Plaintiff”) is a student pursuing a master's degree in publicity from Sacred Heart of University (“SHU”) and a recipient of VRA services. ( See Docket No. 1 at 4.) According to the complaint, Plaintiff suffers from “Avoid Personal Disorder” and began receiving VRA services on January 16, 2002, while studying for his bachelor's degree at the University of Puerto Rico (“UPR”). ( See Docket No. 1 at 4 and 14 ¶ 2.)

On January 28, 2003, as a student in the UPR, Plaintiff requested “a computer system bundled with assistive equipment” from VRA. ( See Docket Nos. 1 at 14 ¶ 3; 34–1 at 1 ¶ 3.) On May 12, 2003, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint against Defendants with the UPR's “Oficina de Asuntos de Personas con Impedimento” or, the Resource Office for the Disabled. ( See Docket No. 1 at 16 ¶ 9) (translation ours). Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of this filing, Defendants agreed to provide the assistive equipment requested, but later denied it when an administrative proceeding concluded. ( See Docket No. 1 at 17 ¶ 11.) Plaintiff eventually graduated from the UPR with a bachelor's degree. ( See Docket No. 1 at 17 ¶ 12.)

In January 2005, Plaintiff began studying for a master's degree at SITU. ( See Docket No. 1 at 17 ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants approved a request for assistive equipment, yet later denied it because he had filed a complaint with the Office of the Advocate for Persons with Disabilities (“OPPI,” for its Spanish acronym). ( See Docket No. 1 at 17 ¶ 12–13.) An administrative hearing against Defendants was held on April 29, 2006. ( See Docket No. 1 at 17 ¶ 14.)

According to the complaint, on November 11, 2007, Plaintiff made another request for assistive equipment in order to complete his thesis in “PUB 798 Project.” ( See Docket No. 1 at 18 ¶ 16–17.) On April 3, 2008, Plaintiff's request for equipment and the provision of comparative services was denied. ( See Docket No. 1 at 18 ¶ 18.)

Plaintiff alleges that he met with co-defendant Marideli Arrieta, VRA Supervisor at the UPR, on January 15, 2010, and was asked to “withdraw and waive his rights to the assistive equipment requested as a pre-condition to continuing receiving services in the form of academic tuition for the next semester at [SITU].” ( See Docket No. 1 at 23 ¶ 41.) On April 26, 2010, Plaintiff “contacted” Defendants “to secure his tuition and other services and assistive equipment ... to no avail.” ( See Docket No. 1 at 24 ¶ 45.)

Plaintiff filed the present complaint on December 14, 2010 (Docket No. 1). On April 14, 2011, Commonwealth, DOL, DOJ, and VRA moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the claims against them (Docket No. 25). Specifically, they moved to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) no individual liability under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act; (2) Plaintiff's Section 1983, ADA, Rehabilitation Act and supplemental jurisdiction claims are time barred; (3) Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against the Commonwealth, DOJ, DOL, VRA, and the individual defendants in their official capacities; (4) failure to state a claim under the ADA; (5) failure to state a claim against DOJ and DOL; (6) no personal or individual liability under Law 44; and (7) claims prior to November 5, 2009 should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Co-defendants Myrna Cambrelen, Carmen Diaz–Trinidad, and Marideli Arrieta joined the motion to dismiss on May 5, 2011 (Docket No. 32). On May 13, 2011, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (Docket No. 36). Co-defendants Maria Benitez and Nydia Colon subsequently joined the motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 54). Default was entered against co-defendants Ruben Bonilla, Gilda Dacosta–Martel, Wanda Lozada and Leyda Santiago on August 30, 2011 (Docket No. 60).

III. Discussion

A. Individual Liability under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act and Law 44

Plaintiff brings claims under Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Law 44. Defendants contend that the ADA, Rehabilitation Act and Law 44 claims should be dismissed against all individual defendants because there is no individual liability under these statutes. ( See Docket No. 25 at 6–7, 15–17.)

Title II of the ADA (“Title II”) is modeled on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”), Pub.L. No. 93–112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). Parker v. Univ. de...