Toledo v. Brooks

• Decision Date: 31 January 1876
• Citation: 1876 WL 9963,81 Ill. 245
• Parties: TOLEDO, WABASH AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANYv.JULIA A. BROOKS, Admx etc.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

81 Ill. 245

1876 WL 9963 (Ill.)

TOLEDO, WABASH AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY

v.JULIA A. BROOKS, Admx etc.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1876.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Champaign county; the Hon. J. C. ALLEN, Judge, presiding.

This was an action on the case, by Julia A. Brooks, administratrix of the estate of William H. Brooks, deceased, against the Toledo, Wabash and Western Railway Company, to recover damages for causing the death of plaintiff's husband and intestate, through negligence. A trial was had, resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff, for $3166.

Messrs. HAY, GREENE & LITTLER, for the plaintiff in error.

Messrs. CUNNINGHAM & WEBBER, for the defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

In this case the record discloses a conflict of evidence whether defendant in error was married to deceased in his lifetime. She testified she had been and was his wife at the time of his decease. It is claimed that she made contradictory statements as to when the marriage occurred and the place of its celebration; also, that the marriage register at Detroit, Michigan, where she located its ratification, showed no such marriage, nor could the minister who she says performed the ceremony be found, nor could persons be found in the city who knew him or had heard of his residence there, at any time. The evidence tends to show that deceased lived with, and on the journey in which he was killed, recognized defendant in error as his wife. He so called her when conversing with the conductor and brakeman, before entering the train, and at the instant of the collision she exclaimed: “My God, my husband.”

In this conflict of evidence it was highly essential to the rights of the parties that the jury should have been fairly and accurately instructed, but the court gave this instruction:

“The court instructs the jury, that the testimony of the plaintiff in this case to the alleged fact of her marriage is better evidence, bearing on the question of marriage, than the alleged fact that there is no record in Detroit of such alleged marriage.”

Now, this instruction was manifestly wrong, and highly calculated to mislead the jury. The court, on the trial of a cause, is required to admit all legitimate evidence tending to prove the issue, and it is improper to admit immaterial testimony. The jury are the sole judges of the weight of evidence, when thus admitted. It is, as all know, the province of the jury to weigh and consider all the testimony before them, and determine its value, and to act upon their convictions as to what part is better than another. It is true, when the judge acts as a jury in finding the facts, or on a motion for a new trial because the finding is against the evidence, it then, and not till then, becomes the duty of the judge to weigh and determine its value, otherwise he could not properly discharge the functions of his office.

In this case, on the contrary, the court invaded the province of the jury in telling them which was the better evidence on this question. It should have been left to the jury to determine that for themselves. If the court were to instruct the jury that plaintiff's evidence was better than the defendant's, or the converse, we presume all would say that it would amount to an instruction to find in favor of the better evidence, and thus take the whole case from the consideration of the jury. It is not error for the court to thus instruct in case of records, writings, or other evidence which is, in its nature, conclusive, or can not be contradicted. Circumstantial evidence may be, and frequently is, more satisfactory than the direct and positive statements of a witness who is of doubtful veracity, limited information as to the matter testified about, or who is evidently biased. Hence, the proposition contained in this instruction, as a rule of evidence, is by no means true. The court could not properly assert, as a rule of law, which was the better evidence. The giving of this instruction was manifest error, that may have been highly prejudicial to plaintiff in error, and should not have been given.

If it be urged that the question whether defendant in error was, or not, the wife of deceased is immaterial, the reply is, that she sues alone for her own benefit, and there is no contest as to whether there is another person who was in fact and in law his wife. If the contest were whether another woman was the wife of Brooks at the time of his death, then any recovery which might be...