Tomko v. Hilbert, 13394.
Decision Date | 28 March 1961 |
Docket Number | No. 13394.,13394. |
Citation | 288 F.2d 625 |
Parties | Anthony TOMKO, Appellant, v. Paul HILBERT and Michael Kreheley. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Harry Alan Sherman, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.
J. Alfred Wilner, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Ines W. Cordisco, McKeesport, Pa., Ernest G. Nassar, Donald J. Lee, Wilner, Wilner & Kuhn, Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellees.
Before BIGGS, Chief Judge, and STALEY and HASTIE, Circuit Judges.
This appeal requires us to determine whether Title I ("bill of rights") of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA"), 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq., regulates the conduct of private individuals not acting as agents or representatives of any labor organization.
Tomko, appellant, commenced an action under the bill-of-rights section of the LMRDA for damages and an injunction, alleging that Hilbert and Kreheley, appellees, libeled and assaulted him, and that by means of threats, force and disorderly conduct, unlawfully interfered with his rights as a member and officer of Local 1408, an affiliate of the United Steelworkers of America ("USW"). The action was brought against appellees in their individual capacites, although both are officials of District 15 of the USW. Appellant does not allege that any labor organization or any officer or agent thereof acting in an official capacity has violated his rights under the bill of rights.
The district court dismissed the action because of the appellant's failure to exhaust the remedies provided for by the USW's constitution. This, appellant contends, was reversible error. We need not reach this question, however, for it is our conclusion that the LMRDA does not provide a civil remedy for the vindication of rights contained in the bill of rights against one who in violating such rights is not acting in the capacity of an official or agent of a labor union. This interpretation results not only from the language of the LMRDA, but from a consideration of its purpose, the evils it was meant to cure, its legislative history, and what few pertinent decisions are available.
The need for and purpose of enacting the LMRDA is clearly set forth in subsection 2(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 401(a), of the preamble, which states that in order to realize a free flow of commerce, "it is essential that labor organizations, employers, and their officials adhere to the highest standards of responsibility and ethical conduct in administering the affairs of their organizations, particularly as they affect labor-management relations." Subsection 2(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 401(b), shows that Congress concluded that as a result of certain investigations that had been conducted in the labor-management field, further and supplementary legislation was necessary to protect the rights and "interest of employees and the public generally as they relate to the activities of labor organizations, employers, labor relations consultants, and their officers and representatives." In subsection 2(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 401(c), Congress declared "that the enactment of this Act is necessary to eliminate or prevent improper practices on the part of labor organizations, employers, labor relations consultants, and their officers and representatives * * *."
The provisions with which we are chiefly concerned are contained in Title I. Under subsection 101(a) (1), 29 U.S. C.A. § 411(a) (1) every union member has equal rights and privileges of participation in the internal affairs of the union subject to reasonable rules and regulations of the union's constitution or bylaws. Subsection 101(a) (2), 29 U.S. C.A. § 411(a) (2) guarantees a union member the right of free speech and assembly as regards union activities, subject again, however, to any reasonable rules and regulations that a union may adopt to protect itself as an institution. Procedures for increasing dues, initiation fees, and levying assessments by the union are meticulously spelled out in subsection 101(a) (3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (3), while subsections 101(a) (4) and (5), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 411(a) (4) and (5), protect the member's right to sue the union and provide procedural safeguards for improper disciplinary action by the union. Sections 104 and 105, 29 U.S. C.A. §§ 414 and 415, require the union to provide its members with copies of the collective bargaining agreement and information concerning the provisions of the LMRDA. The civil enforcement provisions of the bill of rights, section 102, 29 U.S.C.A. § 412, provides that There is no indication here that the substantive provisions of the bill of rights can be enforced against any person as that term is defined in subsection 3(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 402(d).1 In contrast, Title II, 73 Stat. 524, 29 U.S.C.A. § 431 et seq., which imposes a duty on labor organizations, their officers and employees, and employers to prepare and file certain enumerated reports, can be enforced by a civil action under section 210, 29 U.S.C.A. § 440, against any person. Also, criminal sanctions are contained in section 610, 29 U.S.C.A. § 530, which makes it unlawful for any person through threats or the use of force or violence to attempt to or to in fact interfere with or prevent the exercise of any or all rights that a union member may have under any of the titles of the LMRDA. Section 609, 29 U.S.C.A. § 529, protects union members who attempt to enforce their rights under the LMRDA against recriminatory acts of labor organizations or their representatives and not the world at large.
