Tombal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange

• Decision Date: 05 February 1974
• Docket Number: No. 180,180
• Citation: 214 N.W.2d 291,62 Wis.2d 64
• Parties: Magdalen TOMBAL, Respondent, v. FARMERS INS. EXCHANGE, a foreign corp., et al., Appellants.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 291

214 N.W.2d 291

62 Wis.2d 64

Magdalen TOMBAL, Respondent, v. FARMERS INS. EXCHANGE, a foreign corp., et al., Appellants.

No. 180.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Feb. 5, 1974.

Everson, Whitney, O'Melia, Everson & Brehm, Green Bay, for appellants.

Bittner, Petitjean & Hinkfuss, Green Bay, for respondent.

BEILFUSS, Justice.

Two issues are presented in this appeal:

1. Did the court err in directing a verdict for the plaintiff as to liability issues?

2. Were the damages awarded by the jury excessive?

At 3 p.m., on Saturday, November 8, 1969, at the intersection of University Avenue and Henry Street in the city of Green Bay, a collision occurred between a 1962 Rambler sedan driven by the plaintiff-respondent, Mrs. Tombal, and a 1969 Ford station wagon driven by the defendant-appellant, Mrs. McKee. University Avenue is an arterial highway, 46 feet wide from curb line to curb line, and runs in an eastwest direction. Henry Street is 36 feet wide and runs in a north-south direction. The streets intersect at right angles and the view, insofar as material here, is unobstructed. The streets are straight and level. On Henry Street there are two stop signs about eight feet back of the intersection. One is at the curb line northwest of the intersection to signal drivers coming from the north, the other in the southeast corner. There is also an overhanging flashing signal in the center of the intersection. It flashes red for the northsouth traffic on Henry Street and amber for the east-west traffic on University Avenue. The streets were dry and the weather clear. The volume of traffic at the time in question was comparatively light.

Mrs. Tombal was traveling east on University Avenue and Mrs. McKee south on Henry Street.

Mrs. McKee stopped at the stop sign north of University Avenue, waited for a car to pass through the intersection traveling from east to west, looked both ways, saw nothing and proceeded slowly into the intersection. Her maximum speed before the collision was from five to 10 miles per hour. At no time prior to the impact did Mrs. McKee see the Tombal vehicle.

The collision occurred in the southwest quadrant of the intersection. The major damage to Mrs. McKee's vehicle was to the right front fender and right door; the damage to the Tombal vehicle was to its front end. The impact forced or pushed the McKee vehicle to the southeast corner of the intersection. Sliding or sideways-type tire skid marks were left on the pavement by the McKee vehicle. There were no skid marks attributable to the Tombal car either before or after the point of impact.

Mrs. Tombal's speed for a considerable distance from the point of impact was 20 to 25 miles per hour and there was no appreciable reduction in speed before the impact. She testified that when she was about two car lengths from the intersection she saw the McKee vehicle stopped at the stop sign and when she was about one car length from the intersection saw the McKee vehicle moving into the intersection. Mrs. Tombal had her headlights on and there is some testimony she blinked them. She also testified that just before the impact she applied her brakes and attempted to turn to the right but could not do so. Her vehicle did not deviate from its lane of travel before the impact.

From this evidence, upon motion by Mrs. Tombal's counsel, the trial court correctly found, as a matter of law, that Mrs. McKee was causally negligent as to lookout and failure to yield the right-of-way. The trial court further found that Mrs. Tombal was not negligent as to lookout, speed or management and control and, accordingly, directed the verdict for Mrs. Tombal on the liability issue.

'A case should be taken from the jury and a verdict directed against a party:

"'. . . only when the evidence gives rise to no dispute as to the material issues or only when the evidence is so clear and convincing as reasonably to permit unbiased and impartial minds to come to but one conclusion." Anderson v. Joint School Dist. (1964), 24 Wis.2d 580, 583, 129 N.W.2d 545, 547, (130 N.W.2d 105), citing Smith v. Pabst (1940), 233 Wis. 489, 288 N.W. 780, and Rusch v. Sentinel-News Co. (1933), 212 Wis. 530, 533, 250 N.W. 405.

