Toler, Matter of

Decision Date06 April 1992
Docket NumberNo. 134420,134420
PartiesIn the Matter of Tia Azalea TOLER, Gaius Warren Toler, Jerome Warren Toler and Nicodemus Toler, Minors. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Petitioner-Appellee, v. George TOLER, Respondent-Appellant, and Tiana Toler, Respondent.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

David J. Clark, Traverse City, for George Toler.


MARILYN J. KELLY, Presiding Judge.

Respondent George Toler appeals as of right from an order of the Wexford Probate Court terminating his parental rights to three minor children.

Respondent argues on appeal that the trial judge erred, since he failed to specify the statutory basis for termination of respondent's rights and the court's assumption of jurisdiction. He asserts error also in the judge's failure to find that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm.

The Department of Social Services sought the involuntary termination of respondent's parental rights pursuant to Sec. 19b(3) of the juvenile code. M.C.L. Sec. 712A.19b(3); M.S.A. Sec. 27.3178(598.19b)(3). The petition alleged that respondent physically and sexually abused his children.

After 3 1/2 days of testimony at the initial dispositional hearing, the parties entered into an agreement. Respondent stipulated to the jurisdiction of the probate court. In addition, he agreed to termination of his parental rights in exchange for dismissal of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct charges then pending against him. Tiana agreed to file for divorce and to include in the divorce judgment a provision preventing respondent from entering Wexford County, where she lived with the children. The probate judge asked respondent if he understood that his parental rights would be terminated if he agreed to the stipulation. Respondent answered that he understood and agreed. The probate judge found sufficient evidence on the record to establish jurisdiction and entered an order terminating respondent's parental rights.

Respondent filed a motion for rehearing or continuation of trial. At the hearing on the motion, he presented no new evidence. The judge refused to set aside the order, finding that it was in the best interest of the children and that respondent had voluntarily and understandingly agreed to it. He did refuse, however, to enforce the provision in the settlement mandating that Tiana divorce respondent.

Probate court jurisdiction over termination proceedings is derived solely from statutes and the constitution. In re Prater, 189 Mich.App. 330, 333, 471 N.W.2d 658 (1991). After a petition is authorized, the probate court must hold a hearing to determine whether the child is within the court's jurisdiction. In re Nunn, 168 Mich.App. 203, 207, 423 N.W.2d 619 (1988). To obtain jurisdiction, the judge must find that a statutory basis for jurisdiction exists and that the allegations contained in the petition were proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Nelson, 190 Mich.App. 237, 240, 475 N.W.2d 448 (1991). Since jurisdiction is statutory, it cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. In re Youmans, 156 Mich.App. 679, 684, 401 N.W.2d 905 (1986). On appeal, our inquiry is whether the error alleged was of such magnitude that, but for it, there was an insufficient basis for the probate court to assume jurisdiction. In re Gass, 173 Mich.App. 444, 446, 434 N.W.2d 427 (1988).

Here, although respondent stipulated to the court's jurisdiction, the probate judge also found sufficient evidence to authorize the assumption of jurisdiction. However, no statutory basis was given either on the record or in the order. Although the order is not a model of specificity, we believe it makes clear that the basis relied on for jurisdiction was Sec. 2(b)(1) and (2). M.C.L. Sec. 712A.2(b)(1) and (2); M.S.A. Sec. 27.3178(598.2)(b)(1) and (2).

Before parental rights may be terminated under the juvenile code, the court must make findings of fact, state conclusions of law and identify the statutory basis for the order. MCR 5.974(G). In this case, the judge failed to articulate the statutory basis for the termination and instead relied on the agreement between the parties. We determine that a respondent can consent to termination of his parental rights under the juvenile code, in which case the judge need not announce a statutory basis for it.

Respondent does not argue that his consent was involuntary. Rather, he suggests that the termination of his parental rights in exchange for dropping criminal charges pending against him is contrary to public policy. We will not further address this issue, as respondent failed to provide us with any supporting authority. Goolsby v. Detroit, 419 Mich. 651, 655, n. 1, 358 N.W.2d 856 (1984). A party may not merely announce his position and leave it to us to discover and rationalize the basis for his claim. Sargent v. Browning-Ferris Industries, 167 Mich.App. 29, 32-33, 421 N.W.2d 563 (1988).

We also reject respondent's argument that termination was inappropriate here, since...

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  • People v. Leonard, Docket Nos. 178121
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    • Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)
    • July 18, 1997
    ...and rationalize the basis for the claim. Goolsby v. Detroit, 419 Mich. 651, 655, n. 1, 358 N.W.2d 856 (1984); In re Toler, 193 Mich.App. 474, 477, 484 N.W.2d 672 (1992). In any event, there was overwhelming evidence presented from Dr. Coussens, the independent DNA-procedures expert, and Dr.......
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  • Great Lakes Soc. v. Georgetown Twp.
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    • October 30, 2008 sustain or reject that party's position. Goolsby v. Detroit, 419 Mich. 651, 655 n. 1, 358 N.W.2d 856 (1984); In re Toler, 193 Mich. App. 474, 477, 484 N.W.2d 672 (1992). Further, the gist of the argument is that the Township's zoning scheme treats churches less favorably than some commer......
  • People v. Griffin
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