A recapitulation of other pertinent provisions of the LMRDA clearly shows that its operation is narrowly focused on protecting the union-member relationship. Title II specifies certain reports that must be prepared and distributed by labor organizations, their officers, and employees, and employers.2 In Title III, Congress delineated with particularity the circumstances under which a trusteeship may be established and the administration of and powers possessed by a union in trusteeship.3 The frequency of and procedure for conducting elections for enumerated union officers is covered by Title IV.4 Safeguards for the preservation of union funds are contained in Title V, which prescribes a code of fiduciary responsibility on the part of union officers, disqualifies certain persons from holding office in a union or acting in other enumerated capacities, prohibits unions from paying fines incurred by its officers or employees, and greatly restricts loans that a union can make.5
A chronological review of the LMR DA's legislative history begins with the Kennedy-Ervin bill. It did not contain a bill-of-rights section.6 In referring to that bill, Senator McClellan said, during congressional debate:
7 (Emphasis supplied.)
During debate on the amendment that he proposed and that the Senate passed,8 Senator McClellan said:
"Mr. President, I do not believe that racketeering, corruption, abuse of power, and other improper practices on the part of some labor organizations can be, or will ever be, prevented until and unless the Congress of the United States has the wisdom and the courage to enact laws prescribing minimum standards of democratic process and conduct for the administration of internal union affairs."9 (Emphasis supplied).
While the amended Kennedy-Ervin bill was still in the Senate, the so-called Kuchel substitute was offered for the McClellan bill of rights, the substantive provisions of which were, however, in the main retained.10 From the debates that followed, it is clear that the Kuchel substitute was likewise limited to regulating the activities of unions and their officials and agents as they affect the union-member relationship.11
The House of Representatives in enacting the Landrum-Griffin bill as a substitute for the Senate bill retained the bill-of-rights provisions of the Senate bill with minor modification.12 During debate in the House, Representative Griffin, one of the floor managers, stated: "The labor reform legislation before the House at this time is directed at the regulation of the internal affairs of unions."13 Representative Derwinski brought congressional intent into sharp focus when in debate he said:
14
Earlier that same day, Representative Arends said:
* * *"15
After the conference committee reported, the Landrum-Griffin bill passed the Senate where during debate...
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...statute are additional to other rights of union members under state law." (Id. at p. 973, 121 Cal.Rptr. 423; see also Tomko v. Hilbert, supra, 288 F.2d 625, 629 ["Rights and remedies [the union member] may have under state law have not been preempted or affected by passage of the bill-of-ri......
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SAFE WORKERS'ORGANIZATION, CHAP. NO. 2 v. Ballinger
...etc., 237 Or. 130, 384 P.2d 136 (1963), cert. den. 376 U.S. 963, 84 S.Ct. 1125, 11 L.Ed.2d 981 (1964); also see Tomko v. Hilbert, 288 F.2d 625 (3rd Cir. 1961), and Holdeman v. Sheldon, 204 F.Supp. 890 (D.N.Y.1962), aff'd 311 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1962). As to Ohio law, see generally: 33 O.Jur.2d ......
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Thompson v. New York Central Railroad Company
...S.D.N.Y. 1960, 183 F.Supp. 750. The legislative history of the statute confirms the correctness of these decisions. See Tomko v. Hilbert, 3 Cir., 1961, 288 F.2d 625. Rulings elsewhere are to the same effect. See Rinker v. Local No. 24, Amalgamated Lithographers, W.D.Pa.1962, 201 F.Supp. 204......
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Koenig v. Clark, Civ. A. No. 79-2209.
...action for failure to exhaust internal union remedies will be denied. 6. "Private Misconduct" Relying upon the case of Tomko v. Hilbert, 288 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1961), the individual defendants argue that the action should be dismissed as to them because plaintiff has failed to allege that th......