Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp.

• Decision Date: 13 September 1939
• Docket Number: Record No. 2135.
• Citation: 173 Va. 425
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: MARTHA TOLER v. OAKWOOD SMOKELESS COAL CORPORATION.

Page 425

173 Va. 425

MARTHA TOLER v. OAKWOOD SMOKELESS COAL CORPORATION.

Record No. 2135.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Staunton.

September 13, 1939.

Present, Holt, Hudgins, Gregory, Growning, Eggleston and Spratley, JJ.

1. MARRIAGE — Validity — Conflict of Laws — Governed by Statutes of Forum State — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission dismissing appellant's claim for compensation for the death of her alleged husband, the evidence showed that claimant, under the erroneous impression that a former husband was dead, married the employee in West Virginia.

Held: That the question of the validity of the marriage must be settled upon general principles and governed by the statutes of Virginia.

2. MARRIAGE — Validity — Conflict of Laws — Law Governing Form and Ceremonies. — The general rule is that the law of the place of its celebration governs as to the form and ceremonies incident to marriage.

3. MARRIAGE — Validity — Conflict of Laws — Marriage Valid Where Celebrated Valid Everywhere. — A marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere.

4. MARRIAGE — Validity — Conflict of Laws — Marriage Valid Where Celebrated Valid Everywhere. — To the rule that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere there are two exceptions, as universal as the rule itself, namely: (1) Marriages deemed contrary to the laws of nature as generally recognized in Christian countries, such as polygamous and incestuous marriages; and (2) marriages positively forbidden by statute because contrary to local public policy.

5. MARRIAGE — Conflict of Laws — Right of State to Determine Who Shall Marry. — Every state has the power to determine who shall assume or occupy the matrimonial relationship within its borders.

6. MARRIAGE — Conflict of Laws — Control Left to States. — The control and regulation of marriage for the purpose of promoting public morality and the moral and physical development of the parties is left to the states and not to the federal government, and in this control and regulation the states are fully sovereign and are foreign as to each other.

7. MARRIAGE — Validity — Conflict of Laws — Laws Repugnant to Policy of Forum State. — One state cannot force its own marriage laws, or other laws, on any other state, and no state is bound by comity to give effect in its courts to the marriage laws of another state, repugnant to its own laws and policy.

8. CONFLICT OF LAWS, DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE — Comity — Reason for Recognition Given Laws of Other States. — Such effect as may be given by a state to a law of another state is merely because of comity, or because justice and policy may demand recognition of such law. Such recognition is not a matter of obligation.

9. MARRIAGE — Validity — Conflict of Laws — Power of Legislature to Declare What Marriages Shall Be Void. — The Legislature is fully competent to declare what marriages shall be void in its own state, notwithstanding their validity in the state where celebrated, whether contracted between parties who were in good faith domiciled in the state where the ceremony was performed, formed, or between parties who left the state of domicile for the purpose of avoiding its statute, when they come or return to the state.

10. MARRIAGE — Validity — Effect of Void Marriage. — A void marriage confers no legal rights, and, when it is determined that the marriage is void, it is as if no marriage had ever been performed.

11. MARRIAGE — Validity — Voidable Marriage. — A voidable marriage differs from a void marriage in that it may be afterwards ratified by the parties and become valid and usually is treated as a valid marriage until it is decreed void.

12. MARRIAGE — Validity — Void Marriage Is Mere Nullity. — A void marriage is a mere nullity, and its validity may be impeached in any court whether the question arises directly or collaterally, and whether the parties be living or dead.

13. MARRIAGE — Validity — Rule under Common Law. — The rule of the common law is that the canonical impediments such as consanguinity, affinity and impotence render the marriage voidable, while the civil, such as a prior marriage, idiocy and the like, usually render it void.

14. MARRIAGE — Validity — Marriage Contracted under Belief that Former Husband Was Dead — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission dismissing appellant's claim for compensation for the death of her alleged husband, the evidence showed that claimant, under the erroneous impression that a former husband was dead, married the employee in West Virginia. Under section 5087 of the Code of 1936, the second marriage was absolutely void, while under the West Virginia Code, 1937, section 4701, such marriage was void only from the time it was so declared by decree of nullity.

