Tolleson Lumber Co. v. Kirk

Decision Date05 July 1991
Docket NumberNos. A91A0466,A91A0662,s. A91A0466
Citation200 Ga.App. 689,409 S.E.2d 260
PartiesTOLLESON LUMBER COMPANY et al. v. KIRK. AMERICAN INTERSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY et al. v. SOUTHERN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Lowendick & Speed, J. Wallace Speed, Charles G. Hoey, David C. Woll, Jr., Atlanta, for Tolleson Lumber and Lumbermen's Underwriting.

Malcolm G. Lindley, Macon, for Kirk.

Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Joseph A. Munger, Atlanta, for Smith and American Interstate Ins.

Jones, Cork & Miller, Rufus D. Sams, III, Dorothy J. Adams, Macon, for Southern General Ins.

COOPER, Judge.

We granted these discretionary appeals to address the issue of whether under OCGA § 34-9-206, a motor vehicle personal injury protection ("PIP") carrier which covered certain medical expenses of the claimant, can be a party at interest to a workers' compensation claim.

The claimant, Roy Kirk, filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits alleging an injury which arose in the course of his employment with his statutory employers Jackie Smith d/b/a Smith Trucking Company, George Smith d/b/a Smith Logging Company and Tolleson Lumber Company, Inc. While the claim was pending, Smith Trucking Company's PIP carrier, Southern General Insurance Company ("Southern General"), covered medical expenses incurred by claimant. Subsequently, the ALJ entered an order stating that upon request, Southern General was added as a party at interest to the claim. The original parties, claimant, his employers and their respective insurers, filed a joint objection to the joinder of Southern General as a party in interest on the grounds that OCGA § 34-9-206 only provided for joinder of a group insurance company or "other health care provider." The ALJ entered an order dismissing Southern General as a party at interest, concluding that the term "health care provider" as used in OCGA § 34-9-206 referred only to those entities which provided treatment. Southern General appealed the ALJ's decision to the full board and while the appeal was pending the full board approved a settlement agreement entered into between the original parties. Southern General was not a party to the settlement proceedings. Southern General then appealed the decision of the full board approving the settlement to the superior court. The superior court entered an order setting aside the decision of the full board approving the settlement and remanded the case to the full board for Southern General to be included as a party at interest. The superior court specifically found that Southern General was an "other health care provider" within the meaning of OCGA § 34-9-206. The full board apparently approved the settlement again, although this order is not in the record, and on appeal of that decision, the superior court entered another order setting aside the full board's approval of the settlement and again found that Southern General was an "other health care provider." In Case No. A91A0466, appellants, the employers and their respective insurers, appeal the superior court's first order setting aside the decision of the board, and in Case No. A91A0662, appellants appeal the superior court's second order.

1. Appellants first contend that the trial court erred in ruling that the full board did not have authority to approve the settlement while Southern General's appeal of the ALJ's decision dismissing Southern General as a party was pending before the full board. As an interested party, Southern General would have had the right to move for a hearing in the claimant's case. Also, under Rule 15(a) Southern General would have been included in the caption to the settlement agreement; therefore, Southern General could have made known to the board that it sought reimbursement for medical expenses paid on behalf of the claimant. Although the board in its discretion may have approved the settlement in spite of any objection it may have had to it, we conclude that the board's approval of the settlement while Southern General's appeal was pending deprived Southern General of any meaningful opportunity to exercise its rights as a party at interest. Therefore, we find appellant's first enumeration of error to be without merit.

2. Appellants next contend that the superior court erred in concluding that Southern General should be included as a party at interest within the meaning of OCGA § 34-9-206(a). Prior to the 1990 amendment, which is not applicable in this case, OCGA...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Massey v. Allstate Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • May 24, 2017
    ...context of other statutes and the common law); Abrohams , supra, 282 Ga.App. at 178 (1), 638 S.E.2d 330 ; Tolleson Lumber Co. v. Kirk , 200 Ga.App. 689, 691 (2), 409 S.E.2d 260 (1991) (a statute should be construed to "square with common sense and sound reasoning" and to avoid "unreasonable......
  • Ussery v. Goodrich Restoration, Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • May 16, 2017
    ...damages,1 or (b) that the client is entitled to the windfall that such an outcome would entail. See Tolleson Lumber Co. v. Kirk , 200 Ga.App. 689, 691, 409 S.E.2d 260 (1991) (a statute should be construed to "square with common sense and sound reasoning" and to avoid "unreasonable or absurd......
  • City of Atlanta v. Sumlin, A02A1232.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 14, 2002
    ...235 Ga. 201, 203, 219 S.E.2d 115 (1975); Boyles v. Steine, 224 Ga. 392, 395, 162 S.E.2d 324 (1968); Tolleson Lumber Co. v. Kirk, 200 Ga.App. 689, 691(2), 409 S.E.2d 260 (1991); Undercofler v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 114 Ga.App. 739, 742-743, 152 S.E.2d 768 (1966); Undercofler v. Capital Auto......
  • LFR Invs., LLC v. Van Sant
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • May 1, 2020
    ...or absurd consequences not contemplated by the legislature." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Tolleson Lumber Co. v. Kirk , 200 Ga. App. 689, 691 (2), 409 S.E.2d 260 (1991).Georgia law provides:As a matter of public policy, any contract entered into on or after July 1, 2008, for the per......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT