Toler v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 28 March 1913
• Citation: 249 Mo. 152,155 S.W. 26
• Parties: TOLER et al. v. EDWARDS et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

155 S.W. 26

249 Mo. 152

TOLER et al. v. EDWARDS et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

March 28, 1913.

CONFLICTING TITLES — DETERMINATION — RIGHT TO RELIEF.

In an action to determine title to land, plaintiffs held not entitled to recover.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Butler County; Jesse C. Sheppard, Judge.

Action by Susan J. Toler and others against William C. Edwards and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

This suit was brought on the 9th of April, 1906, by Susan J. Toler, formerly Susan J. Summers, and others to determine the title, estate, and interest between plaintiffs and defendants in 160 acres of land. Defendant W. C. Edwards disclaimed any interest in the land in controversy, and averred that all his title and interest therein had been conveyed, in February, 1897, to his codefendant, W. R. Edwards. Defendant Joseph Sanders made no answer. The remaining defendant, W. R. Edwards, answered separately, stating that none of the defendants other than himself had any interest in the land sued for, admitted that he was a claimant of title to said land, and averred that he owned it in fee simple, and that plaintiffs had no right, title, or interest in and to said land. For a second defense he pleaded the statute of limitation of 10 years. For a third defense he pleaded the statute of limitation of 30 years. For a fourth defense he averred that neither plaintiffs nor those under whom they claimed title paid any taxes on said land since 1874, nor had possession of the same, nor exercised any ownership over said land; that, though in full possession of knowledge concerning the claim they now seek to establish, they remained silent until the bringing of this action; that during all these years defendant and those under whom he claims title paid taxes on the land, spent large sums of money in lasting and valuable improvements, cleared and fenced a good portion of the same, thereby materially enhancing its value; that with reasonable care plaintiffs might have known of these acts and doings of defendant, but by their conduct led defendant and others under whom he claims to believe they had no claim to the land. All of which defendant avers constituted laches and estoppel against the claim now made by plaintiffs.

The case was sent to Butler county on a change of venue. At the April term, 1908, the cause was submitted to the court, a jury being waived, and was taken under advisement until its January term, 1909, when the court rendered judgment in favor of Susan J. Toler for an undivided three-sixths interest in and to three-fourths of the above-described land, and in favor of plaintiff James R. Brewer for an undivided two-sixths interest in and to the same quantity of land, and in favor of plaintiff J. S. Patrick as the owner of an undivided one-sixth interest in and to the same amount of land, and adjudged that defendant had no right, title, or interest in and to an undivided three-fourths interest in the land described in the petition.

As showing the theory upon which the case was decided, the learned circuit judge made a finding of facts and law, setting out plaintiffs' chain of title and the chain of title claimed by defendant emanating from a sheriff's deed after a tax sale of the land while Susan J. and William A. Summers were the record owners. The court held that deed to be void, and that defendant had no paper title to the land, nor any title by the statutes of limitation of 10 and 30 years, respectively; and that plaintiffs were not estopped by the laches pleaded. The court then decreed the title in plaintiffs to three-fourths of the land according to their respective interests, one half of that amount to Susan J. Toler and the other half to her attorneys. Other facts will be stated in the opinion.

Defendant duly perfected his appeal to this court, and assigns for error that the judgment is contrary to the evidence and the law; that incompetent testimony was admitted; and that the judgment is erroneous on the face of the record.

Ward & Collins, of Caruthersville, for appellants. Jas. R. Brewer, of New Madrid, for respondents.

BOND, J. (after stating the facts as above).

1. Preliminary to a review of this case, we will dispose of the contention of the learned counsel for appellant that this action, though strictly one at law in its inception, was transformed into a suit in equity by the inclusion in the answer of the defense of laches and estoppel.

As has been seen, four defenses were interposed in the answer. The record shows that each one of them, including the one resting on laches and estoppel, concluded in the following terms: And defendant "again prays the court to go hence without day and with his costs." Neither of the defenses asked for any affirmative relief whatever.

