Toni M. v. Kijakazi

• Decision Date: 23 November 2022
• Docket Number: 6:22-CV-02007-LRR
• Parties: TONI M., Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

TONI M., Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 6:22-CV-02007-LRR

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division

November 23, 2022

ORDER

LINDA R. READE JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.

I. INTRODUCTION

II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

III. ALJ's FINDINGS

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

V. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

VI. ANALYSIS

1. Whether the ALJ Articulated Sufficient Reasons to Find the Opinions of the Medical Expert, Dr. Williams, Unpersuasive

2. Whether the ALJ Articulated Sufficient Reasons to Find the Opinions of the Consultative Examiner, Dr. Guevara, Unpersuasive

3. Whether The ALJ Erred by Not Fully and Fairly Developing the Record Regarding Plaintiff's Physical Limitations

4. Whether the ALJ Properly Considered Plaintiff's Subjective Complaints of Pain

5. Whether the ALJ that Decided Plaintiff's Claim was Constitutionally Appointed by Acting Commissioner Berryhill During Berryhill's Second Term as Acting Commissioner

VII. CONCLUSION

I. INTRODUCTION

The matter before the court is the Complaint (docket no. 1) filed by Plaintiff Toni M. (“Plaintiff”), requesting judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's (“Commissioner”) decision to deny her application for Title II disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under 42 U.S.C. Sections 401-434 and Title XVI supplemental security income (“SSI”) under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1381-1385. Plaintiff asks that the court reverse the decision of the Commissioner and order the Commissioner to provide her disability insurance and/or supplemental security income benefits. In the alternative, Plaintiff asks that the court remand this matter for further proceedings.

II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 13, 2019, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for SSI and on June 14, 2019 filed an application for DIB, with both alleging disability due to anxiety, arthritis, bulging disc, depression, panic attacks and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Administrative Record (“R”) at 305, 317, 342. Plaintiff claims that she became disabled on April 27, 2019. Id. at 317. Her applications were denied upon initial review and on reconsideration. Id. at 183, 198, 203. On April 7, 2021, Plaintiff appeared with her attorney for a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Susan Toth (“ALJ”). Id. at 75-114. In a decision dated June 29, 2021, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claims. Id. at 10-34. On July 13, 2021, Plaintiff appealed the ALJ's decision, and the Appeals Council denied review on January 6, 2022. Id. at 1-6, 297.

On March 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant action for judicial review. See docket no. 1. A briefing schedule was entered on May 26, 2022. See docket no. 11. On August 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Plaintiff's Brief (“Plaintiff's Brief”) (docket no. 13). On September 23, 2022, the Commissioner filed the Defendant's Brief (“Commissioner's Brief”) (docket no. 14). On October 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Reply Brief (docket no. 15).

Additionally, on August 10, 2022, the parties filed the Joint Statement of Facts (docket no. 12). The matter is fully submitted and ready for decision.

III. ALJ's FINDINGS

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability insurance benefits or supplemental security income benefits because she was functionally capable of performing work available in the general economy. R at 26. In making this determination, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential process required by the social security regulations for assessing whether a claimant is under a disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); Swink v. Saul, 931 F.3d 765, 769 (8th Cir. 2019); Moore v. Colvin, 769 F.3d 987, 988 (8th Cir. 2014). The five steps an ALJ must consider are 1) whether the claimant is currently employed; (2) whether the claimant is severely impaired; (3) whether the impairment is or approximates an impairment listed in Appendix 1; (4) whether the claimant can perform past relevant work; and, if not, (5) whether the claimant can perform any other kind of work. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). “If a claimant fails to meet the criteria at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not disabled.” Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 2006).

In considering the steps in the five-step process, the ALJ:

first determines if the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not disabled. Second, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a severe medical impairment that has lasted, or is expected to last, at least 12 months. Third, the ALJ considers the severity of the impairment, specifically whether it meets or equals one of the listed impairments. If the ALJ finds a severe impairment that meets the duration requirement, and meets or equals a listed impairment, then the claimant is disabled. However, the fourth step asks whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to do past relevant work. If so, the claimant can perform other jobs in the economy. If so, the claimant is not disabled.

Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 537 (8th Cir. 2010). At the fourth step, the claimant “bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to return to [his] or her past relevant work.” Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963, 971 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir. 2009)). If the claimant is unable to return to his relevant past work, then, at step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that “the claimant has the physical residual functional capacity [(“RFC”)] to perform a significant number of other jobs in the national economy that are consistent with [his or] her impairments and vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience.” Phillips v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 699, 702 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Holley v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 2001)). The RFC is the most an individual can do despite the combined effect of all of his or her credible limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.925(a); Toland v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir. 2014). The ALJ bears the responsibility for determining “a claimant's RFC based on all the relevant evidence, including the medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual's own description of [his or] her limitations.” Myers v Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 527 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.

In the case at bar, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through June 30, 2024. R at 16. The ALJ then applied the first step of the analysis and determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from her alleged onset date of April 27, 2019. Id. At the second step, the ALJ concluded from the medical evidence that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: lumbar spine degenerative disc disease, degenerative changes of the hips and symphysis pubis, chronic pain syndrome, obesity, unspecified psychosis, major depressive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder(PTSD), generalized anxiety disorder (“GAD”), panic disorder with agoraphobia, attention-deficit-hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) and personality disorder. Id. At the third step, the ALJ found that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Id. At the fourth step, the ALJ determined that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff had the capacity to perform less than the full range of light work, specifically finding:

[Plaintiff] can lift, carry, push and/or pull 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She can stand or walk in combination for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday with normal breaks and can sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday with normal breaks. [Plaintiff] can occasionally climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes and scaffolds, and can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. [Plaintiff] should have no more than occasional exposure to vibration and hazards such as unprotected heights and machinery with moving mechanical parts. She can perform simple, routine repetitive tasks and can maintain concentration and persistence commensurate with those tasks for 2-hour periods of time. [Plaintiff] can have occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors and the general public but should not perform tasks in tandem or as an integral part of a team and should not provide customer service to the general public. She can adapt to occasional changes in the work setting which are consistent with the aforementioned limitations.

Id. at 18. Also at the fourth step, the ALJ determined that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff was not able to perform her past relevant work as an accounts payable clerk, a restaurant hostess, and a salesperson. Id. at 24, 107-109. At the fifth step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was capable of performing jobs available in the national economy as a merchandise marker, a photocopy machine operator and a linen supply load builder. Id. at 25. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id. at 26.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner's final determination not to award disability insurance benefits is subject to judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The court has the power to “enter . . . a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner. . . with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” Id. The Commissioner's factual findings shall be...