'Also:

"A verdict ought to be directed if, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances as they appear in evidence, there is but one inference or conclusion that can be reached by a reasonable man.' City of Milwaukee v. Bichel, (1967), ante, 35 Wis.2d, p. 66, 150 N.W.2d 419.

'In determining whether or not the trial court was in error in failing to direct the verdict, this court must take that view of the evidence which is most favorable to the party . . . against whom the verdict was sought to be directed. Schumacher v. Klabunde (1963), 19 Wis.2d 83, 87, 119 N.W.2d 457; Mueller v. O'Leary (1935) 216 Wis. 585, 587, 257 N.W. 161. If there is any evidence to sustain a defense or a cause of action, the case must be submitted to the jury. Kielich v. Whittaker (1924), 183 Wis. 470, 198 N.W. 270. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence is for the jury (Jolitz v. Fintch (1938), 229 Wis. 256, 261, 282 N.W. 87), as is the weight to be given to the witness' positive or negative testimony. Conrardy v. Sheboygan County (1956), 273 Wis. 78, 82, 76 N.W.2d 560. Furthermore, it is basic that the credibility of the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are matters for the jury. Braatz v. Continental Casualty Co. (1956), 272 Wis. 479, 487, 76 N.W.2d 303. If there is any evidence other than mere conjecture or incredible evidence to support a contrary verdict, the case must go to the jury. Larson v. Splett (1954), 267 Wis. 473, 66 N.W.2d 181. Incredible evidence is evidence in conflict with the uniform course of nature or with fully established or conceded facts. Davis v. Skille (1961), 12 Wis.2d 482, 107 N.W.2d 458; Czerniakowski v. National Ice & Coal Co. (1948), 252 Wis. 112, 31 N.W.2d 156.' Zillmer v. Miglautsch (1967), 35 Wis.2d 691, 698, 699, 151 N.W.2d 741, 745. See also, Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin Southern Gas Co. (1970), 45 Wis.2d 471, 484, 485, 173 N.W.2d 610.

In directing a verdict, the trial court must ". . . view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party moved against. . . ." Bentzler v. Braun (1967), 34 Wis.2d 362, 370, 149 N.W.2d 626, 631.

The law is further clear that:

". . . while one may have a right of way and may presume others will respect it, he may nevertheless be negligent in respect to management and control if his right of way is not respected and he does not do what he can do to prevent the accident." Chille v. Howell (1967), 34 Wis.2d 491, 497, 149 N.W.2d 600, 603.

In recognition of this principle, Mrs. McKee's counsel argues there is credible evidence, if believed, that would support a finding that Mrs. Tombal was negligent in failing to apply her brakes, change her course of travel, sound her horn and in not increasing her caution or vigilance as required because of the warning afforded by the flashing amber light.

The trial court was of the opinion that because Mrs. Tombal had the right-of-way and saw Mrs. McKee's vehicle stopped, she had the right to assume Mrs. McKee would respect her right-of-way and when it was apparent that Mrs. McKee was not going to yield to Mrs. Tombal, she was confronted with an emergency not of her own making without sufficient time to take any effective defensive action that would avoid the collision. The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that Mrs. Tombal was entitled to the emergency doctrine as to management and control and that there was no other evidence of any negligence on her part.

The emergency doctrine is set forth as follows:

'The doctrine, as stated in Papacosta v. Papacosta (1957), 2 Wis.2d 175, 85 N.W.2d 790, is that a person faced with an emergency which his conduct did not create or help to create is not guilty of negligence in the methods he chose, or failed to choose, to avoid the threatened disaster if he is compelled to act instantly without time for reflection.' Seif v. Turowski (1970), 49 Wis.2d 15, 23, 181 N.W.2d 388, 392.

This court went on to say in Seif, supra, at page 24, 181 N.W.2d at page 392:

'. . . While the time factor is, of course, very important in determining whether a driver is entitled to the doctrine as a matter of law, it is not to be applied in a 'stop-watch' fashion. All of the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the accident and the driver's opportunity to respond to the danger must be considered. Several seconds in one instance might entitle the actor to the emergency doctrine as a matter of law, and a lesser time interval under different...