It has long been settled in this state that a purely legal action, such as ejectment, is not converted into one in equity simply by the interposition of equitable defenses thereto, unless there is a prayer for affirmative relief based on those defenses. Shaffer v. Detie, 191 Mo. loc. cit. 388, 90 S. W. 131; Kostuba v. Miller, 137 Mo. loc. cit. 172, 38 S. W. 946; Kerstner v. Vorweg, 130 Mo. loc. cit. 196, 32 S. W. 298. Both divisions of this court, after some hesitation, have applied this rule to suits to quiet title. R. S. 1909, § 2535. In the leading case on that subject the test was stated to be: "If the issues joined entitled the parties to an ordinary judgment at law, then, under the Constitution and laws of the state, the parties are entitled to a trial by a jury; but if the issues tendered are equitable in their nature and call for equitable relief, then the cause is triable before the chancellor." Lee v. Conran, 213 Mo. loc. cit. 412, 111 S. W. 1153. That case was followed, after a thorough discussion of the subject, in a case where the point for review arose upon the answer in a suit under the statute to determine title, to which the defendant made the identical pleas made in the case at bar, but concluding his answers with a prayer for full and complete affirmative relief by the investiture of title, and for general relief. Withers v. Railroad, 226 Mo. loc. cit. 384, 126 S. W. 432. Speaking as to the state of the pleadings in that case, Division No. 2 said that while it was true that the setting up of equitable defenses, without more, would not change a legal action into one in equity, yet in that case there was a prayer for affirmative relief, and that this, conjoined with such defenses, did "convert the case from one at law to a suit in equity," citing cases (Withers v. Railroad, supra, 226 Mo. loc. cit. 397, 126 S. W. 438), and added that this distinction brought the ruling of the court in harmony with the doctrine announced in the leading case of Lee v. Conran, supra. This latter case was also affirmed by this Division in Minor v. Burton, 228 Mo. loc. cit. 563, 128 S. W. 964, and again affirmed in Division No. 2 in Frowein v. Poage, 231 Mo. loc. cit. 90, 132 S. W. 241.

We are cited to a recent decision of this court in banc, where a suit was brought to determine title, and it was held that the case was one in equity. The answer in that case "pleaded estoppel in aid of defendant's title." This is the only reference to the contents of the answer, and from it the inference may be drawn that the answer contained a prayer for affirmative relief; and hence the decision in that case was in harmony with those cited above. The ruling in that case was over the dissent of Woodson and Graves, JJ. In the case at bar the petition merely stated that they "owned in fee" and "claimed title" to the property described. It presented no matter of distinctive, equitable cognizance. The answer pleaded only matters in bar and preclusion. A jury was waived on the trial. Instructions or declarations of law were requested by the parties and given and refused. The court made a finding of facts and law. Only one of the defenses, estoppel and laches, presented any matter of equitable cognizance. It was interposed solely as a bar to plaintiffs' suit. If it had been interposed in that form and to that extent only in any other legal action, including ejectment, it could not have converted such action into a suit in equity, under the unbroken current of decisions in this state. Nor can it have that effect in the present case without destroying the symmetry of the law. The statutory remedy as it now exists for determining titles provides in explicit language for the bringing of legal as well as equitable actions, which shall conform in all respects to the Code of Civil Procedure. R. S. 1909, §§ 2535 and 2536. Under this statutory authority plaintiffs brought a strictly legal action. We do not see how the answer to that action can have a greater potency than the same answer to other legal actions, except by the creation of an arbitrary rule. We think (as the record shows the parties thought on the trial below) that this was a legal action; and being submitted to the court, without a jury, the finding of facts has the force of a verdict of a jury. Minor v. Burton, 228 Mo. loc. cit. 564, 128 S. W. 964, and cases cited. We do not concur in appellant's contention that the case is before us for review as upon appeal in a suit in equity.

2. The first point in appellant's brief is directed to the assumed effect of the allegation in the petition that plaintiffs are "the owners in fee and claim title to the following described real estate." Appellant's contention being that this allegation confines the proof of plaintiffs to the establishment of a legal estate in fee, and that, failing proof of that exact estate, they must be cast in this suit. This is an erroneous conception of the statute under which this action was brought. The allegations of the petition are in conformity with the language of the statute, and have been expressly approved as sufficient to obtain the...