Held: That the fact that claimant's second marriage was made in good faith, under a reasonable belief that her former consort was dead, might relieve her from a successful prosecution for bigamy, but would not render a void marriage valid.

15. MASTER AND SERVANT — Workmen's Compensation Act — Who May Recover — Party Married in West Virginia during life of Former Husband — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission dismissing appellant's claim for compensation for the death of her alleged husband, the evidence showed that claimant, under the erroneous impression that a former husband was dead, married the employee in West Virginia. Under section 5087 of the Code of 1936, the second marriage was absolutely void, while under the West Virginia Code, 1937, section 4701, such marriage was void only from the time it was so declared by decree of nullity.

Held: That the facts brought the case within the exceptions to the general rule of the validity of foreign marriages, in that the marriage of claimant to the deceased employee was both bigamous and contrary to the Virginia laws and public policy; the Virginia statutes do not recognize claimant as the legal widow of the deceased employee; and the action of the Industrial Commission in dismissing the claim was not erroneous.

Appeal from an order of the Industrial Commission of Virginia.

The opinion states the case.

S.H. & Geo. C. Sutherland, for the appellant.

Bandy & Bandy, for the appellee.

SPRATLEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission of Virginia, which dismissed the claim of the appellant, Martha Toler, for compensation for the death of her alleged husband, Raymond Toler. Raymond Toler died on April 29, 1938, as a result of injuries arising out of an accident to him in the course of his employment by the Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corporation, on the 14th day of April, 1938, in Buchanan county, Virginia.

The facts were not in dispute before the Commission. As stated by Commissioner Nickels, they are as follows:

"The record shows that claimant was married to J. M. Lawson in the year 1927, and that she lived with him for a period of five and one-half years. She separated from said Lawson and resided at various places thereafter. About four years after her separation from Lawson she married Raymond Toler, the deceased. She was married to him in Boone County, West Virginia, on March 27, 1937. Thereafter she and her second husband came to Virginia on April 14, 1937, where they had resided until the date of the foregoing fatal accident.

"The evidence of claimant shows that Raymond Toler, her last husband, had seen a newspaper article wherein it was related that her former husband, J. M. Lawson, had been killed in an automobile accident; that she had not instituted any divorce proceedings against her former husband, J. M. Lawson, and, so far as she knew, he had not instituted divorce suit against her; that the last marriage was solemnized in the belief that her former husband was dead. The record further shows this information to be incorrect, because witnesses were introduced who knew the said J. M. Lawson and who testified that he was still alive and a resident of the State of West Virginia."

The sole question for our decision is whether the claim of Mrs. Toler to be the lawful widow of Raymond Toler, and as such entitled to compensation provided by the law of Virginia for the widow of a deceased employee, shall be determined under the laws of West Virginia, the place of the celebration of her second marriage; or under the laws of Virginia, the forum State, and the residence of herself and Toler at the time of the latter's accident and death.

The precise question here presented has never been decided by this court; that is, no case has here been decided touching the validity of a marriage in another state, between citizens of that state, where such marriage, though prohibited is made void only from the time it may be so declared by a decree of nullity, and the parties so married afterwards came to Virginia, where the marriage between them is by statute declared absolutely void, and there resided together as man and wife.

An examination of the numerous cases bearing upon the subject of the validity of foreign marriages, especially as regards the essentials of marriage and the capacity of parties, discloses an amazing and perplexing diversity of judicial determination. As interesting as it may be to review those cases, we cannot, within the scope of this opinion, undertake to enter into a discussion of the varying factors and circumstances involved in a consideration of them. A mere reading of the cases and the authorities therein cited will direct the exploring investigator into a wide field of conflict of laws and opinions. The question before us must be settled upon general principles, and governed by our own statutes.

2-4 The general rule throughout the civilized world is that the law of the place of its celebration governs as to the form and ceremonies incident to marriage. Thus...