Tomlinson v. Dole

• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Writing for the Court: Thomas, J.
• Docket Number: KNL-CV-24-6065160-S
• Decision Date: 05 November 2025
• Citation: Tomlinson v. Dole, KNL-CV-24-6065160-S (Conn. Super. Nov 05, 2025)
• Parties: AMANDA TOMLINSON ET AL. v. PAMELA DOLE

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AMANDA TOMLINSON ET AL. v. PAMELA DOLE

No. KNL-CV-24-6065160-S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New London, New London

November 5, 2025

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR REMITTITUR AND MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT

Thomas, J.

The defendant, Pamela Dole, moves for remittitur of the noneconomic damages awarded to the plaintiffs arguing that the awards are excessive and punitive in nature. The defendant further moves to set aside the common law and statutory recklessness verdicts that were entered by the jury against her. The plaintiffs, Amanda Tomlinson and her two children, Keira and Penelope Tomlinson, object to both motions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at trial, the jury could have reasonably found the following facts by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The plaintiffs, . Amanda Tomlinson and her two minor daughters Keira and Penelope were traveling in the plaintiff's car on or about January 31, 2022, at approximately 5:01 p.m. on Route 2 in Preston Connecticut. The plaintiff Amanda Tomlinson was operating a 2020 Ford Escape motor vehicle in a generally westbound direction with her two minor children traveling as passengers in that vehicle. The defendant, Pamela Dole, was operating a 2002 Honda Accord motor vehicle in a generally eastbound direction at the same time when, suddenly and without warning, the defendant crossed the center line and collided head-on with the motor vehicle operated by the Plaintiff Amanda Tomlinson, causing serious losses and injuries to the plaintiffs. The defendant admitted that while proceeding on Route 2, she crossed the center line and collided head-on with the motor vehicle operated by the plaintiff Amanda Tomlinson, in which the minor plaintiffs Keira and Penelope Tomlinson were passengers. The Defendant also admitted that she failed to keep and operate the motor vehicle under proper control. At trial, the defendant admitted negligence but denied that her actions rose to the level of statutory or common law recklessness.

The jury returned a verdict on June 9, 2025 for the plaintiffs on all of their negligence counts. The jury further found for all three plaintiffs on their statutory recklessness claims but did not award double or triple damages. The jury further found the defendant to be reckless under common law and instructed the court to award punitive damages to the plaintiffs. The jury awarded each plaintiff tire following damages:

Amanda Tomlinson

Keira Tomlinson (minor)

Penelope Tomlinson (minor)

Economic Damages (Medical and Lost Wages): $29,408.25

Economic Damages: $3,941.52

Economic Damages: $8,357.77

Noneconomic Damages: $450,000.00

Noneconomic Damages: $75,000.00

Noneconomic Damages: $225,000.00

Total Damages: $479,408.25

Total Damages:$78,941.52

Total Damages: $233,357.77

The defendant did not contest, at trial, the plaintiffs' respective economic damages claims. She contests the jury's findings of common law and statutory recklessness and award of noneconomic damages as to each of the plaintiffs.

The jury could reasonably have found that the defendant was traveling at an excessive rate of speed for the circumstances and conditions at the time of the accident. The jury could also have reasonably inferred from the testimony that the defendant was traveling in excess of the speed limit. A witness traveling directly behind the defendant at the time of the accident testified that he was traveling the speed limit, and that the defendant appeared to be traveling at the same or a higher rate of speed, such that he could not catch up with the defendant. He further testified that he observed the defendant's vehicle "fishtail" while she temporarily lost control of her vehicle just before the accident, then regain control momentarily, only to lose control again immediately thereafter, cross the center line and collide head-on with the plaintiffs' vehicle. At the time of this accident, the defendant was traveling on an upward incline, approaching a truck that was stopped at the top of the hill waiting to take a left turn. The witness testified that he was able to see the track clearly and for several hundred feet in advance, so the defendant had ample opportunity to bring her vehicle to a controlled stop if she had been traveling at a reasonable speed. The defendant engaged her brakes just before reaching the track and crossed the center yellow line to hit the plaintiffs' vehicle head-on. It was dark at the time of the accident, and the roads were wet and covered in snow and slush. A responding police officer, Officer Sulich, also concluded that the defendant was traveling too fast for the conditions at the time, based upon his review of the conditions, tire track marks, and the extent of the damage to both vehicles. The defendant was observed to be confused at the scene of the accident and noncooperative with the police in the hospital thereafter.

