Toledo v. Sanchez
| Decision Date | 06 July 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-1376.,05-1376. |
| Citation | 454 F.3d 24 |
| Parties | Iván TOLEDO, Plaintiff-Appellee, United States, Intervenor, v. Jorge L. SÁNCHEZ, Deputy President; George V. Hillyer, Chancellor; John Hertz, Dean; Pedro Padilla, Counselor; Sonia Bazán, Design Professor; Nathaniel Fuster, Design Professor/Design Committee Director; University of Puerto Rico, Defendants-Appellants. University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras Campus; University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras Campus-Resource Office for the Disabled; Ludim Díaz; University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras Campus, Legal Advisor's Office; Luis M. Vázquez, Director; María Lugo, Legal Advisor; University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras Campus-School of Architecture; Manuel García; Lizette Colón, Student Affairs Administrator, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Julio Nigaglioni Arrache, for Appellants.
Víctor P. Miranda-Corrada, for Appellee.
Sarah E. Harrington, Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, with whom Bradley J. Schlozman and Jessica Dunsay Silver were on brief, for the United States as Intervenor.
Jennifer Mathis, Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, with whom Debra Gardner, Roscoe Jones, Jr., and Suzanne Sangree, Public Justice Center, were on brief, for AARP, Bazelon Center, Public Justice Center, and 23 other organizations representing people with disabilities, as Amici Curiae in support of appellee.
Before TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge* and HOWARD, Circuit Judge.
This appeal raises the question of whether the Eleventh Amendment prevents a disabled student from suing a state university for damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165. Iván Toledo, a student at the University of Puerto Rico who has schizoaffective disorder, brought an action under Title II of the ADA alleging that the University and various University officials discriminated against him on the basis of his disability and failed to reasonably accommodate his disability. The University moved to dismiss the Title II claims under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and the Eleventh Amendment. The district court granted the motion on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, but later reinstated the claims in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004). The University filed an interlocutory appeal to this court. We have jurisdiction under Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993), and we affirm.
Because this case is at the motion to dismiss stage, we accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in Toledo's favor. Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 62 (1st Cir.2004); Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d 24, 25 (1st Cir.1999). Toledo began his studies at the University of Puerto Rico School of Architecture in the fall of 1999, but during the first semester his mental condition deteriorated, causing him to experience anxiety, panic, and depression. Because of his condition and the required treatment, he was unable to attend classes regularly for part of the semester. When Toledo returned to a regular schedule, one of his professors refused to accommodate his situation; because of the professor's refusal to make any accommodation, Toledo turned in an incomplete assignment which the professor ridiculed in front of the class. Toledo continued to request accommodation from the professor and school administrators. However, these requests were denied and he completed the semester with a grade of D in the course.
During the summer after his first year, Toledo suffered an emotional crisis, attempted suicide, and was hospitalized for some time. He was absent from school during the fall semester of his second year for another hospital stay. When he returned to classes, the school still refused to provide accommodation. Toledo often arrived up to 45 minutes late to class because of side effects from his medication, and despite presenting medical certificates and explaining his situation, his design professor treated him differently from other students who arrived late. The professor also refused to grant him any additional time to complete his work, causing Toledo to receive a failing grade in the class. Later, the dean reprimanded him for complaining about this professor on an evaluation form. Toledo had difficulty registering for classes the following semester due to his poor academic standing. When the University refused to allow him to take courses at another university to preserve his standing, Toledo dropped out of school entirely.
After filing an administrative complaint with the United States Department of Justice, Toledo filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court of Puerto Rico asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; and the Constitution of the United States, among other claims. The University and University officials, who were sued in their official capacity, moved to dismiss the Title II claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. The district court initially granted this motion, but reinstated the claims upon Toledo's motion after the Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004). The University filed a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e), which was denied, and then filed this interlocutory appeal.
Congress enacted Title II of the ADA to combat discrimination by governmental entities in the operation of public services, programs, and activities. It provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The statute authorizes private suits against public entities to enforce its provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (incorporating by reference 29 U.S.C. § 794a).
The Eleventh Amendment guarantees that private individuals may not sue nonconsenting states1 in federal court. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001). Nevertheless, Congress can abrogate this immunity so long as it makes "its intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" and acts "pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953 (2003). With respect to Title II, Congress has met the first requirement of unequivocally expressing its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12202). As to the second requirement, the Supreme Court has held that Title II of the ADA validly abrogates sovereign immunity as to (1) state conduct that actually violates the Constitution, United States v. Georgia, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 877, 882, 163 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006), and (2) some classes of state conduct that do not facially violate the Constitution but are prohibited by Title II in order to "prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct." Lane, 541 U.S. at 518, 529, 124 S.Ct. 1978. Thus, in order to decide whether Toledo can sue the University for damages we must determine "on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of the state's alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress's purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid." Georgia, 126 S.Ct. at 882.
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's direction in United States v. Georgia, we first must ascertain if any aspect of the University's alleged conduct states a claim for a violation of Title II.2 To state a claim for a violation of Title II, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity's services, programs, or activities or was otherwise discriminated against; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits or discrimination was by reason of his disability. Parker v. Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II imposes an affirmative obligation on public entities to make their programs accessible to qualified individuals with disabilities, except where compliance would result in a fundamental alteration of services or impose an undue burden. Parker, 225 F.3d at 5 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.150).
Toledo's Third Amended Complaint alleges that the University violated Title II of the ADA both by discriminating against him based on his disability and by failing to provide him with reasonable accommodation.3 Toledo properly alleges that he is a qualified individual with a disability as he alleges that he has a mental impairment, schizoaffective disorder, that substantially limits the major life activity of learning, and that save for his disability he was qualified to participate in the architecture program at the University. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131; 28 C.F.R. § 35.104. He also sufficiently alleges that the University, a public entity governed by the ADA, engaged in conduct that violated Title II. Toledo claims that he failed his design course as a result of "discriminatory animus" on the part of his professor...
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