The plaintiffs and their witnesses were generally credible, forthcoming, consistent, and sincere in their testimony. The jury could have reasonably credited the testimony of the plaintiffs, the accident witness and investigating officer concerning the circumstances of the accident and concluded from the consideration of all of the evidence that the defendant had behaved recklessly in causing the accident. The defendant presented as combative, evasive, and offered very limited testimony. The defendant claimed that she had little or no memory of the accident and offered little detail to counter the plaintiffs' claims and supporting evidence that the defendant was reckless. In failing to counter or effectively dispute the presentation made by the plaintiffs, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant could not dispute the plaintiffs' claims and evidence that she was reckless.

In considering all of the evidence and testimony, the jury could reasonably have found that the defendant acted recklessly in her actions leading to and causing the accident. The jury could have reasonably found, as the plaintiffs alleged, that the plaintiff recklessly: operated her vehicle in a dangerous and erratic fashion at an unreasonable rate of speed for the traffic and road conditions, and crossed the center line into plaintiffs' path of travel thereby colliding with plaintiffs' vehicle; ignored the danger of entering the plaintiffs' path of travel without ensuring it was safe to do so; clearly saw the plaintiff traveling towards her and chose to ignore it; had sufficient time to react and make the decision to stop and/or avoid the collision but continued to cross the center line; continued to cross the center line unlawfully and intercepted plaintiffs' path of travel; continued to cross the yellow line while driving a very heavy vehicle capable of destroying other vehicles lawfully in the lane; and violated the motor vehicle laws of the State of Connecticut operating the motor vehicle at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable without regard for the width of traffic and use of highway, intersection of streets and weather conditions in violation of Connecticut law.

Where the evidence demonstrated that the defendant temporarily lost control of her vehicle while traveling at an unreasonable rate of speed before the accident, regained control briefly, only to then fail to bring her vehicle to a safe stop in anticipation of tire truck that was stopped at the top of the incline, the jury could reasonably have found the defendant reckless in her conduct. These facts certainly support a finding that the defendant made a conscious choice to engage in a course of action with knowledge that it would involve serious danger to others or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable person.

The jury could also have reasonably found that the defendant violated several statutes deliberately and with reckless disregard in her conduct causing the accident, including: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-222 concerning reckless operation of a motor vehicle without regard to the traffic and use of the roadways and the weather conditions; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-218a prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable having regard for the width, traffic and use of the highway, and weather conditions; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-230 requiring the operator of a motor vehicle to drive her vehicle on the right side of the highway; and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-236 requiring operation of a motor vehicle in the established proper lane. The defendant admitted or did not otherwise refute the allegations of these statutory violations. The jury could then have reasonably found recklessness from the evidence concerning the defendant's conduct and actions causing the accident.

At the scene of the accident, all of tire airbags in the plaintiff's vehicle were deployed, the car was enveloped in steam and smoke, and the minor plaintiffs Keira and Penelope were heard screaming in the back seat of the car. Because the airbags had been deployed, the resting position of tire plaintiff's vehicle, and damage to the vehicle, the plaintiff Amanda Tomlinson could not immediately get to her children, and it was difficult for all of the plaintiffs to exit the vehicle. Both the plaintiff and defendant's vehicles sustained significant and disabling damage. All of the plaintiffs testified to the emotional harm they experienced at the scene of tire accident, as well as from their continued memories of tire accident. Plaintiff Amanda Tomlinson testified to her experiences of not being able to see or reach her crying and screaming children at the scene of tire accident, of being trapped in the vehicle because of deployed airbags.

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